JPRS-TAC-86-082 10 OCTOBER 1986

### Worldwide Report

# ARMS CONTROL

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# JPRS-TAC-86-082 10 OCTOBER 1986

## WORLDWIDE REPORT

## ARMS CONTROL

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

### SOVIET REACTIONS TO JAPANESE DECISION ON SDI PARTICIPATION

Decision 'No Surprise'

OW100425 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1045 GMT 9 Sep 86

[From "The World Today" Program presented by Valeriy Korzin]

[Text] A report from Japan comes as no surprise to people constantly following international events. The Japanese Government today officially decided to participate in the U.S. star wars program. This was announced by Masaharu Gotoda, secretary general of the Cabinet, after a Cabinet meeting. I say that this is not some kind of extraordinary revelation, comrades, because the decision adopted by Japan is not, strictly speaking, a surprise. Things were leading up to it, although little by little and without haste This is not because of certain peculiarities of the Japanese but the result of absolutely precise calculations. Observers have long said that Nakasone favors the militarization of space. He dragged his feet because, first, he wanted to carry out elections, and only then to officially put on Washington's militarist harness. We should not forget, of course, that the land of the rising sun and its people lived through Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nakasone could not fail to consider the antiwar and antinuclear sentiments of most Japanese people. Time was needed to prepare public opinion.

Hence, the decision to join the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] was preceded by a lengthy propagandist and political preparation. At first the Japanese premier -besides he was the first among the leaders of the Western countries to do so -expressed understanding of the U.S. star wars program. After some time the ruling clique announced that participation in this program does not contradict the 1969 parliamentary resolution limiting space research to purely peaceful purposes. At the same time the scientific and technical advantages to Tokyo resulting from its participation in the Pentagon's space project were lauded high and low and its dangerous militarist essence concealed. Now the decision has been adopted. You could say that the green light has been switched on for the participation of private companies in star wars, but apparently government scientific and technical organizations will follow suit. Gotoda's statement has again reiterated the tiresome and ludicrous arguments of the Reagan administration that SDI is supposedly aimed at radically reducing nuclear arms. Now, strictly speaking, there is no cause for surprise, for having agreed to take part in the militarization of space the Japanese generals are forced to dance to the American military flute. And, I should say, this flute is getting louder and louder. Yesterday in Hawaii Kurihara, director general of the Japanese Defense Agency, who was concluding his visit to the United States, met Admiral Hayes, commander of U.S. military forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. The press notes that during this meeting frank appeals to Japan to increase its military efforts in the framework of the aggressive U.S. strategy in this region were

voiced Hayes simply insisted that the Japanese Government allocate additional funds for the maintenance of the 50,000-strong U.S. expeditionary force presently deployed in Japan, and demanded that the new aerodrome to be used for training purposes by U.S. Seventh Fleet carrier aircraft be made available to the Pentagon at an early date. It should be noted that throughout his visit to the United States both U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Vice President Bush, and other administration leaders, as a matter of fact, called on Tokyo with unprecedented harshness, as the YOMIURI newspaper reported, to take new steps towards militarization. Kurihara, according to reports, accepted these demands with understanding, and this understanding is being confirmed with concrete actions. The Japanese Defense Agency has at any rate requested military allocations for the next financial year that considerably exceed the agency's budget for this year.

#### Foreign Ministry Statement

LD111046 Moscow TASS in English 1039 GMT 11 Sep 86

["Statement by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS — Today the ambassador of Japan to the USSR was summoned to the USSR ministry of Foreign Affairs where the following statement was made to him:

"Recently the Government of Japan announced a decision to enter into negotiations with the U.S. Administration about Japan's participation in the realization of the U.S. SDI program. Thereby a practical step was taken toward drawing Japan into the implementation of the U.S. plans aimed at developing space strike weapons and at transferring the arms race to outer space. The Japanese Government's allusions to the ostensibly defensive nature of research under the SDI cannot be recognized as convincing. A large-scale anti-missile defense system with space-based elements, which is being developed under the SDI program, is part and parcel of a unified offensive complex the purpose of which is to ensure military superiority for the United States. The emergence of such a system would give a new impulse to the arms race in all directions, primarily to the build-up and sophistication of nuclear arsenals. The American plans still further complicate the entire process of real disarmament while attempts at implementing them, as the Soviet Union has repeatedly warned, are leading to destabilization of the strategic situation, which is fraught with extremely dangerous and, possibly, irreversible consequences.

"It is also clear that the development of space strike weapons is by no means a way to ensure scientific and technological progress, as is being unfoundedly asserted by some people in Japan, but, on the contrary, is the siphoning off of colossal intellectual and material resources from a solution to the urgent problems facing mankind. The decision taken by the Japanese Government obviously runs counter to its statements about readiness to act for the purposes of strengthening peace, easing international tension, and promoting progress in the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms. Neither does Japan's participation in the SDI tally with its officially proclaimed three non-nuclear principles, as well as with Tokyo's declared defence concept of the country's military policy. Moreover, it objectively creates a qualitatively new channel for the realisation of the U.S. militarist designs to turn the Far East and the entire Asian-Pacific region, where Japan is situated, into a sphere of increased military confrontation."

"The consent to join Japanese economic, scientific and technical potential to the U.S. "star wars" program cannot be viewed otherwise than an evidence of Japan's further involvement in the U.S. military-strategic plans. The Japanene Government bears responsibility for possible dangerous consequences of such policy. This, of course, cannot but have a negative effect on Soviet-Japanese relations. One would like to hope that the Japanese side will give due attention to this address and will draw practical conclusions which will really confirm its statements in favour of strengthening peace and curbing the arms race. Only such a stand would meet the interests of all peoples, including those of the Japanese one".

The ambassador said that the statement would be immediately delivered to the Government of Japan.

KYODO: USSR Warns Japan of 'Consequences'

OW120043 Tokyo KYODO in English 0031 GMT 12 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow, 11 Sep KYODO--The Soviet Union officially warned Japan Thursday that Tokyo's decision to participate in research for the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] will have a negative effect on Japanese-Soviet relations.

A statement, conveyed by Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa to Japanese Ambassador Yasue Katori to Moscow at the foreign ministry of the Soviet Union, said that the Japanese government bears responsibility for possible dangerous consequences of its decision join the United States in research for the spacebased "star wars" antimissile program.

Katori later told reporters the Soviet Union did not specify what it might have meant by "a negative effect." The Soviet Union lodged a similar protest with Britain and West Germany when they announced their decisions to take part in the SDI research late last year.

The statement said that the SDI is part of the U.S. offensive system aimed at securing military advantage. The plan acts as a new stimulation to the arms race, it said.

Japan's decision to take part in the SDI research runs counter to its own declarations that it is ready to help promote progress in the U.S.-Soviet talks on nuclear and space arms, the statement said.

It further said Japan had contradicted its own non-nuclear policy and policy of maintaining forces solely for defensive purposes.

Katori told Kapitsa that the Soviet Union did not seem to have fully understood the Japanese decision.

There has been no change in the Japanese stance aimed ultimately at abolishing nuclear arms, he said.

#### Japan Backs U.S. Arms Escalation

OW141045 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 11 Sep 86

[Station Commentator Nikolayev commentary on Japan's participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative Plan]

[Text] [Nikolayev] For the time being, Washington and a number of its allies are unlikely to have a sense of responsibility and a sense of important issues in dealing with world problems anew. The United States did not have a halt to nuclear experiments in mind when the Soviet Union recently announced that it would again extend its moratorium on nuclear tests until the end of this year. In Washington, everyone's mind was preoccupied with the idea of developing the "star wars" plan.

As this indicates, because of the SDI plan, which has already entered the experimental stage, the United States could not halt nuclear tests, and this, consequently, has hampered nuclear disarmament. However, the problem does not stop here. The SDI presupposes the development of new nuclear weapons and their introduction into outer space. The "star wars" plan widens distrust among nations, makes it exceedingly difficult to reach any settlement concerning nuclear weapons, and increasingly undermines strategic stability.

Considering Japan's participation under these circumstances, we can only surmise that Japan has virtually supported the U.S. line of radically escalating a nuclear arms race. The Japanese people are always apprehensive that the government may ignore their support for a strict observance of nonnuclear principles and other peace policies. However, it has now become clear that the Japanese Government gives priority to Washington's interests over those of the Japanese people.

Japan has gradually been dragged into the SDI in the past two years. Many private enterprises in Japan have been producing and supplying electronic devices to the Pentagon for SDI use, in accordance with Government policy. As is widely known, business leaders in Japan have made fairly active moves to secure Japan's participation in the SDI. It is not possible technological innovations, but profits from U.S. orders that has strongly attracted them.

As a U.S. military expert said at the London International Institute for Strategic Studies' meeting in Kyoto, Japan will probably be disappointed if it hopes that participation in the SDI will abve economically stimulating effects. High-ranking government officials say that Japan's participation in the SDI by no means conflicts with its security. However, this is a nonsensical idea.

Only the abolition of nuclear arms will save mankind. By participating in the SDI, the Japanese Government has thrown cold water on this possibility. The reason is simply that it wanted to show its loyalty to the U.S. Government and the U.S. military-industrial complex.

#### Japan Scientific Council Cited

LD111215 Moscow TASS in English 1204 GMT 11 Sep 86

[Text] Tokyo, 11 Sep, TASS--Japan's Scientific Council, uniting the country's prominent scientists, strongly renounces any participation of Japanese scientists in research within the American "star wars" programme, the Council's statement says.

The council warns that Japan's joining the programme will inevitably militarize Japanese science and technology and the top secret nature of the SDI research will seriously hinder scientific and technological progress in civilian fields.

The statement stresses that the Scientific Council is determined to launch a big anti-"star wars" campaign in Japan.

Marchuk, Nakasone Discuss SDI

LD121204 Moscow TASS in English 1130 GMT 12 Sep 86

[Text] Tokyo September 12 TASS — Guriy Marchuk, a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and chairman of the State Committee of the USSR for Science and Technology, today had a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. The sides had a thorough exchange of opinions on a broad range of questions of Soviet—Japanese relations. Marchuk noted the mutually beneficial character of broader relations between the USSR and Japan in the political, economic and other fields and stressed the Soviet Union's readiness to work towards that goal, naturally, if the Japanese side shows a similar approach.

In this context the Soviet side presented the Soviet Union's principled attitude to Japan's recent decision to contribute to the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative. It was noted specifically that the above decision obviously was at odds with the declarations of the Japanese Government on its readiness to work for stronger peace and lower international tensions and to contribute to the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

The Japanese prime minister noted substantial opportunities for the broadening and development of contacts between the Soviet Union and Japan in different fields and stressed the intention of his government to work for broader political dialogue with the Soviet Union. Nakasone's statements on Japan's participation in SDI virtually boiled down to attempts to rationalise this decision by arguments about its "defensive character."

The Soviet Union's ambassador to Japan, Nikolay Solovev, took part in the conversation.

#### PRAVDA Commentary

LD130526 Moscow TASS in English 0523 GMT 15 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS — By deciding to take part in the U.S. "star wars" program, "official quarters in Tokyo took a practical step to complicity in developing space strike weapons", Commentator Vsevolod Ovchinnikov said in the newspaper PRAVDA today. He said "the claims of the allegedly 'defensive' nature of the U.S. 'star wars' program cannot be considered convincing" because "the large-scale, partially space-based ABM system has been conceived as part of an integral offensive combination of weapons meant to assure the United States of military superiority".

"Work on the SDI program will escalate the arms race in all areas and extend it to outer space. This will only complicate the arms limitation process even further and destabilize the strategic situation and can have dangerous and perhaps irreversible consequences," the commentator said.

"This is why the Japanese Government's decision clearly contradicts its expressed readiness to help strengthen peace, lower international tension and facilitate progress in Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms," he added.

Ovchinnikov said Washington needed Tokyo's political backing to put down the wave of anti-war campaigns in allied countries as it would make it possible to claim that if even the country of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with its "nuclear allergy" did not shy away from taking part in the SDI, there could be no doubts about the latter's "defensive" purpose.

The U.S. developers of space weaponry, the commentator added, also wanted to harness Japan's scientific, technological and industrial potential to further their own effort. Finally, Japan's participation in the SDI was obviously at odds with its "three non-nuclear principles" and the status of its Armed Forces, which were officially called "a self-defense force", and so Washington hoped apparently also to do away both with those principles and that status at one go.

"The consent to share in the 'star wars' program is evidence of Japan becoming involved in U.S. strategic military designs even more deeply and will objectively facilitate American plans to make the Far East and the whole of the Asian-Pacific region into an arena for military confrontation," Ovchinnikov said.

"All this, of course," he added, "can only have a negative effect on the development of the Soviet-Japanese relationship. The onus for the dangerous consequences of the short-sighted step is fully on the Japanese Government."

/7358 CSO: 5200/1592 SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALIAN FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER CRITICIZES SDI

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 7 Sep 86 p 16

[Article by Rocco Di Blasi: "A More United European Left?"]

[Text] Cervetti and the socialist minister in conference after the SPD congress.

Milan-"I believe that the SDI, the space shield, serves only the needs of the American military-industrial bloc. It provides no safety. Therefore, not only must it not be supported; it must be opposed. In fact, it blocks immense resources that could be used otherwise, and at the same time this kind of military research provides no positive fallout for the life of civilian society." Rino Formica, new foreign trade minister and leading PSI spokesman, takes another concrete step forward in the dialog on programs that day by day is becoming more involved at the Milan Festival.

And he does it in the course of an initiative that highlights a very current matter: are mutual objectives among the parties of the European left possible? And which ones?

Introduced by Piero Borghini, the discussion is developed on two levels. In fact, present in the hall with Formica are Gianni Cervetti, chairman of the Communist group, members of the European Parliament, and Juan Francisco Pla, member of the executive committee of the Spanish Communist Party. But also expected are filmed interviews of leaders of the European left, like German Social Democrat Peter Glotz, French Socialist Lionel Jospin, Labor Party member Denis Healy, Spanish Communist Iglesias (made for the Turin European Festival where, together with others, they will be shown this evening).

And it is precisely a comment by Peter Glotz that emphasizes the need for leftist forces to quicken their pace. "There are only 15 years to the year 2000. If we do not take decisive steps before then, Old Europe will become a colonial land. We must protect the identity of European culture from Americanization and advance toward a true European market. Today, the European left exists only in theory. It is not yet capable of joint actions: foreign policy, reduction in working hours, economic policy. Greater mutual

contacts among us are needed. Let us encourage dialog. Otherwise, to use one of Gramsci's ideas, the hegemony of the right will hang over Europe."

Well, then, there is a need of acceleration. But at what point are we? "I believe," replies Gianni Cervetti, "that right now political positions are drawing closer to each other. It seems to me that the European left is more like a constellation than a monolith. But this is a positive element. The important thing is to work on possible agreements, without wiping out the richness of any individual force and pluralism. Important agreements have been reached regarding the European role in a peace policy."

As is natural, there is also talk of the recent SPD congress. Says Formica: "I would not want us to discover some planet and take a fancy to some socialist party: once Mitterrand, now the SPD. I believe that the fact the Social Democrats are in the opposition and want to regain the majority troubled the recent German congress. In any case, Glotz is right when he maintains that the European left's real weakness lies in the scant search for mutual positions. The SPD has set itself a big objective: the reconciliation of Kautsky and Lenin, the reuniting of the left and Europe, itself, from the Atlantic to the Urals. But let us keep our feet on the ground, rather than allow ourselves to hover in the realm of hopes, even legitimate ones."

Therefore, acceleration of consultation in the European left is needed. "But," asks Piero Borghini, "in the meantime what is Italy to do?

"I hope," replies Cervetti, "that a misunderstanding will be cleared up. We have often been accused of seeking unitary relations in Bonn and not in Rome. And we, ourselves, have considered some Italian socialist remarks to be an act of jealousy. Once these mutual suspicions are elimated, we can deal more openly with current questions in Italy: programs, strategies, economic policy choices on which it is possible to agree. I do not believe that there is any use of dealing unrealistically with the times. Still, new leftist relations are crucial, not by the year 2000, but as soon as possible. It is necessary that we go to the next electoral campaign (in a year and a half or whenever it takes place) with elements of agreement among the forces of the Italian left."

The foreign trade minister agrees. "Our next congress must deal with questions of strategy. We must take advantage of the possibility offered by the Communist congress of Florence. Not only that; we must also help to link the PCI with all of the European socialist parties. Jealousies are of no use; on the contrary, they are rear guard elements. Why become annoyed if Luciana Castellina is invited to a round table during the SPD congress?

Instead, we must work for a recomposition of the left in our country, because it is important to the aims of strengthening democracy. Italy's left is strong, but it is less influential than elsewhere, because it is divided.

The discussion ends here. But the newsmen are still interested in Formica's position regarding the space shield. As a matter of fact, Italian socialists up to now had expressed themselves differently from other parties of the Socialist International. The minister was asked if it was a question of a personal attitude. "Regarding this," he replies, "there is no official PSI position, because our latest congress is the precedent." But have not some contracts already been authorized by the government? "No military contract. I repeat, many American scientists believe that the 'shield' is useless. We must keep these opinions in mind."

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CSO: 5200/2773

#### SDI AND SPACE ARMS

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#### HONG KONG COMMENTARY ON REAGAN'S UN SPEECH

HK231042 Hong Kong HSIN WAN PAO in Chinese 23 Sep 86 p 6

["Evening Talk" column by Yang Chu [5017 2612]: "Deferring for From 5 to 7 Years Is Nothing but a Gimmick"]

'[Text] Soft and Firm Tone [subhead]

When President Reagan was talking about the issue of U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament in his speech delivered at the UN General Assembly, his tone was soft. When he talked about the affairs of American reporter Daniloff, he spoke with a firm tone.

He revealed that in a proposal submitted by the United States to the Soviet Union on nuclear disarmament he had even agreed to delay the deployment of the "star wars" defense system.

The United States Is Prepared To Consider It [subhead]

With regard to offensive nuclear weapons, Reagan stressed:

- 1. The United States still hoped that the Soviet Union would agree to a 50 percent reduction in the arsenals of both sides, with the emphasis on a reduction of the nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles. However, if the Soviet Union wanted only a lesser reduction, the United States was prepared to consider it. The percentage of reduction was not restricted to 50 percent.
  - 2. With regard to medium-range nuclear weapons, the United States proposed that they be totally destroyed worldwide. However, if the Soviet Union disagreed with this, the United States was willing to sign an interim agreeement with the Soviet Union with aim of abolishing medium-range nuclear weapons stage by stage.

Completely Different From the Previous Tune [subhead]

All these remarks were mild and indirect, which differed from Reagan's previous tune.

As far as the "star wars" defense system was concerned, he stressed that he had told the Russians that if the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on a drastic reduction in offensive nuclear weapons, the United States would immediately sign an agreement with the Soviet Union on the research, development, testing, and deployment of the "star wars" defense system.

Three Contents of "Star Wars" [subhead]

According to the proposal submitted by Reagan, the "star wars" weapons agreement will include the following:

- 1. For a period of 5 years, from the present until 1991, both sides will confine themselves to research, development, and testing.
- 2. A new treaty, signed now, would provide that if, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. This plan would be negotiated over a 2-year period.
- 3. If the two sides could not agree after 2 years of negotiations, either side would be free to deploy an advanced strategic defensive system, after giving 6 months notice to the other.

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It Seems That He Has Drawn Back [subhead]

Both Reagan and his Secretary of Defense Weinberger said that the treaty on prohibition of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs) must be abrogated because it hinders the United States from developing the "star wars" arms system.

Now, while declaring in his speech that the United States will still observe the ABN treaty, Reagan said the deployment of the "star wars" arms system can be postponed until 1991, or in other words, for 5 or 7 years. It seems that he has drawn back, has he not?

In Fact He Has Not Drawn Back [subhead]

In fact, these are precisely the cunning tactics of the President or his advisers Although the United States has made several breakthroughs in the development of the "star wars" arms system this year, it is still far from actual deployment, which cannot possibly be effected in 5 to 7 years. So, will it be really disadvantageous to the United States if it promises or even signs a treaty to postpone the deployment of the weapons system by 5 years?

The Soviet Union has given a cold response to Reagan's remarks. This means that the Soviets are not slow-witted either.

/9274 CSO: 5200/4003 U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

#### SOVIET REPORTS ON SHEVARDNADZE VISIT TO WASHINGTON

#### Gorbachev Message for Reagan

LD192226 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2156 GMT 19 Sep 86

[Text] Washington, 20 Sep (TASS) — Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, who has come here by prior agreement, has had a meeting at the White House with U.S. President Ronald Reagan. E. Shevardnadze handed the President a personal message from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The U.S. side was given an explanation of the Soviet approach to ensuring lasting peace and all-embracing security by the averting of the militarization of space, by the limitations and reduction of armaments, especially nuclear armaments, right up to their total elimination, and by a general lowering of the levels of military confrontation.

The need was stressed for the speediest possible achievement of concrete accords in the sphere of security and for a solution of the question of halting and banning nuclear tests.

Questions connected with Soviet-U.S. summit meetings were touched upon in the course of the conversation.

At the same time the Soviet side pointed out that an artificial aggravation of the atmosphere surrounding relations between our two countries for purposes that only benefit the opponents of a normalization of these relations is impermissible.

Today talks also opened at the State Department between Eduart Shavardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

#### News Conference

PM211835 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Sep 86 First Edition p 4

[Text] Washington, 21 Sep (TASS) — Eduard Shevardnadze, CPSU Central Committee Politburo Member, USSR Foreign Minister, held a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists at the USSR Embassy in the United States on 20 September at the conclusion of his meetings in Washington.

Naturally, he said, you are expecting me to give an assessment of the conversations which were held in Washington.

The assessment will follow. In order to make it objective, it is important to choose a correct scale of measurement.

Our present visit has had its history, which began in Geneva. General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev and President R. Reagan reached certain accords at the Geneva summit last November.

Their chief objective was to achieve a shift for the better in Soviet-U.S. affairs in the shortest time possible. It was agreed that both sides would speed up work aimed at reaching concrete accords, first of all in the security field.

In order words, the Geneva summit gave rise to the hope that the train of Soviet-U.S. agreements would gradually gain in speed and would be continuously moving forward toward an end set by the sides. [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 0557 GMT on 21 September carries a virtually identical version of this dispatch, but transmits a service message at 0702 GMT correcting "agreements' in the preceding sentence to read "relations."]

Regrettably, the train that was assembled in Geneva began to skid rather quickly and developments took on a completely different nature from the one we expected.

Instead of being a time of realized hopes, the period after Geneva, to use M.S. Gorbachev's words, became a time of missed opportunities.

I do not intend now to talk about the reasons for this or to present claims to those responsible for this failure. Let me just say that the Soviet side has striven in every way it can to sustain the direction and time-scale of the movement toward mutually agreed goals. We have undertaken a number of major political acts which could immediately led us to practical nuclear disarmament measures.

I would like to recall our repeated extension of our unilateral moratorium on all nuclear blasts. We also put forward a complete complex of specific proposals in which we tried to embody the principle of equivalent [ravnoznachnyy] security on sharply reduced levels of military confrontation.

I would like to draw your attention specifically to one fact: The Soviet Union stands for the reliable monitoring [kontrol] of all agreements in the security field, including the supernational one and on-site inspection.

In addition, wishing to speed up the work on preparing a productive summit meeting filled with substantial content, we suggested to the U.S. side that we hold a series of consultations in midsummer on the level of experts practically on the entire range of our relations with the United States.

Such consultations have been held and both sides have appraised them as useful and necessary. I would like to say that here in Washington we spoke in favor of continuing the practice of conducting such exchanges of opinion as an efficient means of preparing for a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting.

Our present meeting with Secretary of State Shultz was conceived both by us and by the U.S. side as one of the decisive stages in the work of organizing a new meeting of our countries' top leaders: an effective meeting and one that would be significant in terms of its practical results, above all in the area of curbing the arms race and reducing nuclear armaments. A considerable part of the necessary preparatory work in this direction had been done in our view.

And then it happened -- and I want to say this with great regret -- that someone's ill-intentioned hand attempted to block further headway. Actions were undertaken which placed the very possibility of holding a summit meeting into question.

One of these actions was the demand for a reduction in the staff of the Soviet mission to the United Nations by 25 members. [paragraph continues]

This is an unlawful, and I would say, irresponsible and provocative decision. And we are not the only ones who think so. The UN itself also deems it absolutely unlawful.

Not resorting to other, stronger words, I will put it straight: if the U.S. side believes that it can act according to its whims and remain unpunished, it is profoundly mistaken. This action will not remain without consequences, with the only difference being that we will not be making rash decision.

It appears that much has been done in the past few weeks to break up the Soviet-U.S. dialogue. An artificial blockage was created, and questions were moved to the foreground which were designed to supersede the main ones, for the sake of which we maintain the contacts with you. Presumably, it was believed that having given in to emotions, we would not come to Washington.

We have come, although — I will be blunt with you — it was not an easy decision for us to make. We have made it being guided by our sense of lofty responsibility and understanding of political priorities. Soviet-U.S. relations are too important for our peoples, for the destinies of the world and mankind, to be subject to reflex actions [refleksii]. It does not take great mental powers to destroy, but creation takes willpower, intellect, and patience.

Now with regard to the talks themselves. As you know, we have had a meeting with president Reagan and four rounds of talks with Secretary of State Shultz. A personal message from M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general Secretary, was conveyed to the President and our approach to guaranteeing a stable peace and comprehensive security by means of averting the militarization of space and reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, was set out. We stressed the need for the earliest achievement of concrete accords in the security sphere and a solution to the issue of halting nuclear tests.

Naturally, we discussed questions connected with the summit meeting.

Regrettably, we had to draw the administration's attention to the inadmissibility of artificially whipping up the atmosphere in our relations.

A wide range of quesions was discussed in my conversations with the secretary of state. Our conversation was on a one-to-one basis for a considerable part of the time. It was thorough [obstoyatelnyy] meaningful [soderzhatelnyy] and, I would say, constructive on the whole. It is good that there predominated both common sense and an understanding that a language of pressure and aultimatums is an unsuitable one for our relations.

We consider that here in Washington normal diplomatic work has been, I would say, carried out in virutally all main areas, but primarily on questions of security. In a certain sense this work creates a basis for holding a productive summit meeting. We truly are moving forward with regard to this.

A few words on a questions which I will predict you will raise in any case — namely, the "N. Daniloff affair." It was broached in our converstions here and has not yet been resolved. But the possibilities for this exist, and we are in favor of resolving this matter as rapidly as possible.

E. Shevardnadze then replied to numerous questions from journalists.

Question: M.S. Gorbachev said in his interview with RUDE PRAVO that today, in the nuclear age, a new thinking is required. Have you found elements of this new thinking in your U.S. partners?

Answer: Regrettably, we and representatives of the U.S. Administration have different understandings of the principles of the new thinking, of the new approach. The new thinking manifests itself in practical matters, in practical action, in a willingness on the part of states to do everything they can to halt the arms race on earth and to prevent the militarization of space. To use practical language, there are profound differences between us. They existed and continue to do so. But the talks showed another thing, too. On some questions, very important questions of security, a certain prospect for achieving agreements is appearing. These agreements could be signed at a summit meeting, as long as the corresponding preparatory work is done.

Question: Does this statement and your other statements mean that you have been able to convince the Americans that an empty summit is no good, that your position is right, and that a meeting simply to have talks is no good?

Answer: We are convinced, and now, I believe, the Americans also are convinced, that an empty meeting is no good. I will draw this conclusion from the talks that we have held in Washington: There must be preparations for a serious meeting with serious results.

Ouestion: Do you expect a summit meeting to be held this year?

Answer: I do not wish to anticipate events. Let me say frankly that as far as the Soviet side, the Soviet leadership is concerned, everything is being done to ensure that a meeting, a meeting which will yield results, does take place. We are in no doubt that such a meeting is necessary. The Soviet people and the American people, as well as the whole of the world public, have an interest in such a meeting which will yield results.

Question: Have you noticed any headway, any change in the U.S. position on the question of a treaty on banning nuclear weapon tests?

Answer: To judge by its practical actions, no.

Question: In your opinion, what are the obstacles remaining on the path of achieving agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons?

Answer: Let us not go into details at the moment. What you have just asked is the subject of the Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva. In two words I will say that this is a very promising line. There is the possibility of bringing the positions closer together. Whatever depends on the Soviet delegation, it does. The rest is up to the U.S. side.

Replying to questions about the "Daniloff affair," E. Shevardnadze said: The facts show that Daniloff was engaged in illicit activity aimed against the Soviet State's interests. The U.S. side has been given documents and materials which expose him as engaging in unseemly business.

Replies were also given to other journalists' questions.

#### Hopeful Signs Seen

LD221349 Moscow World Service in English 1310 GMT 22 Sep 86

[Text] Washington has been the scene of important Soviet-American talks. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met with President Ronald Reagan and held four rounds of talks with Secretary of State George Shultz. Yuriy Soltan now comments:

The USSR and the United States make up only one-tenth of humanity, however, I am confident that few people would be indifferent to how relations between them develop because endeavors to avert the threat of nuclear destruction from people, wherever they live, largely depend on these relations. Differences between the two states are deep. Last November in Geneva the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan agreed to work to overcome them and to speed up the talks on disarmament with a view to reaching concrete results.

Since then the Soviet Union has offered a plan for scrapping nuclear hardware before the turn of the century and prolonged its unilateral moratorium on nuclear blasts till 1 January 1987. As for the United States, it has reacted with a series of nuclear explosions in the Nevada desert and with testing new types of strategic weapons. The USSR put forward a program for international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space; the United States set out to develop space weaponry under its "Star Wars" program and to entangle its allies in it. The USSR devised foundation for a comprehensive system of international security; the United States launched a strike on Libya and intensified the activity of its hirelings in Nicaragua, Angola, and Afghanistan. Washington kindled anti-Soviet hysteria over the case of Daniloff, a man exposed as a spy. It decided to reduce the staff of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations by 25 persons.

That is why in the course of Mikhail Gorbachev's recent tour of the northern Caucasus Soviet citizens suggested that the way their country was talking with the United States was perhaps too soft. Restraint is no softness, Mikhail Gorbachev answered. Our principle is to follow a firm policy, but to act constructively, realizing our responsibility for the destiny of the world. Moscow uses this principle in its approach to the proposed Soviet-American summit. We are in favor of holding such a summit, but we want it to achieve results. Some hopeful signs are already in evidence. Eduard Shevardnadze's talks with American leader have indicated that there are prospects for gaining agreements of certain important security issues. Such agreements would be signed at the proposed summit meeting if corresponding preparatory work is done.

### Need for 'Fruitful' Meeting

PM221531 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Sep 86 First Edition p 3

["Today's Commentary" by S. Bulantsev: "Decision Time"]

[Text] In our nuclear missile age there are no people, nor can there be any, who are indifferent to the most crucial, the most topical problem — namely, the preservation of peace. It is the common concern of all mankind. However, special responsibility falls on the two states which possess the greatest potential for waging modern warfare: the USSR and the United States. This explains the close attention with which the planet has been following the stay in the United States of Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze.

Th head of Soviet diplomacy has a tight schedule. He has already met with President R. Reagan, whom he handed a personal message from M.S. Gorbachev. Talks have also been held with Secretary of State G. Shultz. It is gratifying to note that common sense prevailed during their dialogue and that this dialogue was on the whole detailed and constructive. The meeting between E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz was seen by both sides as one of the decisive stages in organizing another Soviet-American summit. Let us recall how much hope was generated by last year's meeting in Geneva between M.S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan that the military and political climate on the earth would improve! It is therefore only natural that millions of people throughout the world are now asking: Will there be another dialogue between the Soviet and U.S. leaders?

A substantial part of the work to ensure that such a dialogue takes place was carried out in Washington. We have no doubt that a new summit meeting is necessary. Not just our two countries' peoples, but the whole world public is concerned that a fruitful meeting be held. But let me repeat a FRUITFUL [published in boldface in original] meeting. We are by no means maximalists and we do not demand point-blank: "All or nothing." But it is beyond question that no one needs empty talk. It is our conviction that a new summit must be marked by tangible progress toward the solution of at least one or two of the substantial problems in the sphere of international security.

The USSR is ready to hold such a meeting. What can be said about the United States? Sometimes you get the impression that artificial obstacles are being created there on the path toward improving Soviet-American relations. One such action is the demand that staff at the Soviet mission at the United Nations be reduced by 25. This is an unlawful and irresponsible decision. The United States has no right to do this. Just imagine the Swiss authorities demanding that the size of the U.S. delegation to last year's Geneva summit be reduced. Absurd, is it not? The present U.S. demand is no less absurd.

Or take the so-called "Daniloff case" around which an unusual ballyhoo has been raised in the United States. The U.S. side has been presented with documentary material which testifies to his involvement in matters which bear no relation to his work as a correspondent. Nonetheless, efforts are being made in the United States to link a second summit with the "Daniloff case." What link is there here? It can be perceived only by people who are deliberately working to torpedo the dialogue.

The Soviet leadership has emphasized more than once: Another summit must produce specific results. This is what the world's people expect. We have had our say. We will wait for the U.S. side's reply. The time for responsible decisions has come.

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CSO: 5200/1597

#### U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER COMMENTS ON U.S. 'FORCED OPTIMISM'

PM221120 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Sep 86 Second Edition p 5

[TASS military observer V. Chernyshev commentary specially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Forced Optimism"]

[Text] The sixth round of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms has started in Geneva. A White House statement devoted to this event is notable for its conscious bias in setting out the U.S. position, the predominance of forced upbeat tones, and the total overlooking of the genuine state of affairs at the talks and the atmosphere that the United States itself is creating around them.

According to the U.S. Administration statement, Washington is allegedly fully resolved to reach agreements which would lead to profound, just, and verifiable [proveryayemyye] reductions in nuclear arsenals. Allegedly, the United States has already demonstrated in Geneva that it is doing everything to implement major arms reductions, and the U.S. position provides a "firm basis" for reaching agreement and moving toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The ball, it appears, is in the Soviet court: If the Soviet Union "reacts seriously to the U.S. proposals we can hope for a productive round," which may be an "important stage in the resolute U.S. attempts to get the USSR to agree to deep cuts in nuclear weapons." Washington is waiting for a constructive response from Moscow.

Everything here has been turned upside down. First, are there any grounds for claiming that the U.S. Administration wants any kind of agreement? Do those people who are conducting a feverish nuclear arms race, destroying the existing treaty and legal basis for restraining that race, and taking action worldwide which further exacerbates the international situation, need agreement? After all, it is the United States which is expediting the implementation of the "star wars" program — including the development [razrabotka] of nuclear components — carrying out nuclear explosions, testing antisatellite weapons, and creating [sozdayut] "third generation" nuclear means.

Washington has begun deployment of the new MX ICBM's, is commissioning one SSBN [fleet ballistic missile submarine] after another, is fitting cruise missiles to strategic bombers and preparing to exceed the limits defined by the SALT II Treaty in the very near future, and is urgently equipping surface warships and submarines with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. "The weapons we are buying today will form the basis of the U.S. Armed Forces for many years after the start of the 21st century" -- that statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger frankly sets forth the creed of the present U.S. military-political leadership. The U.S. plans and practical measures to improve and build up nuclear arms hardly attest to a willingness to limit and reduce them.

Second, do those who are still clearly happy to mark time have any right to express optimism about the state of affairs at the talks and about their own position? Washington is still typified by its complete lack of willingness to seek new approches which make it possible to clear away the obstacles in the way of nuclear arms reductions and which take the security of the partner in the talks into account. It is also very typical that the current White House statement completely sidesteps the question of the nonmilitarization of space, which is one of the agreed goals of the Geneva talks. And that is understandable: The United States and the White House chief himself constantly stress that the U.S. SDI program cannot be a subject at the talks—the United States intends to complete development [razrabotka] of a space-based ABM system and deploy it in any case.

The U.S. proposals concerning strategic arms are aimed at obtaining military advantages for the United States and are geared to all intents and purposes not to reducing nuclear arsenals but to building them up — and in avenues which Washington considers to be to its advantage. As for medium—range nuclear means, the United States has avoided a practical discussion of the problems of this kind of weapon in Europe. Thus Washington is maintaining a deliberately deadlocked situation even at the talks.

Third, in whipping up artificial trumpeted optimism with regard to its own position, Washington is distorting the Soviet Union's position or, at any rate, is keeping silent about how the USSR is approaching the talks seriously and responsibly, formulating its own proposals concretely, professionally, and with a view to the other side's interests, and drawing them up on the basis of the principle of equality and indentical security. It is the Soviet Union that has put forward a whole series of far-reaching proposals at the talks and taken many steps aimed at bringing positions closer together over a wide range of problems concerning overcoming the arms race. The "all or nothing" approach is alien to it, it constantly strives to use any opportunity for productive dialogue.

At the fifth round, bearing in mind the fact that owing to Washington's position the talks have embarked on the path of fruitless discussions, the Soviet Union proposed reaching agreement with the United States on partial interim measures which could be taken right now. Those who distort or keep silent about the constructive position of their partner in the talks are clearly aiming to prepare everything to pin the blame for the results of their own destructive policy on the USSR.

In the nuclear space age time quickly runs out for adopting joint, responsible, and compromise solutions. Specific practical actions are now needed more than ever. The Soviet delegation has arrived in Geneva with instructions to continue to seek ways out of the deadlock and toward a speedy mutually acceptable solution to the questions hindering progress. However, reciprocity and efforts on the part of the U.S. delegation are needed in order to achieve this. It is to be hoped that Washington will ultimately realize this, take account of the peoples' demands for peace, respond in like and worthy manner, and provide a businesslike and constructive reply to the Soviet initiatives.

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CSO: 5200/1597

#### U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

TASS REPORTS ON GROUP SESSIONS 23-24 SEPTEMBER

Space Weapons 23 September

LD231155 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1126 GMT 23 Sep 86

[Text] Geneva, 23 Sep (TASS)—A session of the group on space weapons within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons took place here today.

Strategic Arms 24 September

LD241414 Moscow TASS in English 1232 GMT 24 Sep 86

[Text] Geneva, 24 Sep (TASS)—The group on strategic armaments held a session here today within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space armaments.

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### U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: COMMENTARIES ON PROSPECTS FOR SUMMIT

#### No Advance Seen

LD181947 Budapest Television Service in Hungarian 1730 GMT 18 Sep 86

[From the "Newsreel" program; 18 September interview in Moscow with Valentin Falin, chairman of the NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY, by unidentified reporter; Falin in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation--recorded]

[Text] [words indistinct] The Soviet side to these discussions and the future summit meeting?

[Falin] We have stated our standpoint several times. According to our view, an end must be brought to the arms race on earth, and it must be prevented in space. We are waiting for the United States to switch over from words to concrete deeds.

[Reporter] How is it assessed here in Moscow? In what sphere of the Soviet-U.S. relationship can there be an advance, and where is there a standstill?

[Falin] Negotiations are in progress in several channels between the Soviet Union and the United States. Yet progress, truly significant advance is not occurring at these discussions. Although recently they in Washington have not been miserly with statements made on peace, we cannot overlook that it has been announced: The United States in the future will not adhere to the SALT agreements. Furthermore, they are contravening the agreement on antimissile systems. The rejection of the restrictions which quantitatively and qualitatively held back the arms race contradicts the appearance that something might be happening. In reality, there is no kind of constructive development or advance.

'Answer in U.S. Hands'

LD202054 Warsaw PAP in English 1959 GMT 20 Sep 86

[Text] Warsaw, Sept. 20: Polish television, in its main news bulletin tonight, beamed an interview with renowned Soviet expert in international problems, president of the NOVOSTI press agency Valentin Falin.

Asked whether the Soviet-American meeting can be held on time, that is after elections to the Congress and before January 1, 1987, Falin stated that "the answer to this questions is in the hands of the U.S. If the American Administration is ready to lead a dialogue up to concrete solutions, then the Soviet leadership, as was many a time stressed by Mikhail Gorbachev, is prepared for such a meeting at any time, also after the first Tuesday or Monday of November as well as till January 1."

When asked if the Soviet Union will resume its nuclear tests after January 1, 1987, unless an agreement is reached, Falin said: "I can only say one thing, the number of prolongations of our moratorium will not be equal to that of American unilateral nuclear tests."

#### U.S. Blamed for Problems

PM191448 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 20 Sep 86 p 3

[Political observer Yuriy Kornilov article under the rubric "View of Events": "Will There Be a Summit Meeting?"]

[Text] The U.S. mass media are continuing actively to pursue the topic of the potential and prospects for a Soviet-American summit meeting — pursuing it, naturally, from a very specific angle. The White House press secretary, talking with journalists on board the plane on which the U.S. President was recently returning to Washington after his vacation, stated: "The meeting will be productive if the Soviet side wants it to be productive." "If Moscow wants a meeting, there will be a meeting," U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Whitehead echoes him. What can one say about this?

In the Soviet Union it has been stressed repeatedly, even at the highest level, that our country is in favor of developing normal, good relations with the United States, naturally on the basis of equal rights and mutual advantage. But the state of and prospects for Soviet-American relations should be defined first and foremost by progress in the most important field: in progress along the path of limiting the arms race, reviving detente, and establishing and consolidating confidence between states on that basis.

The basic thesis elaborated as a result of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva in November 1985 declares: Nuclear war is impermissible and the sides will not seek to achieve military superiority. The Soviet Union was and is working in this direction by mutting forward a large-scale program of practical actions to eliminate the nuclear danger, end the arms race, and preserve and strengthen world peace. different continents assess as clear evidence of the USSR's peaceability and a convincing manifestation of the new kind of political thinking our country's proposal on creating an all-embracing system international security, which has been submitted by the Soviet Union and its friends and allies for consideration at the 41st UN General Assembly Session which opened in New York on 16 September. The world public assess highly the USSR's firm, consistent line of eliminating nuclear weapons by the end of the century and the Soviet initiatives aimed at preventing the militarization of space, banning and destroying chemical weapons, and eliminating nuclear arms and considerably reducing conventional arms in Europe - from the Atlantic to the Urals. It is generally acknowledged that the USSR's unilateral moratorium on all nuclear tests, which has already been in force for more than a year, is of exceptionally great, topical significance for the situation in the world.

That is one approach to the key international problems of today and to the objectives and tasks of Soviet-American dialogue. If you take on trust the statements of other American figures, including very high-ranking figures, and of a number of U.S. mass information organs, Washington's approach is analogous or similar. Speaking in Glassboro (New Jersey) recently, the U.S. President zealously demanded an "en! to suspicions, replacing them with mutual understanding," and the attainment of "effe ive arms reduction. "And the journal U.S. & WORLD REPORT, in its latest issue, dated 15 September, reported, citing R. Reagan's immediate entourage, that the White House "intends to hold a summit meeting in order to demonstrate the President's peaceability."

Well, the U.S. desire to demonstrate its peaceability could not only be welcomed in itself. It is quite obvious that this desire would accord far more with the realities of the modern world and with the United States' own true interests than the desire to use force to threaten your partner.

However, the question naturally arises: How, by what means, does Washington intend to "demonstrate its peaceability"? Have people there perhaps finally realized that in our nuclear age the world is too small and fragile for all kinds of "strong-arm methods," and have concluded that it is expedient to curtail, or at least to amend in the direction of limitation, the gigantic military programs elaborated by the Republican administration? No, the U.S. military budget for fiscal 1987 reaches nearly 300 billion dollars -- a record sum in the country's history. Have people in Washington perhaps realized what a serious threat to the cause of peace and to the security of the United States itself is inherent in the plans to carry the arms race into space? No, the implementation of R. Reagan's so-called "strategic defense initiative" is continuing at an accelerated pace, accompanied by tests of the ASAT antisatellite system and other actions which undermine the Soviet-American ABM Treaty, that basic foundation on which strategic offensive arms reduction agreements could and should be built. Have people in Washington perhaps renounced their plans to turn a number of West European countries which are the NATO applies of the United States into a launch pad for American first-strike nuclear weapons? This question too, today at least, has to be answered with a brief "no."

It is generally accepted that a nuclear state's attitude toward nuclear explosions is a kind of touchstone of the real direction and main content of that state's policy. U.S. public opinion and a considerably proportion of the U.S. Congress are increasingly actively supporting the USSR's idea of halting nuclear explosions, which encountered a very extensive positive world response. But how does official Washington regard the idea? Its reaction is straightforward: In the 400-plus days of the Soviet moratorium there have been 20 nuclear explosions at Nevada test sites! The chief aim of these militarist acts is a desire not merely to continue the arms race but to take it into new spheres, an effort to forge fundamentally new types of weapons, above all space-based nuclear weapons, the so-called nuclear-charged x-ray lasers. How, pray, does one square the frantic militarist preparations with the claims that Washington is apparently solely concerned with "demonstrating its love of peace"? Add to this the fact that the flexing of nuclear missile muscles is accompanied in the United States by endless anti-Soviet campaigns like the provocative ballyhoo kicked up recently over the so-called "Daniloff affair" or the act of espionage by a U.S. citizen in the USSR, and it is more than obvious that it is difficult to talk seriously not only about Washington's "love of peace," but even about its elementary political restraint at the moment...

"If one deliberately takes the view that a moratorium is unacceptable, if the question of medica-range missiles in Europe is blocked, if strategic armaments have to be improved, and so forth. What is there to talk about?" M.S. Gorbachev noted in his replies to questions posed by the chief editor of the Czechoslovak paper RUDE PRAVO. "In an atmosphere of a frantic arms race, the fueling of tension, and the demolition of existing accords a summit is scarcely going to do any good. But it would be the easiest thing in the world to use it to deceive people, to reassure the public by creating a semblance that all is well and then continue the dangerous policy. As a matter of fact, they are already trying to do that, by pretending that summit preparations are in fully swing."

The line being imposed on us of competing with one another in the production of weapons of distruction and death is not our line; opting for an arms race is not our choice. As is known, World War II cost more than 50 million lives. What would a nuclear conflict mean today, when so many nuclear weapons have been stockpiled that experts argue only about how many times, or tens of times over, mankind could be destroyed? It is more than obvious that today not only a nuclear duel but also preparations for one cannot be politically advantageous to anyone. [paragraph continues]

So it is a matter of needing new approaches, of not threatening one another with ever more sophisticated weapon systems, but — before it is too late — of talking in an honest and businesslike manner with partners at various levels — including summit level, of course — about real ways of eliminating the threat of nuclear self-destruction. The USSR wants this. So no matter how much we are provoked, the Soviet Union does not break the threads of contact with the U.S. Administration, does not place their usefulness in doubt, and does not slam the door, although some people in Washington would very much like this to happen. Of course, the approach expressed in the formula "all or nothing" is alien to the Soviet Union, which since Geneva has taken many steps to bring Soviet-American positions closer together on a wide range of problems connected with surmounting the arms race. But it is more than obvious that all contacts are valuable not in themselves, but in their results.

So will there be a Soviet-American summit or not? In answering this question one should state very clearly that the Soviet Union wants a dialogue, it wants a new summit, one that would mean marked progress in the solution of at least one or two vital problems of international security. This can be achieved if the Geneva atmosphere is preserved, or rather revived. Our country is absolutely determined to continue to exploit every opportunity for productive dialogue, for progress toward arms limitation and reduction. It is up to Washington.

#### Americans' Views Cited

LD211627 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 21 Sep 86

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's speech in Krasnodar Kray, his conversation with working people, in which, in particular, issues of international politics were touched upon, have received a broad response in the United States. Our New York correspondent Vladimir Zvyagin reports:

THE NEW YORK TIMES points out that the Soviet leader stressed the importance of a possible summit meeting for reaching bilateral accords above all on ending nuclear tests, and on the withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles from the European zone.

Observers of practically all television companies are emphasizing that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev sharply criticized the attempts of right-wing and militarist circles in the United States to artificially tie up the solution of the most important problems of the present time with secondary issues.

Touching upon the vociferous campaign unleashed here by certain circles in connection with the detention of an American journalist in the USSR for illegal activities, the CNN television company cited data from a public opinion survey. Over 70 percent of U.S. citizens questioned spoke out in favor of the holding of a Soviet-U.S. summit meeting as soon as possible, for reaching accords on curbing the arms race. And over half of them are opposed to tying in secondary issues with the possibility of a meeting.

As a CNN commentator stated, there are issues too important on the agenda for an irresponsible political game to be conducted around them.

USSR's 'Practical Contribution' Noted

LD221200 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 22 Sep 86

[Commentary by political observer Aleksandr Zholkver]

[Text] The general political discussion began at the session of the UN General Assembly today. Aleksandr Zholkver, our political observer, is at the microphone:

The agenda for the present session includes over 140 issues. The problems of curbing the nuclear threat are indisputably the most important among these for the whole of mankind. The proposal submitted by the group of socialist countries for review at the United Nations, on creating an all-embracing system of international security, is a graphic manifestation of a new way of thinking in the nuclear space age.

However, our country does not restrict itself merely to noble wishes, but is making a great practical contribution to strengthening confidence in relations between states. The fourth extension of the Soviet moratorium on all nuclear tests is just such an effective measure.

The Soviet Union also approaches questions of Soviet-U.S. relations from constructive positions, including that of a new summit meeting. Unfortunately, through no fault of ours, the period since the last meeting has been one of lost opportunities. Over the past few days this issue has been discussed during Comrade Shevardnadze's meetings in Washington. A personal message from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev which expounded our approach to securing stable pace and all-embracing security by preventing the militarization of space and reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons was presented to President Reagan. It proposed implementation of all these measures under reliable monitoring, right up to supranational monitoring and on-site inspection. It also proposed a continued exchange of opinions at the level of experts of the two countries as an effective way to prepare for a summit.

Nevertheless, one cannot but point out that some people across the ocean are trying to jeopardize the very possibility of holding such a meeting. Take, for instance, the provocative demand for a reduction of 25 persons from the Soviet UN Mission. The hullabaloo over Daniloff, who has been unmasked in unpermitted activity aimed against the interests of the Soviet state, is still going on.

To put it briefly, a blockage in Soviet-U.S. relations is being artificially constructed, and tension is being whipped up.

But even Washington must understand that the language of pressure and ultimatums is inappropriate for our relations. It seems to me that an understanding of this is making its way, creating a basis for holding a productive meeting at summit level. And it should be a productive one, for of course no one needs an empty one.

At any rate, on the Soviet side, everything is being done for the meeting to take place, a successful [rezultatavnyy] meeting.

/12858 CSO: 5200/1597 SALT/START ISSUES

USSR'S ARBATOV HITS U.S. 'OFFENSIVE' AGAINST SALT

PM191007 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 36, 15 Sep 86 pp 4-5

[Academician Georgiy Arbatov article: "The Bulldozer Syndrome. Washington's Offensive Against Existing Agreements"]

[Text] The world is facing a historic choice. Whether we cut back on armaments and achieve genuine security, which today are virtually synonymous concepts, or embark upon a runaway arms race and nuclear chaos, depends on decisions to be taken very shortly.

It will be tragic if everything ends in catastrophe because of delusion and ignorance, and our inability to explain things to each other.

I say this because in the U.S. and some other Western countries nowdays reports on Soviet policy are heavily slanted and viciously distorted by both governments and the mass media. Indeed, the latest Soviet proposals have been shrouded in what can justly be called a conspiracy of silence.

As far as we can see, the U.S. Administration is attempting to impose severe constraints on the mass media. Their support or at least tacit acceptance of the Administration's line is a kind of loyalty test. They are told to play down certain stories, otherwise they will be accused of un-American behaviour. That often works. But if it does not, direct interference is employed. NBC television had planned an interesting series of programmes and dialogues, to which prominent personalities in the U.S. and U.S.S.R., foreign ministers, defence ministers, chiefs of general staffs, even political leaders, were to be invited. The U.S. Administration said no, and NBC had to apologize to the Soviet State Committee on Radio and Television. The entire idea was abandoned.

Attempts are made to conceal the Soviet proposals from the public at large. In the U.S., where security and foreign policy are concerned, the mass media are starved of information, which prevents them from saying anything coherent. Otherwise they would not be so avid to grasp every word from Mr Larry Speakes, as if at his innumerable briefings he offered fresh juicy steaks instead of repeatedly chewed bare bones.

All this inevitably comes to mind when one analyzes the U.S. attitude to the latest Soviet bids. It is now becoming increasingly clear that the stoppage of nuclear explosions is not a secondary measure, a mere political gesture, or even a symbol of good will. It is major, highly significant practical step towards ending the nuclear arms race and eliminating the nuclear threat. Today's nuclear tests are quite unrelated to the effort to deter war or "likely aggression," as it is termed, the excuse constantly being offered to vindicate them. So much nuclear weaponry, tested

long ago, has been stockpiled that even if we were to reduce it to half, a third, a quarter even, a fifth, there would still be more than enough to act as a deterrent. Actually, today's tests are being held to devise weapons whose purpose is to wage and win a nuclear war in spite of all the verbal and wirtten declarations to the contrary. Incidentally, the U.S. President signed the last such declaration at the Geneva summit, in it he said he agreed that a nuclear war could not be fought, nor could it be won.

Due to the Washington Administration's line, Soviet-U.S. relations, far from getting better, continue to deteriorate dangerously in such basics as the arms race, regional conflicts, the U.S. stance on the international scene and even the rhetoric we hear from the U.S. What on earth can the U.S. hope for — it has scheduled the next Soviet-U.S. summit for November-December — if it says openly that it is going to torpedo SALT-II? In its view, this summit should come a fortnight after or just before this strike at the entire structure of bilateral treaty relationship. How does Washington see all this?

The impression is that the White House is desperately trying not to keep to what was agreed at Geneva, but to destroy as much as possible as quickly as possible before 1988 arrives, so that the current administration's successors will find it almost impossible to start mending fences. They are undermining SALT and the ABM Treaty. A real bulldozer syndrome. The U.S. wants to shed all cramping treaty restrictions. It finds international law and international agencies intolerable. [paragraph continues]

In this connection, let me remind you that it is committed, more specifically, under two agreements not only to negotiate a complete ban on nuclear testing, but also to seek the complete stoppage of nuclear tests. In the U.S., the Senate and the House have adopted resolutions on this, while according to opinion polls, 80 percent of respondents support the idea. But, alas, nothing affects the Administration.

An offensive has been mounted against the entire regime of even the modest arms race curbs created by the treaties that are currently in force. Efforts are being made to torpedo even the possibility of further negotiation. We say this not at all because we are afraid of what the U.S. might do. Even in the U.S. many realize that withdrawal from SALT-2 will impair U.S. interests more than Soviet interests. The basic restrictions this treaty imposed on the U.S. were set out in a two-year protocol that has long expired. As for the restrictions imposed on the U.S.S.R., they are incorporated within the treaty per se and are observed. The immediate outcome will be that the U.S.S.R. will find itself in a position to augment its strategic forces rapidly and at negligible cost. What price that for the U.S.?

But our basic concern is with the political consequences. How does one express a desire to reduce nuclear armament by suggesting that we start by dismantling even those modest restrictions already introduced? This will unquestionably complicate Soviet-U.S. dialogue and the meetings planned.

Yet in the U.S. we see a growing tendency to present matters as if all basic issues relating to a new Soviet-U.S. summit have already been resolved. The same Larry Speakes suggests that if the summit takes place it will be a good thing, but that if it doesn't, there'll be nothing to cry about either.

That is a palpable attempt to supplant the number one issue of the Geneva agreement — that both countries should commit themsleves to take steps to normalize bilateral relations, ameliorate the international situation, and expedite the process of arms limitation talks — with the issue of another meeting. The question of the end is being replaced by the question of the means.

As regards a new summit, the two definitive points put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev are still valid. One is the political atmosphere, the other productiveness. These are all that matter.

In politics, it very often happens that action comes when it is impossible to remain inactive any longer. for this reason a most persistent effort must be made to edge forward. So far the Americans have not agreed to stop nuclear tests. I believe the U.S. will change its stance but this will only be when it has dawned upon its leaders that they cannot do otherwise, that they have to modify their approach as the situation evolving both domestically and internationally makes it inevitable.

Is this possible? Let me reply to this with two further questions: Is it possible to continue indefinitely with the policy the U.S. is now pursuing without running the risk of blowing itself up along with all the rest of us? And will the world community and the Americans themselves allow it to do so?

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CSO: 5200/1590

SALT/START ISSUES

#### BRIEFS

SOVIET ROCKET TESTS END 25 SEP--Moscow, 25 Sep (TASS)--In connection with the completion of the planned launches of booster rockets, TASS is authorized to state that the regions of the Pacific Ocean described by parameters 70 nautical miles in radius, with their center on the coordinates 22 degrees 5 minutes North and 174 degrees and 20 minutes East, and 14 degrees and 10 minutes North and 175 degrees and 10 minutes East, declared on 17 September 1986, are free for navigation and for aircraft flights from 26 September 1986. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1004 GMT 25 Sep 86 LD] /7358

CSO: 5200/1590

#### CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

IZVESTIYA: U.S. STRIKES 'DISCORDANT NOTE' AT BW CONFERENCE

PM191305 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Sep 86 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by own correspondent V. Kuznetsov: "What the Debate Showed"]

[Text] Geneva — The general debate has ended at the second conference to consider the impact of the convention on bacteriological weapons. Representatives of 49 delegations spoke at the plenary sessions.

Most of them stressed that the convention is an important international law mechanism for disarmament and all states, primarily those which bear the main responibility for maintaining peace and international security, have a direct obligation to preserve it.

A large group of delegation raised in their speeches the question of the expansion of the use of biotechnology for peaceful purposes and strengthening of international cooperation in that sphere. At the plenary session it was stressed that the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are implementing broad international links in the biotechnology sphere.

Scientific and technical cooperation in biotechnology is being conducted between the Soviet Union, Italy, Sweden, and a number of other capitalist countries.

Statements by the U.S. delegation struck a discordant note at the conference. Irksomely repeating the chorus of propaganda attacks on the Soviet Union in connection with alleged violations of the convention, U.S. delegation head Donald Lowitz essentially sought to revive the cold war spirit and hinder the constructive quest for ways of strengthening the convention and making it more effective. This approach was condemned in speeches by representatives of Afghanistan, Bulgaria, the GDR, Hungary, and other states. In his statement Soviet delegation head V.L. Israelyan urged the delegates to elaborate concrete solutions.

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## **EUROPEAN CONFERENCES**

2.8.1

USSR: REPORT, COMMENT VIEW UPCOMING MBFR ROUND

Delegation Arrives

LD231224 Moscow TASS in English 1214 GMT 23 Sep 86

[Text] Vienna September 23 TASS — A Soviet delegation arrived here today to participate in another round of the talks on mutual reduction of the armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

The delegation is headed by Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Valerian Mikhaylov.

## Solution 'Possible'

LD250927 Moscow in Portuguese to Portugal 2100 GMT 24 Sep 86

[From "The World in Review" program by unidentified station commentator]

[Excerpts] Another round of talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe will open in Vienna tomorrow. Our commentator writes in this connection:

These talks have been continuing for 13 years, but to date no concrete results have really been attained. The fact is that inspite of the agreement on the subject matter of the Vienna talks — adopted in 1973 by the North Atlantic alliance and Warsaw Bloc states — the NATO countries persist in their attempts to confine the subject of the talks to the reduction and no subsequent increase of the overall number of troops. They deliberately leave unresolved the problem of armaments reduction and limitation. [passage omitted]

The West replaces the task of resolving the pressing problem of halting and limiting the conventional arms race with contrived questions on control and verification of an agreement not yet in existence. At the same time NATO representatives at the talks (?deliberately) make control measures unreal, even absurd, by increasing them to an extent, unacceptable to the other side, which would lead to the unwarranted disclosure of the entire defensive organization of the socialist states, and to the extension of the verification measures beyond the boundaries of the region in which the reductions would be effected.

To find a way out of the impasse created by the NATO countries, the USSR and other socialist countries propose very simple and effective control and verification measures

which include, in particular: national technical means of control, the exchange of lists of the units being reduced or withdrawn, mutual notification of the commencement and conclusion of reductions, and the setting up by each side of permanent posts to monitor the withdrawal of the troops affected by the reductions.

It should be noted that last June the Warsaw Pact states again submitted to the NATO states and to all the European countries detailed proposals on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

These proposals, and the stand adopted by the socialist countries at the Vienna talks, show that they are seeking in practice to raise a solid barrier against the conventional arms race and the increase in armed forces in Europe.

On the eve of another round of the Vienna talks there has been a successful outcome in the Swedish capital to the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security, and Disarmament in Europe. A set of political, technical and military measures has been agreed with the aim of reducing the risk of war on the continent. The success achieved in Stockholm would have been unthinkable without an effort on the part of all the participants. Likewise in Vienna, a compromise solution is possible on condition that the interests of the security of all the participants are taken into account.

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### **EUROPEAN CONFERENCES**

### SOVIET WEEKLY PONDERS STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE PROGRESS

PM121144 Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 37, 5-11 Sep 86 (Signed to Press 4 Sep 86) p 9

[V. Shatrov telephone dispatch: "Real Foundation for Serious Agreements at the Stockholm Conference"--first paragraph is ZA RUBEZHOM introduction]

[Text] The Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament is called upon to play an important role in reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe. The Soviet Union, in constructive cooperation with the other conference participants, is seeking its positive conclusion. But, despite the positive developments that have been achieved, mutually acceptable solutions to many important questions have still not been found at the last session of the conference's first stage because of the stance taken by NATO countries and primarily the United States.

Stockholm--The Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Europe has entered a decisive phase--this is its last month of work in the present stage. By 19 September it must finish drawing up a final document which, according to the mandate approved at the previous all-European meeting in Madrid, must include a set of mutually complementary confidence-building and security measures and measures to render the principle of the nonuse of force more specific and effective. The forthcoming new all-European meeting to be held in Vienna this fall will evaluate the progress achieved in Stockholm and will resolve the question of adding disarmament problems to the mandate of the conference at its next stage.

Thus the confidence-building and security measures being elaborated must serve as the rung which will lead the conference of 33 European states, the United States, and Canada to a direct examination of questions of disarmament in Europe. This purpose of the conference is pointed out in the Warsaw Pact states' Budapest appeal, which says that the proposals put forward by these countries concerning the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe could become the subject of specific discussion at the second stage of the conference.

Therefore the fruitful conclusion of the Stockholm conference is highly significant not only from the viewpoint of the onward development and deepening of the all-European process, which started in Helsinki and sets an example for other regions of the world. Such a conclusion is also necessary as regards the prospects for cooperation in reducing the military potential existing in Europe. The awareness of this gives new incentives to all who seek to improve the situation in Europe, revive detente, and implement disarmament. At the same time, it hardens the resistance of those forces across the ocean and in Europe itself which have no desire to build up confidence and security, treat the expansion of the all-European process with suspicion, and recoil in horror at everything that may lead to a reduction of armed forces and armaments. The antagonism between these two main trends, evident throughout the duration of the Stockholm conference, began intensifying particularly as the conference began approaching its end.

# Counting on Unilateral Advantages

From the very beginning, influential circles in the United States and their supporters among the NATO partners perceived the Stockholm conference not as an arena for cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, but as an arena for strongarm pressure on them and a propaganda battlefield. And they decided to count on boosting mistrust of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states among European countries, accusing them of secretiveness and a desire to cover up their military activity, which allegedly poses a threat to the West's security.

At the same time, Washington calculated on using concerted pressure by NATO bloc members to demand and gain unilateral advantages for itself, while simultaneously imposing rigid controls on the conduct of normal troop instruction and training activity in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. A far-reaching concept concerning the virtual transparency of the entire structure and disposition of the Warsaw Pact states' armed forces was submitted on behalf of the NATO countries. West demanded that relevent statistical information of an intelligence nature be made available to NATO, that observation of activity outside garrisons, including any movement of troops beyond the boundaries of the place where they are permanently stationed, be established, and that unrestricted on-site inspections be carried out. Moreover, the limit for advance notification of military activity was greatly reduced (to 6,000 men) with a view to obtaining information on even insignificant military exercises and sending observers to them. Finally, a demand was made regarding advance notification of mobilization activity, which was a direct intrusion into the sphere of states' national security.

Ruling circles in the United States and its closest allies calculated that, in the event of the socialist countries rejecting these bids to interfere in their internal affairs, they would at any given time have a pretext to

wind up the conference, blaming the "intractability" of the Warsaw Pact states and, on this basis, fanning even more the myth of the "Soviet military threat" and undermining the all-European process.

The desire to gain unilateral advantages was further highlighted by the fact that the United States placed totally beyond the scope of confidence-building and security measures its main strike forces in the shape of the navy and aviation, whose military actions abroad have demonstrated on many occasions the danger they pose to peoples on different continents, including Europe. It also refused preliminary notification of any transfer of U.S. troops to the European continent, whose influence on the state of the balance of military forces is obvious.

In order to retain a free hand, the United States, Britain, the FRG, and some of their other allies categorically rejected all measures limiting the scale of military exercises, even though the escalation of their size--graphically demonstrated by the current NATO maneuvers--causes serious concern among the majority of states participating in the conference, leads to destabilization of the situation in Europe, and ultimately increases the danger of a military confrontation.

The NATO elite, headed by the United States, were also driven by the desire to diminish the conference's importance as much as possible, narrow the range of problems discussed at it, give it a purely technical nature, emasculate all political aspects of confidence-building and security, and restrict the measures elaborated at it only to the activity of ground forces. This was in pursuit of the goal of denying the conference an opportunity to attain substantial results in the sphere of confidence-building and security measures, preventing it from moving on to the disarmament stage, and depriving it of any prospects.

It was on this largely unconstructive platform established at the very start of the conference that the United States and its obedient NATO partners essentially stood all the time, although many of its elements were rejected by the socialist and other participating states, others effectively disappeared because the majority of their former backers refused to support them, and only some of them reached the present session. The stance of some leading NATO countries acted in practice as a permanent brake on the conference's work. At times they blocked any movement forward, leading matters into the dead ends of confrontation. Those were the times when the U.S. "bell tower" started tolling the funeral knell of the Stockholm conference. But on each occasion the conference, relying on the will of the majority of its participants, proved sufficiently viable to overcome the obstacles placed in its way.

## Constructive Stance

The NATO leaders' most objectionable claims running contrary to the conference's mandate, which demands observance of equal rights, balance and reciprocity, and equal respect for the security interests of all states,

were deflected thanks to the line of initiatives and flexibility followed by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, a line which met with the understanding and support of many European states. The attempts by some leading NATO countries to distort the nature and tasks of the conference in breach of its mandate, which envisaged the implementation of new effective and specific actions and the elaboration of specific pledges by states to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force, were also deflected.

In order to clear the conference's path of the obstacles erected by its opponents, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries took energetic steps aimed at reaching mutually acceptable accords and boldly embarked on compromises, proceeding in this from the task of ensuring the conference's success, which is important both in itself and from the broader viewpoint of the prospects of European peaceful development and cooperation.

"The socialist countries, constructively cooperating with the other participants, did much at the Stockholm conference to find a solution to such key questions as nonuse of force, notification of military exercises and troop movements, exchange of annual plans for military activity, invitation of observers, and verification [proverka]," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, noted in his 18 August statement on Soviet television.

The initiatives which M.S. Gorbachev put forward even at times which were difficult for the conference paved the way toward agreement on important confidence-building and security measures. When he expressed in Paris last October the USSR's readiness, in response to the proposal by a number of states, primarily neutral ones, to agree on the mutual exchange of annual plans for military activity, this marked the beginning of a businesslike examination and coordination of this measure, whose purpose is to help overcome suspicion and make it more difficult to conduct covert preparations for war. The views expressed in the 15 January statement to the effect that a solution to the question of notifying major exercises should be sought in parts, namely, by agreeing now on notifications of major exercises by ground and air forces and postponing the question of naval activity till the next stage of the conference, made it possible to eliminate the greatest bottleneck created at the talks and provide an opportunity for further progress there. It thereby became possible to begin agreeing important confidence-building measures concerning the notification of ground forces activities with the participation of air forces and amphibious and airborne troops.

Serious agreement was reached a few days ago on notification of the transfer of troops to Europe, which, in the evaluation of Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev, first deputy defense minister and chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, in his 29 August speech at the Stockholm conference, "could become an important link in the system of accords meant to ensure European security."

As a result of the efforts made by the USSR and all socialist countries, in combination with the positive contribution of the neutral and nonaligned states and with support from some other participants, there are prospects for concluding the conference with weighty results. Much, however, still remains to be done before the elaboration of the final document's full text, and time is very short. Moreover, no sooner is one set of problems eliminated than the United States and its closest NATO partners create new ones, either raising additional disputed questions or exacerbating existing ones to extremes. In this regard, recently they made in particular attempts to tie yet another knot of confrontation concerning on-site inspections [inspektsiya na mestakh] by presenting this extraordinary and exceptional form of verification [proverka] in the event of suspicions regarding the observance of confidence-building measures as being almost the sole, all-embracing, and unlimited means of monitoring [kontrol]. Nevertheless this operation, designed by means of the juggling of facts to create the impression that the socialist countries are supposedly evading verification measures and on this pretext to cause serious complications in the conference's work, also failed.

## Europeans Are Interested in Success

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have always advocated that the accords elaborated in Stockholm be backed up by reliable and efficient verification so that all member states have confidence in their strict observance. Therefore they not only submitted for the conference's examination their own proposal for various forms of verification, including the use of national technical means, bilateral and multilateral consultations, and the convening of an interim consultative commission, but also studied carefully the balanced proposals of a number of other countries in this regard, including those concerning inspections on the basis of a strictly limited quota.

The Soviet side declared on 19 August, at the opening of the concluding session, its consent to the conduct of on-site inspections [inspektsiya na mestakh] on a quota basis: One or two inspections per year on the territory of each state within the boundaries of the European Continent. It is a question, of course, of inspections of troop exercises, movements, and transfers, in other words specific types of military activity subject to notification with appropriate protection of the states' sovereign rights.

Naturally, the USSR's initiatives presuppose answering movement on the part of the other participants in the talks. The impression they create trumps the cards of NATO strategists. They are forced, from time to time, under pressure from their European partners, to shift from their entrenched positions. However, they still have not abandoned the attempts to complicate the talks, stubbornly oppose the elaboration of real measures to limit major military exercises, and drag out the agreement of notification parameters, which obstructs advance on other issues. But the arsenal of destructive means held by the adversaries of the Stockholm conference is

noticeably diminishing. The only thing left to them is either to accept the constructive march of the forum or to openly embark on thwarting it, showing themselves before the whole world to be implacable enemies of peace, security, and disarmament in Europe. The example of Bern, where the United States did not hesitate at the last minute to wreck—on its own and despite the opinion of all participating states, including its NATO allies—the conference of experts on human contacts which agreed on an important human rights document, shows its arrogant scorn for the interests of peoples in our continent.

The overwhelming majority of European states value the conference being held in Sweden's capital. They are highly sensitive as regards the confidence-building and security measures being discussed at it, want to preserve the results which have already been achieved, and are interested in its success. A profound effect is exerted on their mood by the peace offensive of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states, covering spheres of vital importance for Europe and its future, for detente and disarmament. The Stockholm conference's work is helped by the keen attention and support of broad strata of the European public, which place great hopes on the measures being elaborated by it.

/12858 CSO: 5200/1594

### **EUROPEAN CONFERENCES**

### SOVIET ARMY PAPER ON WARSAW PACT PROPOSALS

PM101933 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Aug 86 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences Colonel A. Sytezhev: "Responsibility for the Cause of Peace. With Joint Efforts Toward the Common Goal"]

[Excerpt] The specific plan put forward by the Soviet Union for the complete liquidation of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons by the end of the 20th century and for the prevention of the creation [sozdaniye] of space strike weapons has a global significance. Introducing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union called on the United States to follow its example and thus open the way toward the conclusion of an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear explosions. Our country put forward the proposal to liquidate Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and to ban and destroy chemical weapons. All this must be implemented under strict international verification [kontrol]. The scope and realism of these proposals, the new approach to the presentation of questions, and the readiness to seek mutually acceptable solutions—all these constitute a manifestation of new political thinking in action.

It is precisely such thinking that underlies the coordinated foreign policy of the socialist community states. The fraternal countries are fully justified in perceiving the Soviet initiatives as a component of socialism's common line in the international arena. Not only because they—these initiatives—have been coordinated with them, not only because of principled internationalist considerations, but also because the peoples of these countries, just like the Soviet people, are engaged in one and the same exclusively peaceful job of improving their society.

A conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee was held in Budapest just over 2 months ago. The fundamental avenues of the fraternal countries' struggle for peace and for transition to real disarmament were confirmed in the course of the conference. These avenues have become the common foreign policy platform of socialist community countries. At the Budapest conference the fraternal countries put forward an expanded program for substantial reduction of armed forces and armament in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. As an initial step, it was proposed to carry out a single reciprocal reduction in the numerical strength of the forces of states from the opposing military-political alliances by 100,000-150,000 on each side over a period of 1-2 years. tactical strike aviation would also be highly important within the framework of this measure. Immediately following this, the Warsaw Pact states are prepared to proceed to further significant reductions as a result of which, given reciprocal readiness by the North Atlantic alliance countries, the ground forces and tactical strike aviation of both alliances in Europe would be reduced by approximately 25 percent in the early nineties by comparison with their present level. Such a reduction would amount to over 500,000 men on each side. Thus the opposing groups of armed forces in Europe would be reduced by more than 1 million men. The allied socialist countries advocate that this process of armed force and armament reductions be continued further.

The Warsaw Pact states have declared with utmost responsibility that they would never, under any circumstances, begin military operations against any state, either in Europe or elsewhere in the world, unless they themselves were the target of aggression.

The peaceful intentions and appeals by the socialist community states, convincingly backed by real deeds, constitute not only a manifestation of a lofty sense of political responsibility, but also an expression of firm faith in their strength and in the growing potential of peace, reason, and good will on earth. The pooling of the socialist countries' strength provides a driving force which is greater than the sum total of its components. This is the decisive guarantee that the concept of peace based on civilized mutual relations in the international arena will materialize.

It was no accident that the Budapest conference of the Political Consultative Committee gave special attention to questions of consolidating the Warsaw Pact states' unity and cohesion and of their defense alliance and the development of cooperation in all spheres. The fraternal countries emphasized the importance of increasingly vigorous collaboration in international affairs and in the elaboration and implementation of a coordinated foreign policy course aimed at ensuring their peoples' security, eliminating the threat of war, striving for disarmament, and strengthening universal peace. The precise and constructive stance of socialist countries is a source of inspiration for the peoples striving for final social and national liberation, for the whole of progressive mankind that is yearning to live in peace.

There has been a broad response across the planet to the new specific proposals by the Soviet state for including the Asian and Pacific region in the general process of creating an all-embracing system of international security and peaceful cooperation. There was a clear-cut sound to the

words spoken by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Vladivostok: "We have openly and honestly told all peoples and governments, and will continue to do so: Yes, we do need peace, and we are once more calling for a halt to the arms race, an end to the nuclear madness, and the liquidation of nuclear weapons, for a persistent quest for political solutions to regional conflicts."

The Soviet stance, which is shared and supported by the other socialist community countries, is conditioned not only by the interests of socialism. It is founded on profound anxiety for the fate of all mankind. After all, a nuclear war would be more than just a clash between two blocs, between two opposing forces; it would lead to a universal catastrophe. This is why the socialist countries are so insistently calling on the West to abandon the old and long-dead formula according to which everything that is good for the socialist countries must be rejected. It is absurd and criminal to act like this in our day and age. The time persistently demands a new understanding of the present stage of the development of civilization, international relations, and the world. The time persistently demands a new political thinking. The socialist community's peaceful initiatives are a fitting response to the challenge of the time. The fraternal countries are doing and will continue to do everything to ensure that this year, proclaimed International Peace Year by the United Nations, is marked by a true turn for the better, in the direction of a safer world.

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## EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET COMMENTATOR VIEWS PROSPECTS FOR CSCE PROCESS

PM100918 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Sep 86 First Edition p 5

[Igor Biryukov "Commentator's Column": "A Test for Europe"]

[Text] Fully aware of the realities of the nuclear age, the Warsaw Pact countries are jointly carrying out persistent, purposeful, and patient work in the international arena in order to achieve a fundamental turnabout for the better in the present complex and contradictory situation.

The clouds of military threat are gathering above the earth. But the potential of peace is more active and more powerful than ever before. The socialist community consistently strives to make the political dialogue between states with different social systems as specific and as fruitful as possible, and puts forward, one after the other, important and constructive initiatives for the strengthening of peace. A growing influence on the development of the world situation is exerted by the idea, put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress, of creating an all-embracing system of international security covering the military, political, economic, and humanitarian spheres.

The fraternal states are particularly concerned about Europe, where vast quantities of weapons have been accumulated. The socialist community countries perceive the utmost strengthening of security and cooperation on our continent as one of the central tasks of their foreign policy. This is why they devoted and continued to devote so much energy to the development of the all-European process which began with the Helsinki Final Act.

Now all people of goodwill expect weighty positive results from the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building and Security Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which was convened on the socialist countries' initiative and whose first stage is approaching conclusion.

Deputy foreign ministers from Warsaw Pact states gathered a few days ago in the capital of people's Poland. They discussed questions of preparations for the forthcoming November meeting of CSCE states in Vienna with a view to assisting in its successful holding. This approach by the socialist countries reflects a readiness to continue to help the further balanced development of the all-European process in all spheres of cooperation envisaged by the Helsinki Final Act.

Will the forthcoming Vienna meeting signify a turn for the better in East-West relations? This is a question of fundamental importance. Everything indicates that the socialist countries are honestly striving for precisely such a result. We perceive

a growing interest in positive changes among a number of other participants in the all-European process.

Unfortunately, however, there are also forces which would not be averse to turning any hall of negotiations into an arena of confrontation for the sake of selfish schemes, preparations for war, and even anticommunist extremism.

But the roots of all-European detente are strong and firm. Europe has sufficient experience and common sense to give an honorable reply to the challenge of the age.

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CSO: 5200/1594

#### EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: REPORTS, COMMENTS ON FINAL STAGE OF CDE

AFP Cites Barry, Grinevskiy

AU191047 Paris AFP in English 1041 GMT 19 Sep 86

[Text] Stockholm, Sept 19 (AFP)—The head of the U.S. delegation at European disarmament talks here Friday said that his task had been seriously undermined by recent leaks in Washington indicating a softening of the NATO position on checking Soviet troop movements.

But as the last day of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) began both sides stepped up efforts to reach a last-minute compromise on an accord to restore "confidence" regarding the military situation in Europe.

U.S. chief negotiation Robert Barry said he was "damned mad" at having learnt of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shift from repors in THE WASHINGTON POST and THE NEW YORK TIMES Wednesday. "There is nothing worse for a negotiation than to see his instructions published before he gets them," he said early Friday morning.

The reports, which were neither officially confirmed nor denied officially, revealed that the While House had decided to retract a demand that neutral planes be used to inspect movements of Soviet troops in Europe.

The choice of the planes would thus be left to the monitoring country and the country be be monitored, which in effect gives Moscow the right to veto. The shift modified what observers here saw as a major issue in the talks.

After the new stand was officially adopted Thursday, however, the Soviet Union noticeably toughened its general negotiating position, probably encouraged by the leaks, which had made it impossible for Western delegates to barter off their concessions.

But Soviet delegation head Oleg Grinevskiy was in more accommodating mood Friday morning, declaring that "90 per cent" of the NATO proposals on inspecting troops movements were "acceptable to us." "We welcome the plane proposals if they are based on an accord between the monitoring country and the country to be monitored," he added.

He was also optimistic on "resolving" the "delicate problem" of setting the thresholds above which troops manoeuvers would have to be declared and checked. The West wants the thresholds low enough so that the number of inspections can be increased. The current system has checks announce 21 days in advance for movements of 25,000 men or more.

Mr. Grinevskiy stood firm however on refusing demands by NATO that Western vehicles be used for land inspections.

A U.S. delegation member said Friday that if the Soviet Union didn't compromise, there would be no accord.

The conference is formally scheduled to close at midnight Friday, but the conference will probably be extended into the weekend to in and effort to reach an accord.

# Delegates Stop Clock

LD201836 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 20 Sep 86

[Text] The work of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security, and Disarmament in Europes is nearing its conclusion. Our correspondent Valentin Gubernatorov reports from the Swedish capital:

Late yesterday evening, the conference delegates decided to stop the clock in order to come to an agreement on the remaining unresolved issues. It's as if time was standing still in the Kulturheset building where the conference is taking place. Here, as before, 19 September is the official day for the end of the forum's work. But before stopping the clock, the conference participants provisionally adopted the majority of the clauses of the final document.

Early this morning, the delegates continued their talks in working groups. What is being discussed in particular is the problem of monitoring the fulfillment of accords that will be adopted in Stockholm. The majority of conference participants are optimistic and believe in its success. The only thing that can hinder this is the unconstructive stance of the United States, which has more than once already tried to win unilateral advantages for itself. But the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have never been adherents of diplomatic barter; they have always advocated achieving accords that would guarantee equal security of all the states participating in the talks. Is the Stockholm conference fated to end with positive results and strengthen confidence and security in Europe? This will become known very soon.

### Comment on Air Inspections

LD212116 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 21 Sep 86

[From the "International Panorama" program presented by Aleksandr Bovin]

[Text] On Friday the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Guilding Measures was supposed to end, but judging by the information that I have at my disposal, the general search for mutually-acceptable decisions is not over there yet. On the whole the progress there at this conference has been very appreciable and there is real hope for success. In principle everyone has agreed to notify one another about the concentration of troops and the restationing of troops on European territory, and the dates of the bringing in of troops onto European territory. They must decide on a number of other things, but there are some substantial details which have until recently given rise to controversy. Here is an example: They have agreed to carry out air inspections in certain situations. The question arises, however, whose plane should be used, whose

crew should it be? One position is that both plane and crew should belong to the country that is being inspected. Another proposal is that plane and crew should belong to a neutral country. As far as I understand somehow or other they have managed to get round this specific difficulty, but there are a few disputes remaining. However I repeat that on the whole there is real hope that a compromise will be found in Stockholm. It is interesting to note that the West European NATO allies are pressing Washington, nudging it toward a compromise at Stockholm. Recently the West German paper NEUER ANZEIGER reported that the foreign ministers of the FRG and Great Britain had sent letters to Shultz in which they warned Washington against any actions which could hamper the reaching of an accord at Stockholm. One can, of course, only welcome such a genuine European stance by NATO members for instance.

The Stockholm topic was discussed this week as well during the consultative meeting between Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl.

As a whole both leaders are, of course, in favor of success at the conference and in favor of confidence-building measures, but evidently the desire to play soldier remains intact whatever the age. Therefore both Thatcher and Kohl climbed into their respective tanks there, and fired one shot each. Well, of course the targets were hit, but I have just mentioned that by the way.

# Agreement of 'Great Importance'

LD220942 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0835 GMT 22 Sep 86

Stockholm, 22 Sep (TASS) - The first stage of the Conference on [Text] Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe has ended in the Swedish capital with the adoption of a final document aimed at strengthening mutual understanding and turning the European continent into a region of stable peace and cooperation. A qualitatively new level has been reached on the way to creating an atmosphere of greater confidence and strengthening security, which correspond to the vital interests of all the European states and peoples. The results of the Stockholm negotiations testify -- 0.A. Grinevskiy, special envoy, head of the USSR delegation, declared at the final plenary session -- that the policy of relaxation of tension has great reserves, that the logic of confrontation has been outgrown, and that the trend toward strengthening peace has deep roots and is in principle irreversible. results of the forum created a favorable basis for further progress toward a stage-by-stage realization of further effective and specific measures aimed at developing and stepping up the whole all-European process that was initiated more than 10 years ago in the Finnish capital. The results of the forum are of great importance for the work of the Vienna conference of representatives of member states of the Helskinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and serve as the guarantee of a successful start to the second stage of the conference, at which issues relating to disarmament on the European Continent will be discussed.

## Final Document Summarized

LD221017 Moscow TASS in English 0950 GMT 22 Sep 86

[Text] Stockholm, September 22 (TASS)--TASS correspondent Nikolay Vukolov reports:

The first stage of the Conference on Confidence— and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe closed here on Sunday. The conference has adopted a final document directed at strengthening mutual understanding and turning the European Continent into a region of lasting peace and cooperation.

As is seen from the accords contained in the final document, a qualitatively new stage has been achieved on the way to creating an atmosphere of greater confidence and strengthening security. This accord on non-use of force in international relations is aimed at ensuring the exercise by the states of their commitment to refrain from the use of force, including in the most dangerous area — the use of armed force.

Thus another important step has been made so that the international commitment to refrain from every threat of force or its use in mutual relations between countries should become an effective and indisputable law of international life.

Agreement has been also reached on a number of mutually-complementary measures to build up confidence and security in the military field and aimed at lessening the danger of military confrontation and at resolving the tasks pertaining to disarmament in Europe. These measures, which are of a politically mandatory character, cover such key issues as notification about military exercises, dispatch and movement of troops, exchange of annual plans of military activity, invitation of observers to attend exercises, limitation of military activity on the European continent. They are of substantial significance for reducing suspicion and lessening the risk of an armed conflict and use of force. These measures lay the important groundwork for building up confidence and security in Europe. Now a solid foundation of military aspects of European security is laid for political aspects of European security. This ensures great reliability in preserving peace and cooperation on the continent. The way is thus also paved towards broadening and spreading to other continents the package of confidence and security-building measures, which was adopted in Stockholm, so that it should become one of the component parts of the comprehensive international security system.

Special significance attaches now to accords as regards effective and adequate forms of verification, including on-site inspection. Reliable control over the observance of the accords reached is important for all stages of the process of building up confidence and security and ensuring disarmament not only in Europe, also all over the world.

Thus the Helsinki Final Act has been practically further developed in the final document of the Stockholm forum in the new important provisions stemming from the political and military realities existing in Europe at present.

This has become possible due to the consistent efforts of the socialist countries, the neutral and nonaligned states, all the participants in the conference, who have proved to be able to display political realism and a sense of responsibility, have overcome many difficulties and embarked on the path of compromise decisions based on the mutually-acceptable balance of security interests of all the participating countries. The results of the Stockholm talks have shown that the policy of detente has great reserves, that the logic of confrontation has become outdated, and the trend towards strengthening peace has deep roots and is irreversible in principle, Oleg Grinevskiy, head of the USSR delegation, ambassador at large, told the concluding plenary meeting.

The results of the forum lay good groundwork for stage-by-stage implementation of further effective and specific actions directed at developing and invigorating the whole all-European process. They are also of great significance for the work of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states -- participants in the conference on European security and cooperation.

# 'Other Side's Requirements' Noted

LD221813 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 22 Sep 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; V. Gubernatorov report from Stockholm]

[Text] The capital of Sweden will now go down in history as the place where important accords on turning Europe into a continent of peace and cooperation were achieved.

What does the experience of Stockholm teach us? First of all, it has shown that all issues, even the most sensitive ones like national security, can and must be resolved peacefully, behind the discussion table. Second, it has once again confirmed that Europe, the cradle of detente, was and remains a pioneer in the search for ways of reducing international tension, and the removal of the threat of war.

The document adopted at the conference has not only developed and deepened the tenets of the Helsinki Final Act, but it has also introduced fundamentally new elements into the stage-by-stage process of strengthening confidence and security on the continent. They include accords on the transfer of troops to Europe, on measures aimed at limiting major military activity.

In 3 years of difficult and complex talks, the participants in the conference nevertheless managed to seek out ways of solving such cardinal issues as the nonuse of force, notification of military exercises and troop movements, an exchange of annual plans for military activity, the invitation of observers, and inspection [proverka], they are all the result of compromise decisions, but not to the detriment of the interests of any one side's security.

This experience of Stockholm — to be able to measure one's own requirements [zaprosy] against the other side's requirements, to take account of the political and military realities of the present time — evidently should be strengthened and developed, too.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, which made a decisive contribution to the successful outcome of the Stockholm forum, think that good prospects now have emerged for the second stage of the conference, the all-European meeting in Vienna, which will concern itself with the issues of disarmament.

# Petrovskiy Press Conference

LD231259 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1015 GMT 23 Sep 86

[Text] New York, 23 Sep (TASS) -- V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, has given a press conference at the USSR's Permanent Mission at the United Nations devoted to the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe.

This conference, he stated, has been an extension and convincing confirmation of the viability of the all-European process that was started in Helsinki a little over 1) years ago.

The practical importance of the Stockholm accords lies in the fact that a package of political and military-technical measures has been agreed for reducing the risk of war in Europe and for strengthening security and confidence between those participating in the agreements that have been reached. The final document not only obligates participant states to respect and implement the principle of the non-use of the threat of force, but stresses no considerations can justify resorting to the threat of force or to the use of force in violation of this principle. Accords have been achieved concerning advance notification of specific types of military activity, starting from a level of at least 13,000 men for land forces and 300 tanks, and also concerning the annual exchange of plans for such military activity and its observation. Each participant state has the right to carry out inspections on the territory of any other participant state within the area of application of the measures for strengthening confidence and security.

Essentially what we are talking about is the first major agreement in the military and political field since the time of the signing of the Soviet-U.S. SALT II treaty. A foundation has been laid for new agreements, including agreements on a substantial reduction in troops and weapons in Europe, as proposed by the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

For its part the Soviet Union has done everything to encourage a positive outcome for the Stockholm Conference. Guided by the statement made 15 January by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, the Soviet side has made energetic new efforts to find solutions to the very important problems under discussion there. As a result of the USSR initiative, the issue of the non-use of force has received further development. In accordance with what we have proposed, solutions have been found in areas concerning the exchange of plans for military activity, the levels of such activity liable to notification, and the carrying out of on-site inspections.

In Stockholm the Soviet Union has implemented in practice its new approach to issues of monitoring, having confirmed that today the problem of monitoring as such does not exist where there really is a serious intention to seek mutually acceptable solutions leading to the lessening and the removal of the military danger.

A weighty contribution to the achievement of the accord has been made by all the socialist countries. Each one has more than once made specific proposals that have made possible the solution of some particular major problem. At all stages — including the sharp turning-points — a large constructive role has been played by the group of neutral and nonaligned countries. Success in Stockholm would have been unthinkable without the efforts made in return by all participants, including the Western countries that are NATO members.

Meetings and talks at summit level, and in particular the exchange of opinions between the leaders of the USSR and France, were of great importance for ensuring interaction between the socialist countries and the Western countries and for the achievement of results in Stockholm.

A great role was also played by talks between the ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR, Britain, Italy, the FRG and other European countries.

Questions concerning the achievement of agreement in Stockholm were discussed at the recent meeting between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and G. Shultz, U.S. secretary of state. We see in what took place at the conference a concrete example of the implementation of accords reached at summit level. This is a good indicator of the fact that Soviet-U.S. relations can and must be built not on a foundation of words, but on a foundation of practical deeds.

The significance of the successful completion of the Stockholm Conference goes far beyond the bounds of the European Continent and will undoubtedly have a favorable influence upon all international relations. it is good that this event coincides with the UN General Assembly session, the most representative gathering of states which has on its agenda questions concerning the strengthening of security and confidence in the world as a whole and in individual regions of the world; and also the limitation of weapons, and disarmament.

The successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference shows that in the current tense international atmosphere, too, it is possible to find mutually acceptable solutions to complex issues on a basis of goodwill and willingness to cooperate and compromise. The lesson of Stockholm says convincingly that the path toward security lies not through refusal to reach agreements, but on the contrary — through the strengthening of accords that are already in existence and through reaching new ones. Without agreements there cannot be a strong and stable structure of international relations, either on a regional or on a global scale.

In the success of Stockholm we see the emergence of new political thinking corresponding to the realities of the nuclear and space age and of the mutually interdependent world in which we live. The need for thinking of this kind was stressed with the utmost force by the 27th CPSU Congress: The Soviet Union is guided by it in its actions and initiatives, a real manifestation of which is the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the conviction that the Stockholm Conference is capable of serving as a powerful new impulse for joint efforts by all states in creating an all-embracing system of international peace and security, as is proposed in the joint initiative the socialist countries submitted at the current session of the United Nations. Practical and effective actions are needed to reach agreements on preventing an arms race in space and ending the arms race on earth. The Soviet Union is willing to participate energetically in working out constructive accords upon the example of the Stockholm accord both in Europe and on a global basis, in all areas of strengthening universal security.

Results 'Inspire Hope'

LD231440 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 23 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow, September 23 TASS--TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev writes:

The world public has received with satisfaction the news about the successful completion of the first stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

President Francois Mitterrand of France stated that the adoption of the final document of the conference in Stockholm was illustrative of the fact that the victory by the forces of patience and trust over mistrust was possible.

Politicians and public figures in a number of countries and mass media emphasize that the mutually acceptable solutions reached at the conference will contribute towards improving the climate in East-West relations itself.

The results of the forum in Stockholm involving 3 European countries and also the United States and Canada can be described with confidence as the ones that inspire hope. The final document of the conference has become the result of a reasonable compromise which was possible due to the tireless efforts by the countries of the socialist community, the neutral and non-aligned states, all participants in the conference who displayed political realism and the sense of responsibility for the destinies of the European nations.

It should be noted, however, that influential circles in the United Staes who saw their key task in the last six years in undercutting existing agreements on reducing the risk of a nuclear was received the accord on confidence— and security—building measures as their own defeat.

United States Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger stated that he did not consider the agreement reached as usual. He even deemed it appropriate to describe the attitude towards the Stockholm decisions by the United States President himself.

Weinberger contends that Reagan was interested in the very fact of the document signed and not in it content.

An international agreement was reached in Stockholm, the first one in the last six years, on concrete restrictions on the military activity, to which the United States Administration agreed. The conference has demonstrated that even given the existing differences in the approaches to the problems of war and peace, the sides can and should find mutually acceptable solutions.

One would like to hope that the successful completion of the first stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe will mark the long-awaited turn in the United States foreign policy from scuttling earlier reached agreements on scaling down the risk of a nuclear war with due regard for the security of all parties, with account of the realities of the current age.

'Opposed Tendencies' Surmounted

LD240824 Moscow in Portuguese to Portugal 2100 GMT 23 Sep 86

[Excerpts] The first stage of the Conference on Confidence— and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has closed in Stockholm. The lengthy marathon came to an end after almost 3 years. Thirty-three European countries, the United States and Canada approved the final document. What, then, are the results achieved? What accords have been struck by the participants? This is the subject of the following article by TASS military observer Colonel Vladimir Chernyshev:

[Passage omitted] Looking back at the path covered by the conference it is essential to point out that an incessant confrontation of opposed tendencies took place there from the beginning which worsened markedly when it came to drafting the final document.

The stand of several major NATO countries led by the United States actually worked as a constant brake on the proceedings. They sought to restrict the range of problems under discussion and to suppress the political aspects of strengthening confidence and security. Nevertheless, the conference managed to surmount these artificially raised obstacles.

What, then, was the secret of the conference's vitality? First and foremost, it lay in the flexibility and initiative shown by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries which did so much to attain solutions to key issues, found compromises, and took steps aimed at securing mutually acceptable accords.

In particular, it was possible, thanks to the socialist countries' flexible stand, to strike a compromise on a problem which had long remained unresolved -- namely, the notification of air exercises. Another important step was the agreement on notification of troop movements in Europe.

The understanding of, and support for the socialist countries' initiatives by the neutral and nonaligned countries, which themselves put forward constructive and practical proposals and contributed to a rapprochement between the opposing sides, also played an important role.

Finally, quite a number of the United States' European partners brought pressure to bear on it and forced it to desist from inflexible and unrealistic stances. [passage omitted]

The political components of security will henceforth be based on wider foundations than in the past, the foundations laid by the restrictive measures in the military sphere. This strengthens the cause of preserving peace and of developing cooperation in Europe.

The conference's successful outcome envisages the prospect of helping toward reducing military confrontation in Europe. This is of great importance to the work of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the participating states in the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation.

The improvement of the situation in Europe, a climate of peace and tranquility on the continent, must now play a greater role as an example to other parts of the world, as an example of constructive coexistence among different countries which acknowledge their interdependence and build their relations on a basis of confidence.

The results of the Stockholm Conference, furthermore, prove the greater potential of the policy of detente, prove that the logic of confrontation has become outdated and that the trend toward strengthening peace has deep roots and is irreversible in principle, Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS military observer, writes in conclusion.

# PRAVDA on Document's Importance

PM231551 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Sep 86 First Edition p 5

[Text] In our difficult time, when good international news is a rarity, Stockholm cannot fail to be gratifying. The success of the first stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which has just ended there, is obvious. The final document laid down accords encompassing the political and military spheres. [paragraph continues]

No movement for the better had been observed in the latter sphere for many years. A real summer swallow in the autumn days of September!

The world reaction to Stockholm has mainly been approving (apart from that in the Pentagon). Certain Western commentators are even talking about the "start of a new era of 'pridge-building' between East and West." Perhaps it is still not worth rushing too far ahead. However, these responses are in themselves remarkable: They reaffirm the mood of most people and the peoples' strengthening desire to move toward practical problem-solving. And in this sense the Stockholm accords are by no means a "consolation prize" but an event of truly great significance.

Take the accord on the nonuse of force in international relations. Need it be shown now important such a political condition is for Europe, where so many weapons have been accumulated and where major armies confront each other. But no less substantive are the complementary measures worked out in Stockholm on confidence— and security-building in the military sphere. When they come into force 1 January 1987 we can hope for a reduction in suspicion and a lessening of the risk of armed conflict on the continent. We would also cite the agreed measures for verifying [kontrol] the observance of the accords, including on-site inspections [inspektsii]. This necessary component in the agreement also effectively serves to strengthen trust [doveriye], of which there is currently a large shortage in international relations.

The Stockholm accords visibly continue the Helsinki process, which has considerable reserves. Europe is again setting a useful example for the rest of the world too. The practical results of the Stockholm conference may well be of service in building a comprehensive international security system, for instance.

But now thoughts turn primarily to the unique Stockholm lesson. Everyone knows work there was difficult and the international situation in which the conference was held is extremely tense. The line of confrontation — intimately related to the gamble on the arms race — in the policy of certain participants had seemingly put insuperable obstacles in the way of agreement. And yet ways were found in Stockholm of unraveling objectively complex questions. This means we must continue to learn to reach compromises and arrive at agreements. It means it is possible to solve the problems of safeguarding peace if sides show goodwill and realism.

This is probably the most important "lesson" of Stockholm for the immediate future. Even peace in Europe requires further serious efforts, and all mankind faces the key task of ending the arms race on earth and preventing one in space.

# Gorbachev Statement

LD241708 Moscow TASS in English 1700 GMT 24 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 24 TASS -- The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev today made the following statement on the results of the Stockholm conference.

The Soviet leadership positively assesses the results of the conference in Stockholm on Confidence— and Security-Building Measures in Europe. A major step has been made towards easing tension and improving the international political climate which is so necessary for solving the vital problems of our nuclear age.

This is a victory of common sense, a gain by all the thirty five countries attending the conference. They managed to rise above differences and reach accords which are important not just in themselves but also improve the prospects of creating a stable situation in Europe. The success in Stockholm can serve the expansion of the atmosphere of trust on the international scale as well.

The Soviet Union sees in this agreement upshoots of new thinking in world politics which are germinating on European soil. Stockholm has proved that even in a complex situation it is possible to reach agreement on questions of security if there is the political will and desire for this. It is an example of how one can and must conduct the new construction of detente, develop new relations among states.

'East, West Allies, Not Adversaries'

LD240326 Moscow in French to France and Belgium 1730 GMT 24 Sep 86

[From the "Notes of a Publicist" Program presented by Boris Tumanov]

[Excerpt] Good evening, listeners. History, our only judge and teacher, will give a good mark for the efforts of the 35 Eastern and Western countries which led them to sign the final document of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security, and Disarmament in Europe, which has just ended in Stockholm. [passage omitted]

The Stockholm conference once again proved a truth which is obvious in the end, but often challenged by the enemies of detente: namely the East and West must and can be allies, and not adversaries where it is a matter of preventing war and preserving peace. In this context, there is particular stress in the Soviet Union on the very important role played in the success of the Stockholm conference by exchanges of views between leaders of the USSR and France. We in the USSR do not believe we have a monopoly of good sense, and thus we do not believe that anyone could have signed the final document of the Stockholm Conference against his will or interests.

We are equal in facing a common danger and everything which distances us from the threat of a world cataclysm is of advantage to all of us equally.

This is why I find it difficult to understand the hesitation of my colleagues at LE MONDE who wonder whether they should describe the successes of the Stockholm conference as a historic event or a batched compromise ushering further difficulties between the East and West.

U.S. Secretary for Defense Weinberger had no hesitation. Quite the contrary. I do not believe, he says, that the Stockholm agreement will be useful. You recognize the refrain. As soon as a movement for detente and mutual understanding begins between East and West, the wreckers are there. A compromise between the East and West can only be useless or badly worked out. So, then, what can be done well ultimately between the East and West according to them? A war perhaps?

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## **EUROPEAN CONFERENCES**

GDR TV REPORT ON GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

DW292026 East Berlin Television Service in German 1730 GMT 29 Jul 86

[No video available]

[Text] At the plenary meeting of the Geneva Disarmament Conference today the problem of a general ban on all nuclear tests was the dominating subject. The Vietnamese ambassador, (Nguyen Tuong), said that the Warsaw Pact's recent proposals fully met the Nonaligned Countries' interests. It was particularly necessary now to prevent the arms race in space and to conclude an agreement on the full ban on all nuclear arms tests. On behalf of the Netherlands, (Robert Van Scheik) said today that the USSR's most recent offers on the verification of the test ban were very important and deserved being closely studied. Following the meeting today, we discussed that problem with Swedish Ambassador (Rolf Ekkeel):

[Begin recording in English with superimposed German translation] [Question] At the meeting you heard new proposals by the Soviet Union on verification and inspection regarding the observance of a nuclear test ban. What do you think about the new proposals?

[(Ekkeel)] We think that the proposals fit very well into the process that we have pursued for several years now. The proposals to use more advanced technology for the verification of the test ban must be assessed as constructive. It will allow the improvement of the functioning of a verification system and bring us closer to the goal of the conference, namely, the conclusion of an agreement on a nuclear test ban.

[Question] Last week, there was a very intensive dialogue between your country's government and the GDR leadership. How do you judge the political significance of those talks?

[(Ekkeel)] We think that the dialogue between us is very important, particularly in connection with European security. It is of importance for our joint efforts for bridging the differences which regrettably still exist on our continent. Translated to the larger scale of the disarmament conference in the scope of the United Nations organization, such positive developments certainly are in the interests of the international community and generally will also have positive effects here.

[Question] Thank you very much. [end recording]

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## **EUROPEAN CONFERENCES**

## XINHUA ON STOCKHOLM DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

# OW221301 Beijing XINHUA in English 1201 GMT 22 Sep 86

["Roundup: Stockholm Conference Ends With Certain Progress on European Security Issue (by Xie Linfeng)" -- XINHUA headline]

[Text] Stockholm, September 22 (XINHUA) — The 35-nation Stockholm disarmament conference ended here today after reaching agreement on avoiding accidental wars in Europe at the last hours of the 32 month tough and difficult negotiations.

According to the final document of the conference, delegates from the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all other European nations except Albania agreed unanimously to a package of accords on the verification of military activities in Europe.

### The main accords are:

- -- To notify each other at least 42 days in advance of any military manoeuvres involving more than 13,000 men or 300 tanks.
- -- To give each other the limited right to inspect military activities or areas, each country can make up to three on-site visits a year.
- -- To invite other signatories to observe manoeuvres involving more than 17,000 troops. This applies to roughly 10 exercises per year in each camp.
- -- To draw up a calender, to be issued by November 15 each year, detailing notifiable manoeuvres in the year ahead.
- -- To assure not to use arms or threaten to use arms against the territories and independence of the other countries.

The agreement, regarded as a major move in easing East-West tension in the 1980s, is mainly the result of concessions from both sides.

The Stockholm conference, formally known as the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, started on January 17, 1984 within the framework of the 1983 Madrid European Security Conference Accord, but it made little headway during the first year as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were strained by issues such as the Euro-missiles.

After the re-election of Ronald Reagan as the U.S. President and the ascent to the Kremlin leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev at the beginning of 1985, the Stockholm conference entered a "constructive phase" with both sides proposing "conference-building measures," although they were quite different from each other.

At the first Reagan-Gorbachev meeting last November, the two countries finally agreed to base the negotiations at Stockholm on compromising initiatives proposed by the neutral states.

Only in the past eight months, however, the United States and the Soviet Union, the two most powerful participants of the Stockholm conference, engaged in serious negotiations as the Stockholm conference was approaching its deadline and both the Soviets and Americans needed some progress in the talks to dramatize the second Reagan-Gorbachev meeting presumably to be held at the end of this year.

During the 11th session of the Stockholm conference, the Soviet side only demanded that the military activities on the ground or associated with the army be informed in advance and independent air force movements will be discussed at the next Conference on European security. This obviously reversed the previous Soviet stand that all air and marine military activities be informed.

The Soviet Union also gave up its opposition to the Western countries' request for on-site inspection of military activities and finally agreed to three such inspections.

The Soviet consent to on-site inspection cleared a major obstacle to an agreement in the Stockholm conference and was welcomed by the West.

On the other hand, the Western countries made a rather big concession by raising the size of the military maneuvers to be notified in advance to 13,000 soldiers from 6,000 they had originally proposed. They also reduced the number of on-site inspections to three every year and pledged not to abuse the right of inspection.

At the final moment, the U.S. side stepped back from its insistence on using inspectors' own planes in the on-site inspection and agreed to use transport means provided by the inspected side.

During the Stockholm conference, the neutral and non-aligned European countries, as well as Federal Germany, Britain and France played important mediatory roles and helped the United States and the Soviet Union make mutual concessions.

Observers here believed that the Stockholm conference marked a step forward in the East-West dialogue and in easing tension in Europe. But they cautioned that one should not think too highly of the achievements since the two superpowers are still far apart on substantial disarmament.

/9274 CSO: 5200/4004 **EUROPEAN CONFERENCES** 

### BRIEFS

USSR CDE DELEGATION--Stockholm, 4 September (TASS)--A meeting between the USSR delegation to the Conference on Confident and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and members of the Secretariat of the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation was held here. The representatives of that public organisation spoke highly of the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries aimed at a successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference. They emphasized that peoples of Europe and the whole world expect from the conference positive results.

[Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1502 GMT 4 Sep 86 LD] /12858

CSO: 5200/1594

Our proposals within the framework of an all-round security system also include measures in the humanitarian sphere, which are significant for trust, mutual understanding, and strong, durable relations. In addition they concern the whole sphere of people's mentality; they are aimed against misconceptions, prejudices, against racism and chauvinism, against the propaganda of war. These are the most important measures, although, of course, it is also necessary to solve the purely human problems — those of the reunification of families, the exchange of information, and so on.

[Question] While we're talking of trust in interhuman relations: the Americans speculated on this matter for some time and then, when they were offered wide-ranging cooperation in this sphere, too, they suddenly started to back out. It is enough to recall the spring debate of experts on the matter of interhuman contacts, held in Bern. Then the United States, at the last moment, announced a veto of a document agreed upon by 35 countries taking part in the all-European process. How do you assess such a move?

[Arbatov] This is very characteristic of American tactics. Frankly we are only just beginning to learn how to combat it. Only please understand me well: We are fighting against American tactics — that does not mean we are fighting Americans. One must constantly learn to live in contemporary, new situations. After all, no one is perfect. Speaking in the French Parliament, Comrade Gorbachegev said that human thought cannot, unfortunately, keep up with changing realities. Currently we are busy trying to rearrange many of our conceptions in accordance with these new realities in, among other things, military and political matters. Here we are totally self-critical — although the results of our efforts are already visible to the whole world. They include a whole series of Soviet proposals; they include the shaping of a new way of thinking which would accord with the present time and which has already reached a definite level of maturity.

#### Part Two

LD172112 Moscow International Service in Polish 1300 GMT 17 Sep 86

[Part two of three-part interview with Academician Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute, by unidentified correspondent; place not given; Arbitov speaking in Russian with superimposed Polish translation — live or recorded]

[Text] We will continue yesterday's conversation with the well-known Soviet expert on U.S. affairs, Academician Georgiy Arbatov. Academician Arbatov represents the Soviet Union in the Olof Palme independent commission on disarmament and security affairs, Yesterday, we discussed the principle based on trust through disarmament. Here is today's first for Academician Georgiy Arbatov:

[Question] Americans more and more often now claim that if the United States joined the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests it would undermine their security. Is this, in your opinion, true naivete or intended hypocrisy?

[Arbatov] In my opinion, the question has not been very well put because answering it I would have to accuse the U.S. leaders of telling a treacherous lie, or claim without sufficient evidence that it is true naivete. I can only say that serious U.S. experts believe that a mutual moratorium has nothing to do with undermining the security of the United States. Just the opposite. Bringing nuclear tests to an end and real steps on the path to disarmament until the complete liberation from nuclear weapons would be compatible with the vital interests of U.S. security. It would be as compatible with U.S. interests as with our interests.

[Question] What positions on U.S. security have you encountered?

[Arbatov] Some people think that true U.S. security will be guaranteed the moment the Americans are able to plant in the Soviet Union someone like Duvalier or Marcos, and as the leader, someone who would be obedient to the United States.

Exactly this, no more, nor less. When the Soviet Union was referred to in the United States as an evil empire, such opinions were quite noticeable.

There are also other opinions suggesting that U.S. security calls for the liquidation of existing political systems in a number of countries such as Libya, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, and so on. Some people treat U.S. security as a right to a decisive say in all regions where its vital interests are involved. As we know, these vital interests concern the entire world. Thus one must conclude that this is nothing but another version of the famous dream about an American era.

[Question] What in this context are our positions concerning security?

[Arbatov] Our criterion is based on mutual and universal security which has been defined in detail in a report by the Palme commission. The struggle for common security is our official doctrine. There can be no security of one country at the expense of another. That means that security on one side can be ensured only when the other side also feels secure. The report by the Palme commission was, in fact, entitled "Common Security;" indeed, common security. If the arms race after 1945 has taught us anything, it is that security is a political, not a military-technical, problem. It can only be resolved by political means.

[Question] Discussing problems of common security, we say: A Soviet initiative, U.S. opinion. But, after all, the moratorium is surely not only a Soviet initiative, but also the fruit of the concerted political thinking of the Warsaw Pact states.

[Arbatov] This is a compulsory ingredient, on which decisionmaking is conditional. When we say a Soviet initiative, it is because we, in spite of everything, bear a special responsibility, as the sole nuclear superpower among the Warsaw Pact countries. (?However), in the field of conventional weapons, we put forward joint initiatives for the entire Warsaw Pact. Even in matters including nuclear weapons, we naturally hold consultations. IN these consultations we not only inform but take additional proposals into account. We agree on our ideas with our allies. What's more, searching for roads leading to common security, we listen to world opinion. We see, after all, that the majority of our initiatives meet with a positive response in the UN General Assembly. Or another example: The stance of the Palme Commission and the Delhi Six does not depart in principle from our proposals. Besides this, the concept of a mutual moratorium is supported by the majority of Americans. Even so, the White House reacts negatively; but that is just a matter of democracy.

As for the U.S. side, it answers for itself. Even the NATO allies only found out in the press about many of Washington's most important military-political decisions.

[Question] We talk about the unilateral nature of the Soviet moratorium. To what extent can these unilateral moves at all guarantee specific results in ensuring security? Can they contribute to progress toward disarmament?

[Arbatov] The force of example plays an enormous part. Unilateral moves can be exceedingly useful, particularly in creating trust. If the Soviet Union does not carry out nuclear explosions, obviously people in the West begin to think: Since the Soviet Union, which is constantly being accused of having an obsession — after its bitter experiences in World War II — with its own security, decides on such a step, then there is nothing dangerous in it.

Why is it, then, that the United States cannot act in a similar way? A definite effect, already exists in the sense of political moods. It is difficult to foretell what will happen next. In my opinion, however, unilateral moves are important and beneficial.

I would like to cite another example: Not long ago we invited the Americans to install their equipment near our nuclear testing grounds. This was a great blow to falsely created conceptions that present the Soviet Union as a sinister and mysterious force that fears every ray of light. Is this not a true political factor, when people see that this is not so? Hence, the conclusion that this type of move is very important, the more so that, throughout history, unilateral moves have usually been undertaken in the opposite direction and very easily undertaken at that. Wars broke out and new armaments systems were invented.

### Part Three

LD182353 Moscow International Service in Polish 1300 GMT 18 Sep 86

[Last part of three-part interview with Academician Arbatov, director of the United States and Canada Institute, by unidentified Radio Moscow correspondent; place not given; Arbatov speaking in Russian with superimposed Polish translation -- recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified announcer] Ladies and gentlemen, we invite you to hear the last part of an interview between the Radio Moscow correspondent and the well-known Soviet expert on U.S. affairs, Academician Georgiy Arbatov, a member of the independent commssion on disarmament and security known as the Palem Commission. We dealt with the importance of the principle of confidence through disarmament in previous installments. We established that the contemporary world's security is only possible through mutual security. Our next question to Academician Arbatov: As is well known, driving force of the arms race and its constant stimulator is military-industrial business. From the point of view of U.S. arms producers, there are two attractive elements: above all, the unusually high profit margin in the military trade, and next the characteristic concept of patriotism. None of the military industrialists will voluntarily give up these profits, in which case, some alternative to the military market is indispensable. What is his view on this?

[Begin recording] [Arbatov] Economic interests undeniably encourage the arms race, although the influence of political circles of the military industry is considerably greater in the United States than its economic qualitative weight. It is a greedy business. This greed can create simply absurd situations. I can state with fullest conviction that here at home, if a general acquired a simple hammer for \$200, or if he paid \$750 for a toilet seat, he would be placed before a court of law. However, in the United States as if in a kaleidescope, facts have been uncovered which testify that industry literally pushes the most expensive and the cheapest items onto the Pentagon at deliberately inflated prices. I believe that a halt in the arms race will not only not create new problems from an economic point of view, but will also solve many of the existing ones. The United States has so many real interests in the sphere of the peace economy that a reduction in the military trade cannot create a vacuum. It is clear that the greed of individuals will have to be limited at that time, but after all, in principle, in conditions of capitalism the battle continues, the battle to try and reconcile in any way whatsoever the interests of the rich minority with the considerably wider national interest.

[Correspondent] In other words, the U.S. Administration's course in the arms race does not take the U.S. economy's interests into account but does exactly the opposite, and harms those interests. And the consequences of the arms race are disastrous for U.S. industry.

[Arbatov] The United States has presently directed an enormous portion of its intellectual potential, resources, and its best equipment into the military sphere, which inevitably causes the loss of its competitive ability on the world market. All problems connected previously to competitive ability were defended by the very high course [words indistinct]. At present, the fall in the (?value of) the dollar amounts to 40 percent and the balance of payments deficit has grown even more. The question is posed: Why? Because U.S. goods have lost their competitive ability. Even the Americans prefer to purchase Japanese or West German goods than their own.

The end result is that in the United States at present more than 30 percent of machine tools, 25 to 30 percent of cars, and perhaps 85 to 90 percent of electronic domestic goods are imports, not to mention such conventional goods as steel, footwear, textiles, and others. The process of de-industrializing the United States is continuing [words indistinct]. It is being used by many patriotically inclined Americans who belong to the ruling class — that is, industrialists and investors. This is a very dangerous process for the U.S. economy and its development has a distorted character.

[Correspondent] The matter of the U.S. industry's competitive abilities is just one aspect of the problem which is caused by the arms race in the United States. Undoubtedly there are others.

[Arbatov] Certainly there are others. How is it that in a rich country — on a world scale — there are enormous poor districts in big cities, such as Harlem in New York, districts inhabited by the destitute in Los Angeles or in the southern part of Chicago? We do not see such dreadful slums even in developing countries. I am sure we would not find them in Cuba, nor would we find them in China. I would have difficulty in saying where else, apart from the United States, where such poverty, such despair, such unsanitary conditions, and such a state in which despairing people are deprived of all [word indistinct] exists.

One more problem: How can the United States, (?such a great power), reject all conern for the world around it. After all, the world comes into contact with the enormity of problems on a large scale, and that is something to which resources should be assigned. For can we — the countries which have a higher level of development — successfully exist and develop when the greater part of mankind is falling over more deeply into the abyss of despair, poverty, hunger, and death? The tragedy is that not those resources which are surplus but those which are presently vitally essential to the United States are being diverted to the arms race. These are sums which are essential for the destitute and the homeless of the United States. And the most eminent achievements of the intellect and priceless resources are being wasted. In addition all this is being assigned not simply for useless things but for fatally dangerous goals.

[Correspondent] So if the arms race were to stop, mankind would have a chance to at last of solve its global problems, and each nation, the U.S. included, could directly turn its whole attention to its internal problems. However, the arms race is still continuing, and not only in the nuclear sphere.

What do you think? Can a joint moratorium on nuclear tests have some influence on disarmament in such related areas as chemical arms or conventional arms?

[Arbatov] I believe that a joint moratorium will pave the way for achieving an agreement regarding a general ban on nuclear tests. Such an agreement will halt the nuclear arms race in its most dangerous field — namely, the qualitative field, the area of creating new types of offensive weapons. This will definitely ease the working-out of an agreement in the matter of nuclear arms reduction. And a reduction in nuclear arms only makes sense if steps are undertaken so that military rivalry does not automatically embrace neighboring spheres. And this is precisely what ensues from the Soviet proposals. It is essential to have reliable guarantees within the framework, for example, of chemical arms because science has gained such imposing achievements today that these achievements can cause the destruction of the whole of mankind. Incidentally, conventional arms have today become quite unconventional. These weapons caused the destruction of 55 million people in the last war and if one were to make an extrapolation of the dynamics of the world's development, just extrapolation, without taking the intensive development of military technologies into account, estimates would show that almost 1 and 1/2 billion people will die in another

[Correspondent] So, when we are talking about a total ban on nuclear tests this in fact means a proposal to demilitarize the contemporary world?

[Arbatov] We are not idealists. Of course, some armies and some weapons will remain but there will be considerably less of them. [Words indistinct] when trust appears, as well as possibilities to streamline efforts onto other paths to solve tasks worthy of man. [end recording]

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cso: 5200/1593

# NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

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PRAVDA GIVES REASSURANCE ON SECURITY CONCERNS OVER MORATORIUM

PM241201 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Sep 86 Second Edition p 4

[Article by political observer Vitaliy Korionov: "The Branch, the Sword, and Reason"]

[Text] People all over the world are listening with increasing alarm to the thunder of nuclear explosions from the U.S. test sites in Nevada. More and more frequently they are asking: Surely this cannot go on forever? What is it all leading to?

Such questions also occur to some Soviet people, undoubtedly patriots, who are legitimately concerned about the security of our motherland. I have before me, for example, a letter sent to the editorial office recently by A.A. Ryabov, a young specialist from Moscow.

"You do not have to be a prophet," he writes, "to see that the Americans will not accept the moratorium and that, consequently, to continue it is to harm our country's security by giving the United States hope of being able to overtake us while we abide by the moratorium." He continues: "The sword cannot be fought with the [olive] branch, it can only be fought with the sword."

Frankly, I understand Comrade Ryabov and the reasons that prompted him to write to the editorial office. Indeed, this is not an easy situation. For over a year now we have conducted no nuclear explosions. Even before the moratorium the USSR was not obsessed with them and conducted considerably fewer tests than the United States, and, what is more, one—third of them were carried out for peaceful national economic purposes. You can understand what such an 18-month gap means for our socialist state, especially when the Americans are exploding one nuclear charge after another and there is still no end in sight. The U.S. press reports that the Pentagon intends to carry out hundreds more explosions.

In such a situation does the moratorium not create a threat to the security of our country and our allies? Are we not showing undue restraint? Questions of this kind are understandable. We make no secret of the fact that the decision taken by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the Soviet Government to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions to 1 January 1987 was not easy to take. It was an extraordinarily crucial [otvetsvennyy] and difficult decision for the Soviet leadership. This has been stated with the utmost directness by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Nevertheless, that decision was taken. And life and the course of events confirm that it was right.

But above all we shall not close our eyes to the times in which we live. And we live in the age of nuclear weapons. It has been said that the sword can only be fought by the sword. But surely this dictum belongs to the prenuclear era. In our era the sword is above all a nuclear sword. That is what worries mankind. And what will become of us if we start brandishing that sword as recklessly as the transatlantic militarists? Even if the image of the two swords suggests a balance of strategic forces (which balance is being maintained at the moment), these nuclear swords would be too dangerous for mankind. They bring not security but equal danger for all.

The modern era imperatively demands new thinking. The problems of the nuclear age cannot be resolved by following the old stereotypes. They are the problems of the survival of the human species and of life itself on earth. States' security in our age cannot be safeguarded by military means alone. This question is now to a tremendous extent a political one. That is how our party and our country approach it.

The Soviet Union has solemnly declared that it will never be the first to use nuclear The USSR has put forward for the first time in history an all-embracing and realistic program for the gradual and complete elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. Seeking to set a good example, the USSR unilaterally ceased all nuclear explosions, thereby winning tremendous new respect from all the peoples, who can see that the Soviet land not only makes proposals but acts on them, too. These actions are not dictated by weakness on our part. As a 19th century writer said, fury is a sign of weakness. It is that fury which is characteristic of the "war party" in Washington. It views fearfully the course of history. with trepidation as its position in justification and defense of nuclear tests is gradually undermined. Time is working against the policy whose whole "wisdom" is based on the nuclear-space cudgel. We, however, represent a world confidently moving toward the realization of mankind's best hopes. Only a party characterized by a sense of the greatest responsibility to its people and all mankind is capable of bold steps such as those the CPSU is taking.

People may object: Surely they are continuing their dark deeds across the ocean. It is clear that the U.S. tests' main aim is to create [sozdaniye] fundamentally new types of armaments designed to wage nuclear war not only on earth but also in space.

Yes, they are continuing to do that for the time being. But I would venture to say that this is indeed just for the time being. Time is working against the "hawks". And our moratorium is playing an ever-increasing role here. As an important factor of the political life of the world today, it is working in favor of the peoples and the cause of international security.

What is essentially a worldwide referendum has been launched on the Soviet moratorium, which is a specific, practical measure on the path of nuclear disarmament. And the course of that referendum shows that our actions are supported by the vast majority of the world's population. They are approved by the conscience of contemporary mankind. They are welcomed by the majority of UN member states. The USSR's actions find increasing understanding among the developing and nonaligned countries. The position of "Delhi Six" is just one example of that. The voice of reason is becoming louder and louder in the United States itself, including within Congress. It would be easier to list those who oppose the moratorium. The current Washington administration's moral and political isolation is intensifying. Essentially it is now in a kind of "moral bunker." But it can hardly remain there long.

By all accounts, the current Washington administration will resist the ending of nuclear tests until the "last shot has been fired," as the saying goes. The military-industrial complex's noose is too tight around its neck. But ultimately, everything does not revolve around it any more than everything in today's world revolves around the United States.

The "war party" has been active in the United States in previous decades, too. Nevertheless, it was possible in the seventies to break its resistance — also with the participation of realistically minded influential circles in the United States itself — and to conclude a number of important international treaties forming barriers to an unrestrained arms race. As is well known, some of these agreements are in force now. Why should we abandon the efforts to conclude new agreements? Quite the reverse, these efforts should be increased, and we are confident that they will be crowned with success.

We have faith in human reason, including the reason and dignity of the U.S. people. for the U.S. ruling circles' present policy is leading the cause of the security of all states, including their own, into an impasse. Yet together with all thinking mankind we are paving the peoples' way to a world without wars and weapons. And sooner or later most of mankind will follow this path, the only correct one.

Of course, we do not have the slightest illusions about the people we have to deal with in the capitalist world. For that reason the fatherland's security is a sacred cause for the party, the government, and all our people.

By brandishing nuclear weapons the imperialist forces, particularly in the United States, are trying to intimidate Soviet poeple, pinning particular hopes on the "Star Wars" program, which for purposes of deception is called the "Strategic Defense Initiative." At the same time they are counting on forcing the USSR into unnecessary expenditure. That card will also be covered! The United States does not have the monopoly of scientific and technical progress in the military sphere. If necessary Moscow knows ways to nullify [obestseneniye] the "Star Wars" program, ways which furthermore are quicker and cheaper than those proposed by Washington.

"As for our economic concerns," M.S. Gorbachev noted in his replies to questions from RUDE PRAVO, "we would like to deal with them faster and better and thus would welcome any opportunity to switch resources and manpower from defense to civil sectors and to improving people's well-being. But we will never sacrifice our security interests to that end and will not make concessions on that score, including at talks. Indeed, the Soviet people would not let us do that."

Lenin's party will never allow the security of our country or of our socialist friends to be harmed. Soviet people can rest easy on that score.

But at the same time we must always remember that it is primarily the motherland's economic might which is the foundation of the country's reliable security. The cause of peace depends directly on each of us at his work place working to a high standard and with maximum effort. History and the present day prove that if we are weak, the enemies of socialism will intensify the pressure. If we become stronger and sounder economically and in the social and political sphere, the capitalist world's interest in normal relations with us also grows and the illusions that history can be reversed are dispelled.

The course by which Lenin's party is leading us is a true, farsighted, and comprehensively weighed and considered course. By following it unswervingly we shall thwart the schemes of the enemies of peace and strengthen still further the cause of socialism and international security.

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CSO: 5200/1595

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET DAILIES REPORT COMMENTS ON MORATORIUM

Trade Unions Leader

LD020346 Moscow TASS in English 2013 GMT 1 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow, 1 Sep, TASS--The Soviet trade unions, which have a membership of 137 million, unconditionally support the decision of the Soviet leadership to extend the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions to the beginning of 1987, Stepan Shalayev, chairman of the Central Council of the Soviet Trade Unions, said today at an anti-war rally in Moscow on the occasion of day of trade union action for peace. The rally was attended, among others, by representatives of foreign trade union centres.

Having extended its unilateral moratorium, the USSR made a contribution to international security, Shalayev said. It thus ushered in a new stage in the peace efforts, which calls for resolute actions of all the sensible people.

Washington, however, is pointedly unwilling to revise its dangerous militarist course, Shalayev continued. This policy is being pushed first and foremost by the U.S. military-industrial complex and big private capital. It is not one of their least objectives to exhaust the USSR economically by the arms race. This goal is illusory, however, because the USSR and the socialist community as a whole have everything they need to thwart these plans.

The trade union leader said that the latest peace initiatives of the USSR had been approved by such major trade union centres in West European countries as the General Confederation of Labour of Brance, the British Trade Union Congress, the Association of German Trade Unions (West Germany), the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers—National Intersindical, the Association of Workers' Commissions of Spain and the Scandinavian Trade Unions.

The anti-war rally in Moscow heard statements in support of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests from Bryan Price, executive secretary of the International (Dublin) Trade Union Committee on Peace and Disarmament, Semeon Semenov, secretary of the Sofia City Council of Trade Unions (Bulgaria), Pekka Rautapporas, a member of the Presidium of the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions, Guido Gabotto, a member of the National Leadership of the Christian Association of Italian Workers, and representatives of other trade union centres.

#### FRG CP Leader

LD131724 Moscow TASS in English 1619 GMT 13 Sep 86

[Text] Bottrop, 13 Sep, TASS--"The communists of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) are fully determined to do everything to secure that the historic chance in the cause of concrete disarmament, the chance which is being given to mankind by the Soviet Union's moratorium on any nuclear explosions, be utilised," stated Herbert Mies, chairman of the German Communist Party (DKP).

Speaking today at a pre-election conference of the DKP in the Ruhr City of Bottrop, Herbert Mies specially pointed out that it was essential to make every effort to urge the FRG's Government to successive actions in the cause of completely ending and banning the tests of nuclear weapons, to break off agreements with the United States on West German firms' participation in the realization of the SDI, and to remove U.S. first-strike nuclear missiles from the FRG's territory.

The participants in the conference discussed the tasks of the FRG's communists in view of the forthcoming general elections to the country's parliament early next year.

# 'Key Question'

PM190925 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 36, 15 Sep 86 pp 3-4

[Valentin Falin article: "The Age of Wars Is Past. Moscow Appeals to Common Sense"]

[Text] Mikhail Gorbachev and President Reagan agreed in Geneva last November that practical steps should be taken to improve Soviet-American relations as part of the process of improving the overall world situation. The parties pledged to concentrate their efforts on preventing an arms race in outer space and ending the arms race on earth. The idea was that the summit meeting the sides planned and are still planning for 1986 would sum up these joint and unilateral efforts and consolidate their results to make the fresh progress.

Travelling in the Soviet Far East, Mikhail Gorbachev noted in one of his speeches that the understanding between the President and himself was not to meet at all events, regardless of the situation and of what the two sides were doing jointly or unilaterally. We do not need a summit for the sake of a summit, just to fan the wind. The peoples expect from the leaders actions, not words.

If they seek concrete measures, the states are naturally expected to concentrate on problems which lend themselves to practical solutions. One such problem, comparatively easy to resolve technologically and politically, is the ending of nuclear weapon tests. It is simple because the Soviet Union has been refraining from nuclear tests for more than a year now and because the only thing needed to settle the matter is good will on the part of the United States. Regrettably, Washington has declined every Soviet offer — and there have been several — on formalizing a nuclear test ban. To all appearances, the Soviet drafts and proposals have not even been seriously considered.

Meanwhile, continued nuclear testing (or a test ban) is the answer to the question of what the two powers plan for the future. Do they want to escalate preparations for war

or are they going to reverse them, work for the deliverance of mankind from nuclear weapons and endeavour to create stable and more humane conditions for the international community? This, in fact, is the key question about what there should be absolute clarity. Innuendo and prevarication in the matter of survival are intolerable and inadmissible.

Washington's refusal to stop testing nuclear weapons does not tally with its declarations that it is desirable "eventually" to have these weapons banned and taken out of the arsenals of all countries. Yet the practical American course of developing new systems and types of nuclear weapon is entirely compatible with U.S. attempts to wreck the entire arms control system developed with so much effort in the 1960s and 1970s. The refusal to join the Soviet moratorium, the subversion of the ABM treaty, the continuing tests in Nevada and the avowed intention no longer to comply with the SALT-1 and SALT-2 accords are all falling into a pattern.

Kenneth Adelman, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, spelled out the reasons for which the Americans decided not to ratify the SALT-2 Treaty. The ratification of the treaty, according to him, would have meant that the principles which underlay the process of the limitation of strategic offensive arms would have been carried into the 1980s and become binding on the U.S. — and the current Administration could not have lived with such a situation.

So it is principles that Washington is unhappy about, especially the principle of equality and equal security. The United States does not consider security to be an asset common to all states but wants for itself a special, custom-built security which disregards the interests and vital needs of others. The Americans even threaten other countries that if they do not agree to it, the U.S. will claim it by force.

The concept of forces should not be simplified and reduced to weapons in firing positions: the persistent U.S. attempts to involve the Soviet Union in a competition in the development of ever newer weapons systems, which are becoming increasingly costly, are also a form of warfare. The Americans once called it the "cold" war, although the philosophy behind it was little different from that of a "shooting" war. In 1947, when Washington had even less regard than today for public opinion and its own allies, the goal was formulated to increase dramatically the external burden on the U.S.S.R. with a view to destroying or eventually eroding the Soviet type of government. [paragraph continues]

Today something reminiscent of that insane idea is called the Strategic Defense Initiative.

To all appearances, the lesson of the cold war and the "painful revision" of policy in the 1960's and 1970's has been lost on Washington.

Adults are sometimes victim of infantile diseases and such ailments have very dangerous effects. But will mankind have to wait for them to recover? If the neoglobalists were isolated from the rest of the world, they could be left to their own devices. But the U.S. Administration is not going to fight itself or go in for shadowboxing: the plan is to put space strike stations into orbit over other countries. This is equivalent to the de facto establishment before the second world war of a continuous air patrol system over the key military targets of a "potential enemy." At that time no one would have tolerated it and today, in the nuclear age, the idea is not likely to be accepted by anyone in his right mind.

So it is to the common sense, instinct for survival, dignity and ordinary human notions of morality of Americans, West Europeans and other people the world over that we appeal.

It was pointed out at the 27th CPSU Congress that the Soviet Union does not see international relations uniquely in terms of Soviet-American relations. The international community consists of almost 160 nations, each with its specific interests, traditions and characteristics. However, the world is so small and interrelated that the contribution of every state and region to security and lessening the threat of war is extremely important and desirable.

The ebb and flow of Soviet-American relations directly affect many countries, if only because American first-strike weapons are deployed in Western Europe and Asia, and American bases form a dense web in the Old and New World alike. Hence, the efforts to make weapons even deadlier and more sophisticated, which is the purpose of continued nuclear testing, affect the whole world community. New, more efficient weapons detract immediately from world security and this adverse process is being exacerbated.

Military technology cannot be allowed to decide the future of humanity, even if this is what the powerful and influential Western military-industrial complex would like. Even today, in view of the flight time of the American first-strike missiles to target, the world is living within 6 minutes of catastrophe. It is the duty of political leaders to avert the countdown, to break the vicious circle of the arms race and make the powers that be realize that the age of wars among nations is over. The fate of our civilization is inseparably bound to continued, lasting peace now and for all time, whatever the good or evil human genius may come up with.

### Serbian Orthodox Patriarch

LD161159 Moscow TASS in English 1144 GMT 16 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 16 TASS -- Petr Demichev, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, first deputy president of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, received in the Kremlin today Patriarch German of the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Demichev said that the main concern of the Soviet people engaged in peaceful work was to preserve peace on earth and block the way to another war. This is the purpose of a whole package of Soviet initiatives which provide for the creation of an all-embracing system of international security and the elimination of nuclear weapons by 2000.

The decision of the USSR on prolonging the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions became another major step on the way to peace. The common concern for the preservation of peace induces all the people of good will to pool efforts in the struggle against a nulcear catastrophe. The USSR supports the efforts of the religious circles of all the countries, including Yugoslavia, which are making their contribution to this struggle.

Patriarch German said that all those who held dear our future had cordially welcomed the new Soviet peace initiatives set forth in the statements of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Everyone should do his utmost for promoting mutual understanding, consolidating good relations between nations and establishing durable peace on earth.

#### Scientist Rebuts U.S.

LD201040 Moscow TASS in English 1020 GMT 20 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 20 TASS — "The United States' Claims, made to justify its refusal to join a moratorium on nuclear explosions, that the blasts are needed to keep the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons in combat readiness do not hold water," well-known scientist Vitaliy Voldanskiy, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, said in a TASS interview. He said that nuclear weapons could be checked and maintained in combat readiness without nuclear explosions.

"The main component of nuclear weapons is radioactive elements, in particular uranium, plutonium and tritium," he explained. "The halflife of the first two is hundreds of thousands of years. So there is no reason to be concerned about them."

Tritium decays in 12.5 years," Academician Goldanskiy added. "So one needs to replace it regularly to keep weapons containing tritium combat-ready."

"The other warhead components, mechanical and electronic, can get out of order -- crack or rust -- but each of the units can be tested separately, without the nuclear fuse. This can be done, in particular, with computers capable of modelling the condition of all units," he said.

Goldanskiy recalled that the 1974 Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons testing had put the ceiling on the yield of a nuclear blast at 150,000 tons.

"But the United States still has bombs whose yields exceed this threshold markedly in its armories. It is obvious that these have continued to be checked although bombs of such yields have not been exploded for more than ten years now," the Soviet scientist said.

"This is further proof that the arguments used by the U.S. Administration to justify its rejection of the moratorium on nuclear blasts are untenable," he added.

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CSO: 5200/1593

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

GDR OFFICIAL WRITES IN PRAVDA IN SUPPORT OF MORATORIUM

PM281511 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Aug 86 First Edition p 4

[Article by Guenter Mittag, member of the Politburo and secretary of the SED Central Committee, under the general heading "Today's Main Topic": "'My Work-place Is Part of the Struggle for Peace, 'Say GDR Working People"]

[Text] Berlin--The statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on Soviet television in connection with the question of ending all nuclear tests met with a strong, broad response in the GDR. The statement was transmitted on GDR television and radio, and the next morning was published in full in all the newspapers. Citizens of our republic greeted with satisfaction the Soviet Union's new peace-loving step. One of the first statesmen to speak about the Soviet leader's statement was E. Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council. He welcomed the Soviet Union's decision to extend the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions to 1 January 1987 as a further significant step in the interests of preserving peace throughout the world. If the United States also stopped its nuclear tests, Comrade E. Honecker stated, that would be a real breakthrough toward ending the nuclear arms race. It would accelerate the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The fact that Comrade M.S. Gorbachev expressed the dearest aspirations of people in our country too is indicated by numerous views and opinions expressed by the working people. I would like to quote some of these.

"The Soviet Union has once again displayed initiative in order to protect mankind against nuclear catastrophe," Thomas Schaefer, a worker at the (Bolfen) film factory, said. "It has once again become obvious that the peace policy of the 27th CPSU Congress is being consistently put into practice."

"Comrade Gorbachev has created an exceptionally good basis for a possible summit meeting," stated (Detlef) Krause, who works at the Berlin (Bergman-borzig) combine. "I hope that under pressure from the international public the United States will think again, and for its part will also take a step along the path to disarmament."

Veterinarian Klaus Luetter of the scientific research center at Dummerstorf noted: "No doubt this was not an easy decision for the Soviet Union. Now the United States must give a concrete answer."

GDR communists, and with them all the people, have a realistic approach to the tasks set in the domestic and foreign policy spheres. At the same time they are profoundly convinced that mankind's vital interests will forge a path. They back up their historical optimism with daily labor achievements, knowing that they are thereby acting in the spirit of the great tasks which must be resolved in order to eliminate the nuclear threat.

As the 11th SED Congress noted, a first step toward freeing the world from nuclear weapons could be the ending of tests. The government and people of the GDR, side by side with the Soviet Union and together with all who advocate peace and security, will help ensure that this significant opportunity on the path of ending the nuclear arms race is not missed, but leads to the attainment of a vital breakthrough. The nuclear and space age requires a new way of thinking, a new approach to international relations.

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CSO: 5200/1593

### NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET PAPER EXPLAINS USSR 1961 NUCLEAR TEST RESUMPTION

PM171327 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Sep 86 First Edition p 3

[A. Mozgovoy "Commentary": "False Argument"]

[Text] Why does the U.S. Administration have a negative attitude to halting nuclear tests? Representatives of the American Administration put forward quite a few arguments on that score. These include an alleged U.S. lag in the nuclear sphere, imaginary difficulties in verifying [kontrol] the observance of the moratorium, and the need to check the reliability of existing nuclear warheads. The falsity of such arguments is obvious and has been convincingly shown over and over again. But the other day President R. Reagan put forward yet another pretext. According to him, the Russian simply cannot be trusted. They, he claims, breach a bilateral moratorium when it suits them. Here the White House boss cited a 1961 precedent, when the Soviet Union resumed its nuclear tests after a long interval.

The American President did not, of course, wish to go into the details of the circumstances which forced our country to embark on such a step. He deliberately refrained from doing so, for otherwise there would be nothing left of his so-called "arguments."

What happended is as follows. On 31 March 1958 the USSR Supreme Soviet, seeking to set an example of good will to the other nuclear powers and spur them to specific action on disarmament, took the decision to stop testing all kinds of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The rumble of nuclear explosions was the response to the Soviet initiative. In a short time the United States carried out around 40 tests. The USSR was forced, in the interesrs of its own security, to abandon its unilateral moratorium, but on 3 November 1958 again stopped testing. After this the United States suspended its own tests under pressure from international public opinion.

On 29 August 1959 the Soviet Government once again confirmed that it would conduct no further nuclear explosions if the Western powers would do likewise. However, France—at that time one of America's closet partners in the NATO military organization—held a series of tests in the Sahara. Naturally, important information on their results also went across the Atlantic. Not only did Washington fail to restrain [osadit] its ally, it announced its intention to begin carrying out nuclear explosions. U.S. Congressman C. Halleck, for example, stated on 15 August 1961: "It is time for the United States to resume testing .... We must act from a position of strength at all talks with the Soviet Union."

In the conditions obtaining, our country had no option but to resume testing its own nuclear devices. "The Soviet Government the USSR memorandum of 31 August 1961 points out, "has taken these steps unwillingly, under pressure of circumstances, but it could not refrain from doing so without foregoing the vitally important security interests of the Soviet Union and all socialists states." The same memorandum stresses the USSR's readiness to ban all tests it the NATO countries were to join such a ban.

That is what really happened in 1961. It must be assumed that the American President is well aware of all this. But in his endeavor to avoid resolving the question of joining the Soviet moratorium he is trying to shift the blame on to others. But then such propaganda speculations are quite in the spirit of the present American Administration. However, such a style, if one may say so, not only does not promote constructive dialogue, it undermines the U.S. Administration's standing.

/7358 CSO: 5200/1593

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET SCIENTIST: NUCLEAR TEST BAN IS 'VERIFIABLE'

PM191433 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 36, 15 Sep 86 pp 6-7

[Interview with Doctor of Mathematicophysical Sciences Professor Mikhail Gokhberg, acting director of the O. Yu. Shmidt Institute of Earth Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and one of the organizers of the Soviet-American nuclear test ban verification experiment, by B. Balkarey: "Seismologists on a Nuclear Test Ban: 'Feasible and Verifiable'"]

[Excerpt] Question: The United States and Britain have more than once declined Soviet proposals on a nuclear test moratorium and talks on a nuclear test ban. The main argument is that such a ban is unverifiable. What have you to say?

Answer: This argument is absolutely false. A nuclear test ban is feasible and verifiable. Today's technology to monitor nuclear explosions is very sensitive. Monitoring stations established at different sites all over the world provide a clear picture of all changes in the earth's crust. The site of an explosion can be determined to within fractions of the geographical degree and its yield with an error factor of under 15 percent. The problem of detecting nuclear blasts, scientifically speaking, is nonexistent today. It has been resolved, as every seismologist knows.

I shall elucidate. When a nuclear device is exploded, part of its yield sends tremors—seismic waves—through the mass of rock. The spectrum of these waves is substantially different from those caused by an earthquake. Scientists have developed special algorithms which incorporate mathematical screening methods, and they make it easy to identify seismic waves caused by nuclear tests.

Question: The Western press is talking a good deal about "concealment measures" that allegedly make it possible to hide a nuclear blast. What are they?

Answer: In theory, there are several ways of hiding nuclear tests--but only in theory. Their practical efficiency is a different matter.

One method is to stage a test against the background of an earthquake. Specialists realize, however, that this is an illusion. The earth is a

huge mass and if a nuclear device is exploded during an earthquake, some monitors will indeed get a mixed signal. But monitoring stations at other sites are bound to record the difference because the signal from the nuclear blast will reach the instruments at one time and the shock wave from an earthquake at another. Moreover, we are as yet unable to forecast earthquakes with sufficient accuracy. So what are we to do, sit waiting for an earthquake to strike before detonating our nuclear device?

Another way is to stage a test against the background of a powerful conventional explosion, such as those used in industry. But this would take thousands of tons of TNT. Is it feasible? Hardly.

Lastly, it is possible to stage a nuclear blast of a smaller yield in a cavity formed by an earlier high-yield underground test. This is more or less feasible theoretically, but if new, potent weapons are to be tested, this "method" has no practical value. Existing weapon stocks cannot be tested in this way either. And the excavation of such a cavity with conventional technology is pure science fiction.

To sum up, the "concealment measures" are ineffective. And if a mutual verification system is established in the territories of the parties to a nuclear test ban, the possibility of, concealing nuclear explosions will be completely ruled out.

Question: Is this the goal of the Soviet-American project involving the establishment of seismic stations in the territories of the USSR and the U.S.?

Answer: Quite so, I have already described in your magazine the Soviet-American experiment near Semipalatinsk. It demonstrated to all the skeptics that the technology available to the USSR and the USA makes the efficient monitoring of a nuclear test ban completely feasible.

Question: What were your personal impressions of the experiment?

Answer: Well, it is still in progress. One station was set up near Semipalatinsk, another is about to be opened and a third will shortly be established. Instruments have been installed on the surface for the time being but in the second phase of the experiment highly sensitive devices will be lowered into a hole. Similar experiments will be carried out in Nevada, where stations staffed by mixed U.S.-Soviet teams are going to be set up.

We were very pleased at the fact that we immediately found a common language with our American colleagues. Just as we do, they understand perfectly that the experiment, in addition to being very important politically, is yielding much valuable scientific data. Listening to the voice of the earth, we can learn far more about its properties.

Question: Who exactly are you working with?

Answer: The Natural Resources Defence Council, a nongovernment, private organization. The programme is headed by Dr Thomas Cochran.

Question: How is your cooperation shaping up?

Answer: The American seismologists are our long-standing friends. After the first phase of the experiment was over, James Brune, a leading expert on seismic phenomena, gave a lecture at our institute on the organization of seismological studies in California. We have an agreement on scientific exchanges between the U.S. seismological service and the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Control of the Natural Environment, and up to 30 scientists a year take part in them. Americans are happy to work with our comprehensive seismological expedition at a Soviet research site in Garm near Dushanbe, where a complex of geophysical methods, rather than just seismic ones, for forecasting earthquakes are being studied. Our scientists go to work at Menlo Park in California and the Boulder Geophysical Research Centre in Colorado.

But I have strayed from our subject. The first seismic reading was obtained just three days after the American scientists arrived at the site near Semipalatinsk. Moscow was playing host to the Goodwill Games at the time and in the afternoon a game of volleyball was played between the Soviet and American teams of seismologists at the Semipalatinsk station, set up on the shore of a beautiful lake in a forest. The first seismic recording of natural earth noises was demonstrated to an international scientific forum on nuclear testing in Moscow. All the participants in the experiment put their signatures to that historic document and a copy of it will be handed over to the central Lenin Museum.

The American members of the team, incidentally, were amazed at having been admitted to an area so close to a Soviet nuclear testing site. They were also moved by the hospitality and good will of their Soviet colleagues.

Question: You mentioned that on 18 July the Semipalatinsk station recorded a nuclear test in Nevada.

Answer: Yes, it did. Geophysical instruments record all the data in digital form on a magnetic tape subsequently decoded by computer. But seismologists are used to having a visual record, so the instruments have a special device for the purpose. The Americans' is quite simple: A roll of smoked paper on which a continuous line is drawn with a steel stylus. When the Nevada explosion went off, the straight line on the paper, reflecting quiet at the Soviet testing site, was broken by a sharp peak of a particular shape. It was symbolic in a way: American seismologists recording in Soviet territory a nuclear weapon test in the far-off USA.

Seismologist Paul Bodin said at the time that as an engineer he was happy with the perfect functioning of the equipment but as a citizen sad to "hear"

Let us again return to the phrase. The idea expressed by the new thinking is not of itself new: It arose in percipient politicians and humanist scientists immediately after the atomic mushroom cloud at Hiroshima. It has never died. On the contrary, it has grown and matured at every stage of the nuclear race. But until the 27th CPSU Congress the idea had never so clearly borna seal conforming that it was indeed the state policy of one of the two great nuclear powers.

The new thinking is, in short, the way toward ensuring mankind's survival in the conditions of the nuclear age, when science has provided us with the means to destroy all life on earth and history has divided people by different socioeconomic systems.

The world is simultaneously split and tragically united, since nuclear weapons do not "discriminate."

This common fate of ours was well expressed by the Delhi Six, comprising the leaders of India, Mexico, Argentina, Sweden, Greece, and Tanzania, in their declaration of 28 January 1985. "In the last quarter of a century all the countries and peoples have, almost imperceptibly, ceased to be the masters in deciding questions of life and death," they wrote. "We have all become accustomed to the fact that a small handful of people and machines in far-off cities can decide our fate. Every day we are living on borrowed time, as if the whole of mankind were imprisoned in a death cell awaiting execution but not knowing when. Like anyone unjustly charged, we refust to believe that the execution will actually be carried out."

Salutary collaboration among the diverse and divided elements in our world is essential if this universal death penalty is to be prevented. It is necessary to proceed together along a common path — that is axiomatic. The new thinking, if it is to yield results, must be universal — that is to say, not unilateral but at least bilateral, adopted as the guide to action by the nuclear powers. But ideally it should be general just as security dictated by the new thinking should be general or mutual. It is possible to maintain a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions for a year or 18 months, but, for pity's sake, how long can you hold out if the other side continues to carry out underground explosions in Nevada?!

In short, how inclined to the new thinking are they in Washington today? Are they ready to proceed together along a common path?

When you want to express yourself more forcefully, you have recourse to tested folk wisdom. Two proverbs can help, I think, to answer that question: Namely, "Easier said than done" and "A leopard can't change his spots."

Is it not easier to utter all these true words about the imperative need for new thinking or even point the way by one's own example than to change the thinking of those who have thought in the old way throughout their lives and still on the whole feel no particular discomfort from this habit? These are people who have based and continue to base their notion of America's role in the world on force, all manner of force, including a worldwide presence and the use of military force.

And as for the leopard, no matter how hard one tries to convince the present—day Washington leopard that the choice in the nuclear age lies between coexistence and nonexistence, it prefers nonexistence.... It prefers the nonexistence of the Soviet Union, the socialist community, and socialism as a state system.

Power in Washington is now vested in people with such a view of the world that, 70 years after the October Revolution and just over 50 years after official American recognition of the Soviet Union, they have essentially still not resolved the old question of whether to recognize it or not. They do not, of course, consider a suicidal nuclear war a means of resolving ideological differences, but their innate anticommunism and nagging anti-Sovietism sometimes whispers and even bellows at them that they should not recognize if for all that. Moreover, on seeing our economic problems and hoping to make us bend beneath the burden of an increasingly expensive arms race, these people convince themselves that time is on the side of capitalism and private enterprise system and that the Soviet Union and socialism will in some way or another vanish or, if worse comes to worst, be transformed and recognize the primacy of American-style capitalism. They cherish the hope of exacting historical revenge.

And for that reason they refuse to have anything to do with our proposals and agreements, which would mean a reduction in confrontation, a relaxation of international tension, and a return to detente.

With a recklessness characteristic of people who as individuals and as a people have no experience of bloody wars, they prefer to keep mankind on "death row" in order to hold on to their hopes. What kind of new thinking is that! Let us listen to what Senator J. Biden, among others, says: "We now find ourselves threatened by an unrestricted nuclear arms race which, HOWEVER TRAGICALLY, has been created by ideologues who consider that his kind of race is in America's interests."

There are many people in the United States who, like the aforementioned senator, do not share the "ideologues" views, but they do not make the decisions. There are even more more people who simply do not think about where such dangerous "ideologues" could lead them. Most Americans want normal, peaceful relations with the Soviet Union. But that majority, absorbed in its daily life and removed from the details of international politics, thinks that there is not today, thank God, anything acutely threatening or critical in American-Soviet relations. They believe President Reagan's peace-loving words, yield to their hyponotic effect and do not go to the trouble to compare them with his actions, and for that reason are pretty unconcerned and equable in mood. Public opinion polls show that most people approve of Washington's policy. They do not even suspect that during these very days, months, and years an historic opportunity for constructive collaboration between the two countries in their common interests in the interests of world peace is perhaps slipping by.

And those people who actually have the ability to see all this are close to despair. Listen to THE NEW YORK TIMES: "The TRAGEDY is that from any objective standpoint the world situation promise an historic opportunity to considerably improve U.S. -Soviet relations... But until the Congress and American public opinion begin to be guided by considerations of commonsense and genuine national interests, the possibility mains that this prospect will be lost."

In the two quotations I have underlined what is essentially the some word: tragically and tragedy. Pessimism is unproductive, because it makes you give up. It is hard to say what will be the eventual result. But it cannot be ruled out that history, looking at us for the vantage point of a future unknown to us, can already see the tragic reflection of a lost opportunity in our time. Whenever the Soviet leadership is most constructive, the American leadership demonstrates a combination of hypocrisy and rigidity. In the atmosphere of agreessive anti-Sovietism the more moderate and sensible yield to those who act according to the principle that the worse it is the

better it is, satisfying a craving for enmity, suspicion, and hatre. The worse it is the better it is — and hence an acceleration of the arms race in order, naturally, to limit it. The worse it is the better it is — and any attendant circumstance, any episode like the "Daniloff case," will do to jeopardize the whole state of relations between the two powers, to play on Americans' emotions, and at the same time to attempt to negate all the potential of goodwill built up in the American public's mind by ur nuclear test moratorium and other Soviet initiatives.

We are putting the principles of the new thinking into action. But across the Atlantic, meanwhile, for all the diversity of the political picture, the deciding voice belongs to those who consider that it is precisely now, under their leadership and with their fantastic military budgets, that the old thinking — strong—arm, imperialist, and egocentric thinking dictating that America rely on its military might and its technological genius to militarize outer space — rather than principles of reciprocal and common security is what is called for.

But our logic, validating the importance of the moratorium on nuclear explosions, is weighty and cogent. It is having its effect on experts and laymen, public figures and statesmen, as evidenced by the support expressed for it by the Delhi Six and the leaders of the Nonaligned Movement who met in Harare recently. But this logic alas, exerts no hypnotic effect on those who have a different logic, drawn from different convictions and a different life. Priority belongs to life and the lessons drawn from it. Easier said than done....

It will be achieved, if nor quickly than steadily — it is a matter of reeducating and changing people's minds by force of one's own example. There is no other sensible path. What is needed is a struggle in which ever larger numbers of people and ever larger organized political forces become committed to and defenders of the new thinking — thinking which opens up the way to cooperation in the name of life.

/12858 CSO: 5200/1595 NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET ACADEMICIAN CHAZOV COMMENTS ON ANTINUCLEAR STRUGGLE

PM091050 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Aug 86 First Edition p 3

[Own correspondent A. Borovik interview with Academician Yevgeniy Chasov: "Only Recipe"--date and place unspecified]

[Text] [Borovik] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, there are currently dozens of letters on your desk. What are people writing to you about?

[Chasov] Yes, we get a great many letters. And not only from Soviet people but from citizens of other countries. The main theme of these numerous messages is that the peoples must live together for the sake of maintaining peace and ensuring a tranquil future for our children and grandchildren. People fully support the initiative put forward by our party and government. And things could not be otherwise, since the latest extension of the Soviets moratorium on nuclear explosions is aimed precisely at strengthening peace and the spirit of detente.

I personally am inclined to view the USSR's historic step not only from a military-political standpoint but also as a further step along the path of changing people's outlook and instilling fundamentally new thinking. For decades the Western mass media have taught people to fear the USSR and have whipped up a sense of fear of us in them. Unfortunately this propaganda has not been in vain. But the Soviet Union, in extending its unilateral moratorium for the third time, is gradually destroying the monstrous image of the USSR created by Western ideologues. The peoples are seeing for themselves that we threaten nobody and that all the most important peace initiatives are being produced by us. I can judge the changes in people's feelings from the letters I receive from abroad.

[Borovik] You devote a great deal of time and effort to the "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War" movement. What can representatives of your profession do in this direction?

[Chazov] Our organization puts the question of banning nuclear weapons tests at the center of its activity. We are convinced that this can and must be the starting point for an effective nuclear disarmament process.

Physicians cannot fail to be concerned by the indifferent attitude shown by many people in the West to the irresponsible statements made by certain politicians to justify the nuclear arms race. Under these conditions we must make everyone aware of the full danger posed by nuclear weapons. Physicians have always been obliged to tell their patients the truth about their diseases. And nuclear weapons are the most dangerous disease of the 20th century. If they are not eliminated in good time, they will, I fear, eliminate us. That is why we are telling people the truth. For instance, the truth that medics will in no way be able to help the millions of victims of a nuclear catastrophe. experience which we have amassed in the sphere of treating victims of burns, injuries, and radiation sickness proves that giving all the aid needed to victims during a nuclear catastrophe would require the participation of at least 30 million physicians and 100 million ordinary medical personnel. And that is impossible: Today our planet has in all around 3.5 million physicians and 7.5 million ordinary medical personnel. We must also take account of the following fact: Were there to be a nuclear war, physicians themselves would be casualties. I am profoundly sure--and I try to pass on this conviction to all my interlocutors in the West--that no ideological, national, political, or economic differences could justify the millions of deaths which would inevitably be caused by a nuclear war. "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War" believe that the only recipe for successfully combating this dreadful modernday disease--the arms race--is to prohibit nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Union has extended the hand of peace to America. The ball is now in Washington's court. Will it respond?

[Borovik] Is it not inhuman to squander means on the deadly arms race in which the United States is involving the world?

[Chazov] Undoubtedly! And we protest at such criminal expenditure. SDI alone will consume a mass of funds which could have been used for different, more humane aims. Physicians are proposing a medical space communications system instead of SDI. Under this project major medical and scientific centers would be able to create a satellite communications systems which would make it possible for any specialist in any country to be consulted for the sake of saving human live. This would ease the solution of urgent medical problems to an incredible extent. In short, we have many ideas. They must be implemented. But, however paradoxical it may seem, their implementation must begin with the prohibition of nuclear tests. A joint Soviet-U.S. moratorium could put a firm obstacle in the way of the arms race.

At our latest congress in Cologne recently physicians called on the United States to follow the Soviet Union's example and end nuclear tests. A reciprocal and reliably verifiable [kontroliruyemyy] moratorium on all nuclear explosions would make it possible to step back from the abyss. It was in Cologne that the so-called "global peace program" was worked out. Its essence is that the participants in our movement must convince people from different countries in the most active way of the need to reject nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons tests.

We believe that the time for loud peace slogans is over. The disarmament struggle requires deeds, not words.

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RELATED ISSUES

### U.S., USSR UN ASSOCIATIONS DISCUSS ARMS ISSUES

Meeting Opens

LD221332 Moscow TASS in English 1321 GMT 22 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 22 TASS — The Soviet and U.S. Associations of the United Nations opened a bilateral meeting here today to discuss pressing disarmament issues.

The discussion, which will last till September 24, will cover the Soviet-U.S. relations and the problems of limiting the arms race, first of all the nuclear race, as well as the role of the United Nations in maintaining peace.

The U.S. delegation is led by Ivan Selin, chairman of the board of American management systems who formerly served as a deputy assistant secretary of defense. The Soviet delegation is led by Georgiy Arbatov, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences who chairs the Soviet Association of the United Nations, and Academician Roald Sagdeyev, director of the Institute of Space Studies.

#### Arbatov, Selin Comment

LD222307 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 22 Sep 86

[Text] The Soviet-American meeting on disarmament opened in Moscow on Monday. It is held by the United Naitons associations of the two countries. The director of the Institute of the United States and Canada Studies, Georgiy Arbatov, said in his opening address that security was not a technical problem but a political problem. He pointed to the growing world tension. In defiance of the Soviet nuclear moratorium, the United States has gone ahead with its nuclear testing. In the current situation, he said, security cannot be achieved at the expense of the security of the other side. The leader of the American delegation, former assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis Ivan Selin, has said this:

[Begin Selin recording] We feel we have very little control over progress or lack of progress in the short term. What we can do is talk about the issues on our agenda and believe that more mutual understanding of the shortcomings and of the advantages of different kinds of agreement will lead to such agreements in the future. [end recording]

Zhurkin: 'Useful and Constructive'

LD232207 Moscow TASS in English 1950 GMT 23 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 23 TASS -- Vitaliy Zhurkin, correspondent member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, deputy director of the Institute of the United States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has described as useful and constructive the meeting of representatives of the Soviet and American U.N. associations which is under way here.

He said in a TASS interview that due to the fact that the meeting was devoted mostly to questions connected with the limitation and reduction of armaments, the attention of its participants was centered on the main principles of this all-embracing system in the military and political spheres. Soviet participants emphasized that the problem of the consolidation of security should be settled first of all by political means, with the help of political will.

According to Vitaliy Zhurkin, the Soviet moratorium on conducting any nuclear explosions gives a real opportunity to the two sides to reach agreement on a complete discontinuation of nuclear tests.

Sagdeyev: Different Viewpoints

LD241223 Moscow TASS in English 1123 GMT 24 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow September 24 TASS -- A meeting of representatives of the USSR and the United States U.N. Associations ended here today. It was devoted to topical problems of international security and disarmament. In the course of the discussion participants in the meeting set forth the views of their organizations on such questions as the state and prospects of relations between the USSR and USA, limitation of the arms race, primarily nuclear, prevention of the arms race from spreading to outer space, an end to all nuclear explosions, practical measures towards disarmament.

"The discussion was contructive", a TASS correspondent has been told in an interview by Director of the Institute of Space Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician Roald Sagdeyev. "An exchange of opinions was held on topical questions linked with activities of the United Nations organization, on problems of bilateral relations, the arms race and disarmament, on questions of terrorism. We cannot say that our view points coincided in many questions. But we tried to formulate the essence of our differences, the essence of different view points, and in some cases noted that the view points of experts of both groups are rather close."

It was significant that the meeting took place in the days of the session of the U.N. General Assembly which is summing up the results of the year of peace, announced by the United Nations. Therefore the question of maintaining peace was the keynote of our discussion, said Roald Sagdeyev.

U.S. President Ronald Reagan, speaking at the U.N. General Assembly's session, the academician said, in his speech actually reiterated the wellknown American stand, the academician said. We did not see anything new. As a physicist, I may say that discussions on control might lead to such technicalities and leave so much freedom to those who do not want a ban on nuclear tests that this cannot be the foundation for any progess in the sphere of ending tests.

The meeting was useful, said Director of the research programme of the United States U.N. Association Ann Florina, in a TASS interview. A broad range of topical problems, including control over armaments, were discussed. The general tone of conversations was positive. At the meeting we tried to look into the future and from that stand to consider tendencies in development of relations between our countries. The contact with the Soviet colleagues is necessary in that important question and also in the question of studies of world problems, she stressed.

/12858 CSO: 5200/1596 RELATED ISSUES

IISSR'S 'FUNDAMENTALLY NEW APPROACH' CONTRASTED WITH REAGAN'S

LD231902 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 23 Sep 86

["Conversation" on the theme "Under the Pressure of the Military-Industrial Complex" between Vladimir Ivanovich Bogachev, TASS military affairs observer, and Igor Surguchev, All-Union Radio foreign policy commentator]

[Text] [Surguchev] The emergence of nuclear weapons, first of all in the United States and in other countries of the world, created an unprecedented threat to the very existence of human civilization, and posed in an entirely different way the problem of guaranteeing the security of individual states. Vladimir Ivanovich, to what degree must these realities of the nuclear age be considered in the foreign policy activity and military strategy of states?

[Bogachev] The situation here has indeed changed radically. Some 45 or 50 years ago, within the living memory of the present older generation, the ancient Romans' thesis, if you want peace prepare for war, might have seemed acceptable and even wise. Now, it has a sinister, concealed meaning: If you want peace, prepare for nuclear catastrophe. Under current conditions, not only nuclear war, but also preparations for it can bring no political gain to any of the sides. Furthermore, preparations for war and the arms race with every day, with every hour, increase the risk of the total destruction of human civilization. Diplomacy without weapons is like an orchestra without musical instruments, King Frederick II, the idol of the Prussian militarists, once said. In times of yore, perhaps superiority in arms really did help to achieve the goals of the diplomats from aggressive countries. Today, this kind of exhortation is hopelessly outdated. Inherent in nuclear weapons is death, the capability of wiping the entire human race from the face of the earth. The question is not whether one of us wins or loses in a nuclear war, but whether we can survive together, or together will perish.

As for military strategy, its importance has not diminished, although its tasks should also correspond to the realities of the nuclear age. The Soviet military doctrine is purely defensive in character: It takes as its point of departure that a potential aggressor should be aware that in case of an attack against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, crushing retribution will inevitably follow. We will never sacrifice our security interests.

The main thing is that equal and reliable security is currently guaranteed not by an infinitely high level of strategic balance, but by an infinitely low level.

[Surguchev] In one of his speeches, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev even said that the Soviet Union does not have the least interest in whether the United States feels itself less secure. From the position of the old, accustomed logic on guaranteeing security, this has a paradoxical ring, does it not?

[Bogachev] Indeed, the onset of the nuclear age has actually exacerbated the problem of international security. At the same time, it demands new approaches and new solutions. The loftiest wisdom of state leaders consists not in being concerned exclusively with their own security; the loftiest wisdom consists in bringing about a situation in which all sides feel themselves to be equally secure. Under current conditions, the violation of parity and the strategic balance is equally dangerous for all sides. Inequality in military might engenders fear and alarm and unpredictability in policy. It can also give rise to a hasty and unjustified response to actions from the other side, and to destabilization, when a few hotheads might be tempted to press the nuclear button.

It is the task of all countries, without exception, to do everything possible to prevent the possibility of a dangerous destabilization of the situation.

A situation which might have seemed paradoxical 45 or 50 years ago has not arisen: The interests of each of the sides require that they should take care not to lag behind militarily — this task remains — but that they should also take care not to get too far ahead themselves in terms of weapons system of mass defeat [porazheniye], and especially means of inflicting a first strike. Unfortunately the United States does not acknowledge this. As the CPSU Central Committee Political Report at the 27th CPSU Congress points out, the Soviet Union does not seek greater security, but will not settle for less.

This aim is manifestation of the Soviet Union's fundamentally new approach to issues of war and peace and its fresh way of looking at the way to ensure security in the nuclear age. Ensuring security is more and more becoming a political task. It can be resolved by political means, first and foremost by the limitation and reduction of weapons, by way of negotiations. And the Soviet Union is working in this vein. The Soviet program for the total elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the end of this century is the clearest example of this genuinely new approach toward issues of war and peace. In this action, the USSR has shown readiness to rise above national egoism, tactical calculations, disputes and dissension, which are of worthless significance compared with the main values of peace and reliable prospects for the future.

The Soviet Union has come forward with a specific program of nuclear disarmament calculated for a precise time period. Acceptance of the Soviet proposals by the Western states would enable mankind to gradually be freed from nuclear weapons over the course of the next 15 years, without the principles of equality and equal security being violated.

The Soviet Union has also undertaken a number of unilateral restrictive actions in the military sphere aimed at acting as an example for the positions of other countries. First, this relates to the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. It is no accident that the problem of stopping nuclear tests is the touchstone, the litmus paper by which one can quite accurately judge the position of this or that state, on a wide range of issues relating to ensuring international security. However, up to now, all tests to find good will on the part of Washington on this issue have proved negative.

[Surguchev] And yet the seventies showed that in spite of the differences in the socioeconomic systems, the USSR and United States can reach mutually acceptable solutions on wide range of problems relating to reducing the threat of nuclear war. What conditioned the reaching of such agreements?

[Bogachev] The Soviet Union never cherished any illusions about the pacifism of the U.S. Administration under Nixon or Carter, when we managed to reach very effective accords on reducing the danger of a nuclear catastrophe. The fact is, after the Soviet Union attained strategic parity with the United States at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies, Washington started to understand that any military adventure held the threat of catastrophic consequences for the United States. In spite of all the differences between the sides in the approach to the problems of war and peace, which were conditioned by the differing socioeconomic systems, a certain common ground emerged in their positions.

For instance, in the seventies, even the then leaders of the United States — one must give them their due — understood the danger of also destabilizing the military political situation for the Soviet Union. It was precisely the Soviet side's readiness for a tireless search for mutually acceptable solutions as well as a certain identity of views on the nature of war in modern conditions, that made it possible in the seventies to reach important Soviet-U.S. agreements such as the 1972 treaty on limiting antimissile defense systems, the 1972 and 1979 treaties on strategic arms limitation, and other accords.

[Surguchev] In the eighties, Vladimir Ivanovich, the situation, however, changed somewhat abruptly.

[Bogachev] Yes, the Reagan administration which came to power in the United States in 1981, just like a bull in a china shop, started to mindlessly smash the Soviet-U.S. agreements previously reached. The signed but not ratified treaties on limiting underground nuclear weapons tests, and on nuclear tests for peaceful purposes, fell victim to the Reagan administration's militarist course. In May 1986, President Reagan declared the SALT-II Treaty to be moribund. Since March 1983, the current administration has been working to undermine the exceptionally important agreement on limiting antimissile defense systems. The United States broke off the negotiations on a total and universal ban on testing nuclear weapons, on antisatellite weapons, on the nonmilitarization of the Indian Ocean, on arms trading, as well as on a number of other talks.

[Surguchev] All this, evidently, is the result of the fact that in the seventies the U.S. military-industrial complex felt its interests to be particularly threatened.

[Bogachev] Yes, that is in fact the case. It is precisely for this reason that at the Republican Party convention in 1980, the bosses of the military-industrial complex included in the party platform the demand for the United States to attain military superiority. After Reagan's victory in the elections, U.S. spending on war preparations rose to an unprecedented level. The current U.S. Administration manifested a complete disregard for the dangers of destabilizing the military political situation and deployed [razmestit] U.S. medium-range missiles on the very threshold of the socialist countries. The time taken by these missiles to reach important targets in the USSR and other countries of the socialist community is 8 to 12 minutes. This means that in critical situations, vitally important decisions must be made within minutes. The danger of an accidental war has increased sharply as a result of faults in computers and means of communication.

The U.S. Administration has augmented its dangerous concept of a limited nuclear war in Europe by its insane plans for star wars. The Pentagon is pressing ahead with preparations for nuclear war at a considerable distance from U.S. territory. A limited

nuclear war for Europe, an antimissile defense umbrella for the territory of the aggressor -- such is the sinister meaning of Washington's current military strategy.

Now, when the Soviet peace initiatives have opened up a realistic prospect for disarmament, the tragedy of the situation consists of the fact that the main obstacle in the way to attaining these historic goals is a comparatively small but influential group of people represented by the bosses of the military-industrial complex. The merchants of death are ready to sacrifice the future of mankind itself for ready money. Unfortunately, one must conclude that the current U.S. Administration is under the thumb of these circles.

Is it not time that the White House made a realistic assessment of the dangerous situation that has come about in the world; and started to limit the appetites of the military-industrial complex and, in conjuction with other countries, set about removing the nuclear threat which is hanging over mankind?

[Surguchev] What aims is the present U.S. Administration pursuing in whipping up tension in international relations, in stepping up the arms race, and in breaking off previously reached agreements on reducing the danger of nuclear war?

[Bogachev] The first task the Reagan administration poses for itself is to give the big monopolies the opportunity to make a fat profit out of the means of destroying people. Indeed, Reagan's star wars program, for instance, promises the United States monopolists truly unprecedented profits. It is these monopolies that are the generators of the military hysteria in the United States. Reagan is even prepared, for the sake of the monopolists' interests, to swagger on the edge of the nuclear abyss.

The second goal is to attain military superiority in order to free its hands for widespread economic, political and military expansion throughout the world. Washington fully understands that the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community are currently at the chief bulwark of the independence of the peoples and the chief obstacle in the way of U.S. neoglobalism. For the present, Washington intends to fight socialism mainly through blackmail and threats.

Washington's third goal is to bleed the Soviet Union white by the arms race, undermine its economy and achieve the possibility of dictating Washington's conditions to the socialist countries, and, that means, to the countries of the entire world.

All three of these goals are closely interlinked; the possibility of achieving them, however, is far from equal. it is entirely possible that the current U.S. Administration really will manage, at the cost of the American taxpayers, to allow the sharks of the military business to make fat profits out of the arms race. Accomplishment of this aim depends in the first place on the correlation of political forces within the United States. Attaining military superiority over our country, for In any event, the Soviet Union has at its disposal instance, is unrealistic. sufficient human, economic, and scientific potential to maintain strategic parity with The U.S. militarists' hope of wearing out the Soviet Union the United States. economically through the arms race is equally illusory. The Soviet leaders have on more than one occasion stressed that our country will spend for military purposes exactly as much as is absolutely necessary for our security -- and not a ruble more. The Soviet Union will be able to give a worthy response to the U.S. plans for star wars and to the preparation of means of limited nuclear war and other military preparations by the United States. We will act in several directions at once: on the diplomatic front, the military front, the political and propaganda fronts, but first and foremost, on the economic front.

[Surguchev] Yes, Vladimir Ivanovich, the contribution of every Soviet person to enhancing the efficiency of the economy, stepping up acceleration, and further improving management will at the same time be the best contribution in the struggle for peace on earth and for the security and happiness of present and future generations on our planet.

/12858 CSO: 5200/1596 RELATED ISSUES

## SOVIET COMMENTARIES ON REAGAN UN SPEECH

'Profound Disappointment'

LD231035 Moscow TASS in English 0946 GMT 23 Sep 86

[Text] New York September 23 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Arkadiy Sidoruk.

Bewilderment and profound disappointment — this is how one can briefly describe reaction at the U.N. Headquarters to the U.S. President's address to the 41st session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Representatives of most nations express the opinion that Ronald Reagan's speech contains no constructive ideas on resolving problems of international peace and security, curbing the nuclear arms race and settling regional conflicts.

The United States came to the current session of the General Assembly with an empty briefcase, said the deputy head of the Syrian delegation, 'Abd al-Atasi. At a time when the USSR advanced a set of major peace initiatives, including the proposal for establishing a comprehensive system of international security, the U.S. was not going further than verbal assurances of its commitment to peace, he said. Reagan's speech, devoid of constructive elements, confirmed this once again.

It was absurd to portray oneself as defender of human rights and liberties and try to stifle simultaneously the Nicaraguan revolution, denying the Nicaraguan people the right to free, independent development, said Victor Hugo Tinoco Fonseca, Nicaragua's first deputy foreign minister. Reagan used the U.N. rostrum to confirm his support for the so-called freedom-fighters, he said. The President's declarations were made contrary to the ruling of the World Court of Justice which denounced the financing and training of mercenary forces, and Washington's other interventionist actions against Nicaragua.

'Abd al-'Aziz al-Dali, foreign minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, described the American President's speech as a "manifestation of the policy of neoglobalism." Reagan deliberately ignored the true causes of regional conflicts and even failed to mention the most important of them, like the Middle East, he said. Why, in talking about human rights, did he totally ignore the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to freedom and self-determination? Al-Dali asked.

# 'Old Ways of Thinking'

OW241101 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0950 GMT 23 Sep 86

[From "The World Today" program presented by Farid Seyful-Mulyukov]

[Excerpt] By tradition, general political debate at the UN General Assembly begins with speeches by the heads of delegations. First to speak at the 41st Session was King Juan Carlos I of Spain. It would be impossible and perhaps unnecessary, to cite all the speeches. I will merely note that the head of the Spanish State expressed the hope that the strengthening of a climate of dialogue and trust in international relations will lead to a significant reduction of nuclear arsenals and the end of the arms race. We all, of course, wish to believe in this.

Currently foreign mass media are quoting the remarks made by U.S. President Reagan in the General Assembly. The U.S. and other western press is praising this speech in every way possible. The White House boss devoted a great deal of attention to Soviet-U.S. relations. He said specifically: We are seriously and attentively studying the personal message of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, secretary general of the CPSU Central Committee, which was handed to us by Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs.

However, further utterances by Ronald Reagan show that the U.S. Administration adheres to its old ways of thinking and strives to achieve military superiority for the United States. Thus, the President spoke for such strategic offensive weapon reductions which would clearly place the Soviet Union at a disadvantage. Reagan also spoke of the intention of the White House to continue with preparations for the SDI program, which would only further escalate the arms race.

In his speech, the White House chief managed to avoid mentioning the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests and to ignore the demands of the whole international community which is calling for the United States to join this moratorium. On the other hand, Reagan made it clear that Washington intends, in the foreseeable future, to continue with nuclear explosions, allowing the Pentagon to develop and perfect new first-strike nuclear weapon systems.

UN observers note that Reagan's speech on his readiness to make two steps in the direction of nuclear test limitation is in essence an attempt to mislead world public opinion, which is demanding an end to all nuclear explosions. Declaring the intention of the United States to, and I quote, "discuss ways of achieving a gradual and parallel program of limiting and finally ending nuclear tests in tandem with the Strategic Defense Initiative," Reagan made it known that the White House intends first to complete the SDI program and to deploy nuclear weapons in space, and only then discuss the question of nuclear test bans.

U.S., Soviet Policies Contrasted

LD231554 Moscow TASS in English 1538 GMT 23 Sep 86

[Text] Moscow, September 23 TASS--By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The agenda of the U.N. General Assembly's current session in New York includes the most vital problems of the times — the problems of war and peace, of setting up a reliable system for international security, stopping the arms race and keeping weapons out of space. An end to nuclear weapons testing is one of the keys to resolving these problems, a link by pulling which one can draw out the entire chain. Two policies have clashed in the world in approaching this linchpin issue. The attitude to terminating nuclear testing and hammering out an early agreement to ban it completely is today the most effective indicator of how seriously each of the major nuclear powers treats the need for disarmament, international security and the cause of peace in general.

The Soviet Union's halt to nuclear testing, a measure addressed to the United States, has not been merely a proposal and a declaration but a practical action — a one-and-a-half-year unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. The USSR is firmly convinced that the renunciation of testing is a versatile measure in the field of disarmament, which can limit the development of all nuclear systems, strategic, medium-range and tactical, at once. It is the fastest and most drastic of all feasible steps to limit arms. An end to nuclear testing can change the socio-political climate in the world more effectively than any other one-off [single] measure. Repeatedly renewing its moratorium, the USSR has demonstrated again and again that its goal is to make a real step to nuclear disarmament.

Washington has been pursing a different line. It has flatly refused to join the Soviet moratorium, contrary to demands by the international community. Its position is that as long as there exist nuclear weapons, the United States will keep conducting nuclear explosions. Realizing that this refusal to follow the Soviet lead has clearly tarnished the U.S. image in the eyes of world opinion, U.S. Administration officials have moved to change their ways. The change, however, has not been in the attitude to the issue as such but purely cosmetic, mostly in terms of re-phasing and covering up true intentions.

This has been borne out by the U.S. President's remarks to the U.N. General Assembly session. "Just as eliminating all nuclear weapons is our long-term goal, so too is a total ban on nuclear testing," he said there. But while making that declaration, the TIMES newspaper noted, Ronald Reagan also warned that the world should for the time being rely on nuclear weapons.

Commenting on his speech, the Western mass media conceded that the U.S. President had not offered anything new that could help iron out the substantial differences in approaches to the overriding issue of disarmament — and making headway towards this goal.

Awareness is growing in this world that the very U.S. refusal to end nuclear weapons testing gives the lie to the U.S. Administration's obviously image-building claim that the United States seeks to deliver mankind from nuclear weapons.

No Account of 'Mutual Interests'

LD231952 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1640 GMT 23 Sep 86

[From the "International Diary" program presented by Konstantin Patsyuk]

[Excerpts] Hello comrades! The 41st session of the UN General Assembly is continuing its work in New York. [passage omitted]

U.S. President Reagan stated in his speech that the American Administration is "seriously and carefully" studying the personal message from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central committee. He also appealed for a continuation of the peace dialogue. But these words and appeals were not supported by any new outlook, or the sort of political thinking that would take account of the mutual interests of the sides and the principles of their security and equality in solving important international problems — particularly disarmament.

Thus, the President spoke in favor of the sort of reductions in strategic offensive weapons which would clearly place the Soviet Union in an unfavorable position, and he again pressed for the continuation of the program of preparations for star wars. It is revealing that in speaking about nuclear weapons tests he did not even mention the unilateral Soviet moratorium on these tests, and he let it be understood that the United States intends to continue nuclear explosions in the foreseeable future. So the appeal for a peace dialogue remained just an appeal, the more so as it was accompanied by anti-Soviet attacks in connection with the "Daniloff affair". But this affair is being used by Washington clearly in order to poison the atmosphere of Soviet-American relations. There is no need to try and prove that this is only advantageous to those who oppose the normalization of these relations and detente.

### Call for Missile Cuts Hit

PM231645 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Sep 86 First Edition p 5

[Special correspondents N. Prozhogin and V. Sukhoy report: "Burning Problems. Opening of the General Political Debate at the UN General Assembly Session"]

[Excerpt] New York, 23 Sep -- Following the completion of the special session on Namibia, the 41st UN General Assembly Session began the general political debate.

The morning plenary session opened with a speech by King Juan Carlos I of Spain. In his speech, he expressed in particular the hope that the establishment of dialogue and mutal trust in international relations will, in a relatively brief period, lead to a substantial reduction of nuclear arsenals, the termination of the arms race, a ban on chemical weapons, and significant progress in the sphere reducing conventional types of weapons.

The delegates were then due to hear the speech by U.S. President R. Reagan. We saw for ourselves the interest with which his speech was anticipated by representatives of the international community of nations. This interest was that much keener in view of the fact that the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference — coupled with the talks held in an on the whole constructive spirit the other day between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, and the former's meeting with President Reagan — seemed to give ground for hope that U.S. policy would return to the channel of the accords reached at the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Geneva. Unfortunately, the U.S. President's speech to the UN General Assembly session delegates did not justify these hopes and caused disappointment among all who believe that the course of easing international tension has many still unutilized opportunities.

It was natural that R. Reagan could not fail to devote a significant portion of his speech to Soviet-U.S. relations. He declared that M.S. Gorbachev's personal message

"is being studied seriously and in depth" in Washington. Nevertheless, the way the President outlined in his speech the U.S. stance on specific problems affecting the vital interests not only of our two countries but also of the whole world testifies that, as before, Washington is counting on gaining unilateral advantages for the United States, and that people there have no intention of abandoning either the continuation of nuclear tests or the development [razrabtka] of the "star wars" program.

For example, the speaker insisted in particular on the reduction of land-based ballistic missiles, which, bearing in mind the difference in the structure of Soviet and U.S. strategic armaments is clearly aimed at placing our country in a disadvantageous position.

He did not utter a single word about the unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions, which is already in its second year, and, despite repeated calls by the UN General Assembly for the termination of nuclear tests, made it unambiguously clear that the United States intends to continue them in the future.

For the master of the White House, the termination of nuclear tests is just a "distant prospect." Ignoring the Soviet Union's readiness to embark on any forms of monitoring [kontrol] the moratorium's observance in the event it is joined by the United States, the President again — and as if the distant future were involved — spoke about the "elaboration of an agreement on verification [proverka] procedures." Moreover, it stems from his highly frank statements as regards the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" that the United States really needs nuclear tests in order to complete the "star wars" program.

The President's statements about a "readiness to take two steps in the direction of limiting nuclear tests" — "to move toward ratification of the treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and the treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes" — are difficult to assess as anything but an attempt to delude world public opinion. After all, having declared the U.S. intention "to discuss ways to implement a gradual parallel program for limiting and ultimately terminating nuclear tests" in conjunction with the SDI program, Reagan made it clear that the U.S. Administration intends first to complete the "star wars" program, deploy [razmestit] nuclear weapons in space, and only then discuss the question of banning nuclear tests.

The UN General Assembly delegates could not fail to have been disappointed by the U.S. President's anti-Soviet statements in connection with the so-called "Daniloff affair," accompanied by the now customary rhetoric here on the subject of "human rights." This was exactly how they also perceived the statements on regional problems which, for the United States, are confined to the struggle waged by the peoples of Aghanistan, Cambodia, Ethopia, Angola, and Nicaragua to gain their independence. [passage omitted on other delegate speeches]

/12858 CSO: 5200/1596 RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S VORONTSOV HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE ON REAGAN UN SPEECH

LD241908 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 24 Sep 86

["Special report" on 24 September Moscow press conference given by Yuliy Vorontsov, first deputy minister of foreign affairs, devoted to the speech by President Ronald Reagan at the 41st UN General Assembly session; "Special report" replaces scheduled "International Dairy" program].

[Excerpts] [Begin Recording] [Vorontsov] You all know that at the recently opened 41st session of the UN General Assembly a general discussion is in progress, with representatives of various countries making speeches in which they are giving accounts of their vision of the present situation in the world. There has been the address of Edvard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and also the President of the United States, Reagan, who delivered an extensive speech to the General Assembly. A general evaluation of this propaganda speech of the U.S. President has also been given at the General Assembly session in the address of Shevardnadze, minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union.

The President's speech this time was, once again, full of delusions, and predudice toward our country, distorting the reality and facts. Again this time the President was not able to move away from his stereotypes regarding the Soviet Union and its Thus our appeal for the necessity for the transition to new thinking, corresponding to the reality of the nuclear and space age, still remains valid. In the course of his address. The President of the United States deemed it permissible to violate the confidential character of the correspondence at the highest level, and gave a detailed account of the contents of his 25 July letter to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, with the obvious aim to embellish as much as possible the U.S. position on issues connected with nuclear and space weapons. He attempted to present some U.S. proposals, put forward in the course of the correspondence, as ideal recipes for the solution of problems that have arisen - at the talks on nuclear arms. However, the President did not say that before his message of 25 July that he had received a message from Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev of 19 June, which contained precise, clear and constructive proposals of the Soviet side concerning quite a full system of possible solutions of the basic aspects of the problem of security - concerning space, strategic offensive and medium-range nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, and chemical and conventional weapons.

At the same time, the President was apprised in this message of the broad range of measures elaborated afresh by us to intensify monitoring [kontrol] and strengthen confidence—building measures. the President's attention was also drawn at that time to the importance of the atmosphere taking shape around Soviet-U.S. relations.

In Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's messge, it was suggested to the President that the attention of both our countries should be focused on the following aras where, given mutual desire, progress could be achieved which might come to take the form of accords at a summit meeting. These areas are: space and strategic offensive weapons, medium-range missiles in Europe, and the halting of nuclear tests. Specific organizational measures were also proposed for developing such decisions. These would take the form of several working meetings to be held at the level of specialists, at the level of experts, to examine the problems in question on a strictly businesslike footing.

In his UN speech the President also failed to mention how the Soviet side had reacted to the U.S. approach set our in the President's message of 25 July. This omission should be made good. In his address to the UN Assembly, the U.S. president lauded the U.S. approach to the ABM Treaty. Yet it had already been pointed out to the President by us that the U.S. position merely takes the view that this treaty, which has no time limit attached, should exist for only another 5 to 7 years. In the meantime, according to the U.S. approach, work is to be done that would wreck the treaty. So what comes out of this is not forward progress but in fact the violation of what has already been agreed on. For our part, we suggested that any work in the sphere of space-based antimissile systems should be confined to the laboratories, and what do we hear in response? Praise heaped on star wars weapons, proposals to develop [razrabotka] space weapons and test them at testing sites, and the intention expressed to begin deploying in 5 to 7 years large-scale antimissile defense systems, and thereby cancel the ABM treaty.

The President was warned that we would not agree to this. In such an approach, presented as if new, we can see only a bypass channel for the achievement of miliatry superiority. We have already told the President that we do not intend to help the United States in their efforts to put weapons into space. We will do everything possible to nullify these efforts, to wreck them, and no one needs to have any doubt that we have all the means for this which, if necessary, we will use. The President was told that the Soviet Union is firmly behind the strengthening of the working of the ABM Treaty, and it is namely this consideration that underlies our position — that work should be confined to laboratories and that there should be strict observance of the ABM treaty for at least 15 years. In this case it would be possible, and this was proposed to the President, to agree on considerable reductions of strategic offensive weapons. We are ready, without delay, to do this, and by this it would be shown in practicethat neither of the sides is striving for military superiority.

In his address to the General Assembly, President Reagan could not bring himself to agree to the halting of all nuclear tests in the immediate future. Although he did not mince words that the full ban on nuclear tests is some kind of long-term goal of the United States, we have more than once expressed to the President our conviction that the issue of halting nuclear test can be solved. Monitoring of such a ban has long been no obstacle. This issue has to be solved radically, through a ban on all nuclear blasts. Keeping them within set limits or regulating them also constitutes the continuation of nuclear weapons tests, only political will is needed. This address, as well as the analysis of the U.S. positions at talks, brings us yet again to the thought that we have already expressed to President Reagan: Is the U.S. leadership at ready, and does it in fact want to seek an agreement that would lead to the halting of the arms race — to realistic disarmament? [end recording]

[Unidentified journalist] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, the fact that the President of the United States mentioned the Stockholm conference only fleetingly and sparingly draws attention to itself. What lies behind this modest response?

We also noticed that the President did not pay due tribute to the important work done in Stockholm by the representatives of 35 states. These included, moreover, representatives of the United States. We very highly value the success achieved in Stockholm, for various reasons. First, because it was demonstrated and proved in practice that representatives of 35 countries were able to arrive at an accord on some very complex issues related to armed forces, military preparations, and the military sphere. Unfortunately, the U.S. delegation did not always endeavor to attain accord or act constructively in a spirit of compromise. However, both the allies of the United States and other countries succeeded in persuading the United States not to block the attainment of accords in Stockholm. It was evidently this that elicited such a sparing response to the success in Stockholm in President Reagan's speech to the General Assembly.

This is a very important element. The attainment of the accord at a difficult time -at a time when movement has so far been very little on other questions concerning the limitation and reduction of armaments. An agreement has been attained on a group of important military questions, and it is an agreement among 35 countries. This is very

[Announcer] You have been listening to a press conference by Comrade Vorontsov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs, in connection with the speech by President Ronald Reagan of the United States at the 41st session of the UN General Assembly.

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#### SHEVARDNADZE ADDRESSES UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

LD232332 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1616 GMT 23 Sep 86

["Statement by Eduard A. Shevardnadze at the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly" -- TASS headline]

[Excerpts] New York September 23 TASS - Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of foreign affairs, made a statement today at the 41st Session of the UN General Assembly. He said: t anachat

Mr President, distinguished guests;

As we come to this high rostrum, we speak of our perception of the world. In this way, collective efforts produce a picture of present-day international realities. How do we see that picture today? At first glance, the period since the previous session of the General Assembly has not added bright colors to the panorama of our time. It has been marked by a number of factors which have aggravated old concerns. The arms race has not been halted; it is going ahead in a steep spiral. The danger of the arms race spreading to outer space has become more real. Dangerous hotbeds of armed conflict persist. Misery and poverty in many parts of the world are becoming more acute.

All this being so, we nevertheless believe that the International Year of Peace will go down in history with something more than just its symbols of peace. Let me draw your attention to the trends which enable us to speak of glimmers of light on the world's horizon. They should be seen by every one of us, for it strengthens the resolve to act even more vigorously. They should be seen by all peoples, who are tired of bearing the burden of fears and anxieties. They should be seen by the world, which is becoming an increasingly interrelated and indivisible whole and which might no longer withstand strains and destructions.

Hope awakens optimism. In the words of Mikhail Gorbachev, "Everywhere in the world there is a growing conviction in the minds of the people and in the political and public circles widely differing in their orientation and outlook that at stake is the survival of humanity and that the time has come for decisive and responsible action."

We see the glimmer of light in the fact that at the time crucial for mankind the people and an increasing number of governments are becoming aware of the need to adopt a new way of thinking in line with the realities of the nuclear and space age. The time is coming when considerations of groups, blocs or ideologies are beginning to give way to the understanding that peace is a supreme value. Only if peace is translated from declarations into practical action is there a chance for survival. The changing way of thinking is bringing this truth to the foreground. Groups of countries, the Nonaligned Movement, political parties, public organizations and anti-nuclear forces are putting forward promising ideas for ending the nuclear deadlock. A favourable background is emerging for developing a dialogue.

An exception to this trend is the policy pursued by the imperialist forces. This contrast, however, only emphasizes the general will for action, for concrete practical deeds.

It is becoming a practical reality that vast territories are being declared zones free from nuclear weapons. Democratic majorities decide on that through democratic procedures. Political leaders claiming that they are committed to democracy should become aware of the contradiction between their behavior and declared principles. Instead of building up and counting warheads, they should be counting the votes of those who call for the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

Unfortunately, in some countries the institutions of democracy are superseded by the immoral arithmetic of military superiority. But it is an indisputable fact that the call for action is no longer a voice crying in the wilderness. On the contrary, even in the wilderness of the Nevada desert calls are being heard for an end to nuclear testing. The Nevada explosions are now registered not only by us but also by U.S. scientists with their instruments installed near the Soviet city of Semipalatinsk. At the same time not a single seismograph in the world is registering nuclear explosions on our territory — not because of any loss of the instruments' sensitivity, but because of the Soviet Union responsiveness to the will of the world community.

In pursuing the foreign policy course proclaimed by the 27th CPSU Congress our country is taking specific, practical steps. Among them, the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions is one of the most substantial. This is precisely the kind of action that proves the sincerity of our intentions and the seriousness of our concern for the future of the world. For over a year now there has been silence at Soviet test sites. Listen to it, it is very eloquent. If that silence were matched by silence at U.S. test sites, too, this would tell mankind better than any words that real movement is starting toward realizing the idea of a nuclear-free world.

Halting the tests means preventing the emergence of new types of nuclear weapons, blocking the way to the development of nuclear space weapons. We urge the United States to join us in this forward movement instead of asking us to go back to carrying out explosions, as it proposed here yesterday. A bilateral moratorium, followed by a multilateral one, is one of the most important links in a series of steps leading toward a comprehensive system of international peace and security.

Determined to make it a reality, the Soviet Union together with other socialist states has submitted for your consideration proposals to that effect. We are convinced that such a system encompassing the political, military, economic and humanitarian areas is in the interests of all states and peoples. The sponsors of the proposal do not claim to have discovered a hitherto unknown political "continent". If there are any blank areas today, they exist mainly in the sphere of concrete, practical deeds. Giving an impulse to and clearing the way for such deeds would be the greatest discovery. The proposed fundamental elements of security are in harmony with the principles of the UN Charter and are designed to facilitate their implementation in the specific conditions of our time. In this respect we are looking forward to a most democratic and constructive debate, to collective creative efforts of all countries.

The idea of comprehensive security implies above all material guarantees of peace, political and international legal safeguards and the establishment of principles of civilized and respectful relations among states. A safe world is a world of law and order, in which there is strict compliance with the UN Charter and respect for all rules of international law, for human rights and freedoms. Our initiative contains an answer to the question of what should be done to save life on earth.

As we speak of this, the scenes of abandoned villages in the zone near the Chernobyl AES power plant stand before our eyes. For us, that accident has meant more than grief over our losses and compassion for its victims. It has heightened our concern for the future of the earth. Chernobyl was a tragic error of man working with peaceful atom. When the atoms of war are involved, there is certainly no guarantee against error. With 50,000 nuclear weapons existing in the world, we are living on borrowed time and nobody knows when the time will run out.

So what should be done? Should the game of nuclear roulette continue? But even now it is clear that sooner or later it could push us to collective suicide. There is only one way out while there is still time, before it is too late, to stop playing for insane stakes with no prospect of winning for anybody, to end once and for all this fateful deadly nuclear gambling.

The international community, the sole sovereign master of its destiny, is capable of doing this. No single nuclear power has the right to take decisions for all. The USSR forswears such a right. In is historic statement of January 15 the Soviet leader proposes a different way — scrapping all nuclear weapons. Here again, practice stands as the criterion. Political responsibility is the opposite of political arrogance. The problem of nuclear testing puts in sharp focus those two mutually exclusive approaches.

There are other facts as well. Look at what happened to the SALT I and SALT II treaties. They are being torn into shreds only because they allow no room for equipping the 131st bomber with cruise missiles. A total of 1,500 such missiles seemed not to be enough, so it was decided that twenty more were necessary.

The judgment of history is merciless in its verdicts. If political leaders fail to take timely and responsible decisions, history will not forgive it. History is giving us a chance for laying the foundations of a lasting peace. Of course, this is not a matter of passing yet another resolution. The United Nations must establish a system of values which gives the highest priority to practical actions. Let me emphasize that this is being staged by a nuclear power. We did not seek to acquire nuclear weapons but ever since the time when we were compelled to develop them we have always been looking for ways to limit, reduce and eliminate them. Although we are not last among the members in the "nuclear club" we propose that it be disbanded. Let there be no mistake — we are as proud a nation as any other. But we associate the prestige and dignity of a great power with equivalent security for all.

We are motivated by a sense of responsibility both to our own people and to other peoples. That is why we are willing to accept reasonable compromises and make realistic concessions in proposing reductions in strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles. This reflects the new approach to the realities of the nuclear and space age outlined most fully and comprehensively in Mikhail Gorbachev's report to he 27th Congress.

The sincerity of our intentions and the integrity of our position are on a par with our resolve to put an end to the dangerous drift of world affairs. We are putting so much emphasis on the renunciation of nuclear weapon tests because this is the touchstone of the sincerity declarations.

Yesterday we heard the U.S. President's statement. It is regrettable that the rostrum of the UN General Assembly was used in such a way. To respond point by point to that speech presents no problem. However, to enter into polemics would be to show a lack of respect for our audience. The subject under discussion is too serious to turn it into a grindstone for sharpening political wit. Time is too precious to spend it on refuting misconceptions and prejudices that distort reality and the fact.

Still, there is a need to address one key point, for it is of fundamental importance. I am referring to the attempt to provide a philosophic rationale for the assertion that new sophisticated technology of war is capable of reliably ensuring security. It is precisely such "philosophy" that caused the tidal wave of armaments, which has been growing year after year and is now threatening to crush the earth. There is but one path to security — to destroy existing weapons instead of replacing them with new ones. The technology of destruction must not be allowed to determine policy. One can imagine the sigh of relief that people would heave on hearing that in this year of peace the United States, too, has decided to stop nuclear testing. This is what they had been expecting from the U.S. President.

I have been authorized to state that the Soviet Union is prepared to sign at any time and in any place a treaty on a total prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. We are prepared to do so here at the United Nations, so that the entire world community could become part of this great act and a turning point in history is marked as a sign of respect for its will. Words not matched by deeds are a false value. But words supported by deeds are a country's gold reserve.

We urge those who make verbal pronouncements in favor of eliminating nuclear weapons to follow this up with practical deeds. Otherwise, whatever they say of the inhumanity of nuclear weapons is no more than a rhetorical mirage behind which there looms an altogether different policy.

Its proponents have a favorable argument, which is verification. But that argument increasingly resembles a worn-out curtain. Broadly speaking, there is no longer any problem of verification. Convinced that there is no trust without verification, the Soviet Union is open to any form or method of verification.

In our view, the summit conference of the nonaligned states in Harare has made very valuable recommendations in this respect. The United Nations could support the proposals of the Delhi Six — Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden—on monitoring compliance with the obligation not to carry out nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union will accept recommendations formulated under UN auspices. We agree with those states which believe that the question of whether mankind will live in a nuclear or a non-nuclear world must be decided by the entire world community, not by a small group of nuclear powers.

This fully applies to the future of outer space, for near-earth space is the common heritage of mankind and should be used for the benefit of all. If, however, weapons should appear there, this heritage would become a threat to all. Just two or three states having the status of military-space powers would dominate the rest of world. Is that what we want? Do we want a military-space vassalage to be established? This question is posed by the course of events, which may become tragic for the entire structure of international relations. Therefore we shall continue to work for protecting outer space from attempts to turn it into a military domain of one or two powers.

Today those designs are basing camouflaged with high-sounding pronouncements about a defensive program, which supposedly would once and for all do away with the threat of attack. One hears stirring and heart-moving stories about a vision which, when implemented, would free mankind from the fear of nuclear death. Evil designs are being passed for good intentions, and a sword for a shield. Let no one be misled by such talks. It serves to conceal an attack against the main pillar of stability — the ABM Treaty. The intention is to get the treaty out of the way within the timeframe of 7 years. Everything is carefully calculated here, for it is precisely in 7 years that they plan to prepare space weapons for deployment.

The question is, what for? Would it not be more sensible to work for an agreement on a complete elimination of nuclear missiles, whether strategic, medium-range or any other, as we are proposing? The answer is simple: Whatever is done to conceal it, the so-called defensive space shield is being developed for a first strike. The first strike may become the last one, and not just for the country which is attacked. Space weapons, like nuclear arms, do not recognize national boundaries, they do not chose whom to spare and whom to destroy. Under any circumstances they would threaten not one country or several countries, but the entire world. Therefore we consider it necessary to warn everyone if space is to remain peaceful, everyone must protect it. In this the United Nations, the only legitimate trustee of space peace, should make its voice heard.

We also request the United Nations' help in a matter of extreme importance — the elimination of chemical weapons. Encouraging progress has been achieved at the Geneva Conference. The historic goal of ridding the earth of chemical weapons is now closer to attainment. It could only be frustrated by the position of the United States, which is seeking to develop binary weapons. However, obstacles can be removed if political will is shown. This organization is quite capable of stimulating it.

A comprehensive system of international security has more than its nuclear, space or chemical dimensions. Securing implies the non-use of any force, including conventional armaments and armed forces. The Soviet Union calls for significantly reducing the level of military confrontation, above all between politico-military alliances. Radical proposals to that effect, based on the concept of reasonable sufficiency, have been made by the Warsaw Treaty member states. I shall say even more, we would generally not want our troops to be present anywhere beyond our national borders. This question is also open for discussion and it can be resolved in a context of growing confidence and implementation of measures of military detente.

This has already been started at the Stockholm forum. All of us, and not just the Europeans, can congratulate ourselves and each other on this triumph of reason and good will. It has given us something more than just a major agreement; it has demonstrated that when we all really want something we can do it. It has confirmed that the Helsinki process is successfully developing and has taken deep root in the European soil. It is now extremely important that the forthcoming meeting in Vienna should become yet another milestone in Europe's advance toward reliable security and improved cooperation.

The Asian and Pacific region should also be allowed to breathe quietly and steadily. Our ideas in this regard are incorporated in a concrete program of action outlined in Mikhail Gorbachev's address in Vladivostock. It is encouraging to us that this program has proved to be in harmony with the feelings of many states in the region.

We are realists and we do not draw inspiration from utopian ideas. At the end of the last century people envisioned the coming 20th century as the belle epoque. But reality has dashed their expectations. Today, on the threshold of the 21st century, the objective situation is such that it could become either the golden age of science or the age of nuclear permafrost. The material means already exist for either outcome. The question is which of them will be put to use.

The danger for the civilization is more than evident. Hence, the need for responsible concerted action to prevent the looming catastrophe. We have made our choice. The Soviet Union, and I quote Mikhail Gorbachev, will "continue to use every opportunity for productive dialogue, for progress towards arms limitation and reduction, as well as towards the settlement of regional conflicts and the development of international cooperation in all areas of importance."

We think that in our deliberations it is very important never to lose sight of the real scale of time and the world. The language that some politicians like to use makes that scale disappear in the fog of nebulous abstract concepts, as if what is involved is not the earth but some other, remote planet. Yet, it is the earth that we see before us in the images of our children and grandchildren, fathers and mothers, sisters and brothers, of all those who are close and dear to us and with whom each of us identifies the concepts of nation, country, and mankind. This is the only acceptable yardstick. One should not set his political telescopes as if his sole interest is whether there is life on Mars. All of us will have to answer one question, equally important to everyone whether there will be life on earth. We would very much like to answer confidently — Yes, there will be!

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SOVIET JOURNAL ON U.S., SOVIET NUCLEAR WINTER RESEARCH

Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 6, Jun 86 (signed to press 13 May 86) pp 77-82

[Yu. Fedorov comment: "'Nuclear Winter' and the Nuclear Policy of the United States"]

[Text] The results of scientific research which markedly expanded and deepened the ideas about the disastrous global consequences of a thermonuclear conflict were published in the first half of the 1980's. Grim climatic changes, which came to be called "nuclear winter," which it would cause were predicted, inter alia.

Scientists' increased attention to such problems in recent years is no accident. It has been brought about by the dangerous turn in world politics which occurred at the start of the 1980's through the fault of imperialist reaction, the unleashing of a new twist of the arms race spiral and the spurring of militarist hysteria. Matters went so far as certain high-ranking figures in Washington declaring at the start of the present decade the possibility and expediency even of the unleashing of "limited" and, in addition, "protracted" nuclear wars. Acute public disquiet is also being caused by the avowed focus of the United States' present military programs toward preparation for such wars in the hope of winning them.

The growth of the military threat has posed particularly strongly the question: what will become of civilization, mankind and life itself on our planet in the event of a nuclear conflagration? The works of physicists, medical people, biologists and climatologists have confirmed most convincingly the fundamental political axiom of the present day—a thermonuclear cataclysm must be averted, and nuclear weapons removed forever. "There can be no winners in a nuclear war," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized. "...It is time to draw the practical conclusion from this—halting the nuclear arms race."\* Discovery of the "nuclear winter" phenomenon testifies yet again that the sole result of a thermonuclear confrontation would be the collapse of man's material and spiritual culture and, possibly, the end of everything living on Earth even.

<sup>\*</sup> M.S. Gorbachev, "Selected Speeches and Articles," Moscow, 1985, p 326.

Ascertainment of the diverse destructive factors of nuclear explosions and study of their impact on the human organism and the environment began practically from the very moment when American atom bombs destroyed two Japanese cities—Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The possible consequences of both the isolated and large—scale use of nuclear weapons against individual cities and whole countries began to be determined. The results of such studies serve as a most serious warning to mankind. In particular, it is shown convincingly that in the course of a general thermonuclear war with a total yield of the warheads used of 10,000 megatons there would be approximately 2.245 billion casualties, half of whom would perish in the very first hours and days of the conflict.\*

However, additional data have been obtained in the past several years testifying that these mind-boggling figures should be substantially increased. It has been ascertained, for example, that a thermonuclear conflict would lead to a climatic catastrophe of a global scale, which, in turn, would have grim socioeconomic consequences. Working independently of each other, Soviet and American scientists have shown that it would be followed by a "nuclear winter"——a profound and comparatively prolonged lowering of the temperature of the earth's surface. In the Soviet Union the corresponding work has been performed under the leadership of Academician N.N. Moiseyev, in the United States by a group of scientists headed by the well-known astrophysicist C. Sagan. It is important that the conclusions of the Soviet and American scientists who predicted a "nuclear winter" practically coincided, although they worked with different models.

The mechanism of the formation of the "nuclear winter" phenomenon is basically quite simple. The air temperature on the earth's surface is ultimately determined by the amount of solar radiation which gets through to it. The latter, however, depends, in particular, on the transparency of the atmosphere. Nuclear explosions would lead to its heavy pollution with dust, soot, fly ash and so forth. Such tiny, suspended particles absorb solar rays. This causes a complex chain of physico-chemical and geophysical processes and ultimately a drop in temperature in the lower layers of the atmosphere.

Climatologists drew attention to the possibility of such phenomena long since. Thus a certain lowering of the earth's temperature has been observed following the eruptions of large volcanoes accompanied by the release of large masses of dust. However, quantitative estimates of such processes have become reliable only recently as a result of the creation of powerful computers and models developed in detail making it possible to obtain important descriptions of the state of the atmosphere and its dynamics.

The main sources of atmospheric pollution in the event of a nuclear war will be upper-air discharges of soil particles, the smoke of forest fires and also, which is the most important, soot and fly ash from burned cities. In order to determine the extent of such pollution and, consequently, its repercussions it was necessary to analyze various nuclear war "scenarios" distinguished from one another by the total yield of the weapons used and the correlation of the targets hit (cities, most important industrial facilities, armed forces and so forth).

<sup>\*</sup> Ye.I. Chazov, L.A. Ilin, A.K. Guskova, "Nuclear War: Medical-Biological Consequences. Viewpoint of Soviet Medical Practitioners," Moscow, 1984, p 108.

It is understandable, of course, that the scale and nature of atmospheric pollution in the event of a nuclear war would largely depend on the total yield of the weapons used and on what part thereof was targeted against cities and how much exploded on the earth's surface.

A "scenario" involving a total yield of the nuclear explosions of 5,000 megatons was examined as the "base" version selected by the American scientists for study of the climatic consequences of a nuclear war. It was assumed that they would all occur in the Northern Hemisphere and that approximately 60 percent of the explosions would be ground explosions and, furthermore, that approximately 20 percent of the weapons would be geared to the destruction of cities and industrial facilities and that there would have to be roughly 10,500 of them in such a conflict.\* In other words, a comparatively small proportion of the present thermonuclear potential (at the start of the 1980's there were approximately 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world with a total yield of roughly 15,000 megatons)\*\* would be expended in a conflict of the given scale.

However, the climatic consequences of a conflict of such a scale would be catastrophic in the full meaning of the word. Calculations have shown that the mean annual temperature of the earth's surface in the Northern Hemisphere would begin to drop rapidly and would within roughly a month fall to 22-23 degrees of frost on the Celsius scale. We would recall that its customary level is approximately 13 Centigrade, and the maximum deviations throughout the past millennium have not exceeded 1 Centigrade. Such a profound drop in temperature would not be very prolonged. In 3 months it would rise to 0 Centigrade and in 12-18 months, scientists believe, would be close to its customary level.\*\*\*

In the event of the total yield of the weapons exploded in the course of a thermonuclear war amounting to 10,000 megatons (roughly two-thirds of the nuclear weapons stockpiled today), the mean annual temperature of the earth's surface in the Northern Hemisphere would drop to 45 degrees of frost Celsius, and the period of its recovery would last several years.\*\*\*\*

Most surprising, but extremely important is the fact that even a comparatively small nuclear conflict would lead to most serious climatic changes. The results of the American specialists' research testify that in the event of the total yield of the attacks against urban and industrial centers constituting only 100 megatons, the mean annual temperature of the earth's surface in the Northern Hemisphere would drop to 20 degrees of frost Celsius. The period of its recovery to the normal level would be somewhat briefer than in the preceding versions. It would last 3-4 months. However, the consequences would be extremely dire, nonetheless. Soviet scientists' calculations also showed that in terms of climatic effect a nuclear conflict of such a scale would be very close to the "base" version, although the optical density of the atmosphere in this case would increase not by a factor of 7 but "only" by a factor of 3. But even this would prove sufficient for several months of "nuclear winter"--just as cruel as

<sup>\*</sup> FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1983/84, p 265.

\*\* See V.F. Petrovskiy, "The Soviet Concept of Disarmament," Moscow, 1983, p 447.

\*\*\* See FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1983/84, p 266.

\*\*\*\* Ibid., p 266.

Destruction of the most important heavily protected military targets, primarily strategic missile launch complexes, command posts, communications centers and so forth, is most effective given ground explosions of nuclear ammunition. However, as the specialists emphasize, the closer to the earth's surface the explosion, the greater the amount of affected soil and fine dust which is discharged into the atmosphere, to great altitudes included, where they are scattered great distances. Given ground explosions, G.S. Golitsyn, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, emphasizes, "billions of tons of soil will be discharged into the atmosphere, a considerable proportion of which in the form of fine dust could reach the stratosphere. Given any explosion, a mushroom-shaped cloud will rise to the stratosphere, occupying a range of altitudes from 10-15 to 30-40 km, depending on the power of the weapons."\* The transparency of the atmosphere will naturally diminish.

The discharge of dust, however, is by no means the most essential factor of A particular role here is atmospheric pollution in the event of a nuclear war. performed by the so-called obscure products of combustion which form as a result of mass urban conflagrations caused by strikes at civilian and industrial targets. P. (Kruttsen), director of the M. Planck Institute (FRG), who was the first to call attention to this, termed them a "firestorm." In his opinion, which is now shared by many authoritative specialists, the high-rise nature and certain other singularities of modern urban development would lead to a powerful suction of air into the combustion zone, which would create the conditions for a self-sustaining reaction with a constant rise in temperature. Meanwhile in large modern cities there is a huge quantity of combustible materials (reserves of oil and other fuel, plastics, a variety of industrial semimanufactures and so forth). From 10 to 40 grams thereof are concentrated per square centimeter of urban area.\*\* It follows from P. (Kruttsen's) calculations that if a "firestorm" destroys a city whose population runs to several million persons, the transparency of the atmosphere will diminish over a quite large area by a factor of 10 million, \*\*\* that is, to practically zero.

Both scientists and many top military theorists believe that under real conditions it will be impossible to draw the line between strikes at military and civilian targets here. Military and military-industrial facilities, particularly in Europe, are often located either in cities or close to them. And conducting a nuclear war according to some predetermined rules precluding, for example, strikes against cities is altogether simply inconceivable. Such "scenarios" appear convincing only in the studies of the Pentagon's armchair strategists. In practice, however, if the nuclear storm originates anywhere, it will sweep over the expanses of the planet, making no distinction between ICBM launch pads and purely peaceful buildings.

Finally, nuclear attacks will inevitably lead to the severest forest fires, which will additionally discharge into the lower layers of the atmosphere a huge amount of cinders, ashes and so forth. According to G.S. Golitsyn's calculations, the total area of such conflagrations could, according to the most modest estimates, amount to 1 million square kilometers.\*\*\*\*

<sup>\*</sup> VESTNIK AN SSSR No 9, 1983, p 57.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Ibid., No 11, 1984, p 57.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Ibid.

<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup> VESTNIK AN SSSR No 9, 1983, p 59.

following the use of a substantial (up to one-third) proportion of stockpiled thermonuclear weapons.\*

The scientists analyzed other possible versions of the development of events also. "The most striking and unexpected result of our research," C. Sagan wrote, "is the fact that even a comparatively small nuclear war would have devastating climatic consequences.... There are indications of the existence of some threshold the crossing of which will lead to severe climatic changes. This threshold could be crossed given several hundred nuclear strikes at cities causing the formation of smoke or 2,000-3,000 explosions on the earth's surface, close to missile silos, for example, which would lead to the discharge of dust and secondary fires."\*\* We would recall for comparison that a single American Ohio-class nuclear submarine is armed with 192 weapons with a total yield of almost 20 megatons.\*\*\* In other words, a missile firing of five such submarines would plunge the world into the darkness and cold of a "nuclear winter".

The effect of a "nuclear winter" predicted by scientists poses a new to a large extent the question of the medical, biological and socioeconomic consequences of a thermonuclear conflict.

In particular, the scientists call attention to the extremely dire situation which would take shape in the part of the planet not directly affected by the nuclear strikes, particularly in zones with a comparatively mild climate. Thus a "nuclear winter" is fraught with the danger of mass and severe starvation. Strong frosts could devastate practically all harvests of food crops and also, obviously, agricultural animals. There would be an acute shortage of drinking water since the soil would freeze to roughly I meter in depth. As a result even of "very limited" nuclear wars, the American scientists point out, "the drop in temperature itself would destroy the production of grain crops in the United States even if civic systems and agricultural technology remains unaffected" in the course of the conflict.\*\*\*\*

The frosts of a "nuclear winter" would cause the most serious difficulties in the operation of transport systems, and possibly paralyze them completely. This would lead to the supply of food, fuel and energy resources becoming an extremely complex and, perhaps, insoluble problem. Polar cold would be combined with the incidence of lethal radioactive fallout carried from the areas of the military operations, practically total darkness and subsequently a considerable increase in ultraviolet radiation as a result of the collapse of the planet's ozone layer.

Thus death from starvation, cold, lack of drinking water and radiation sickness—such would be the lot of the overwhelming majority of the population even of the countries in the Northern Hemisphere whose territory would not be hit by thermonuclear attack.

The situation of the survivors of a thermonuclear war living in states located in the zone of military operations would be virtually hopeless. The very severe frosts of the "nuclear winter" would descend on them under conditions where

<sup>\*</sup> See VESTNIK AN SSR No 11, 1984, p 73.

<sup>\*\*</sup> FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1983/84, p 267.

<sup>\*\*\* &</sup>quot;World Armaments and Disarmament. SIPRI Yearbook," London, 1983, pp 48, 53. \*\*\*\* FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1983/84, p 270.

densely populated areas would have been incinerated by radioactive fallout and various chemical toxins and transport, communications, power engineering and practically all other systems catering for the population's existence (health care, sewerage, food supply) would have been completely or almost completely put out of action. The casualties of the "nuclear winter" would be primarily tens, if not hundreds, of millions of wounded, roasted by the fires, affected by radiation and poisoned by the pyrotoxins, poisonous semimanufactures and effluent of demolished enterprises. And somewhat later the majority of those who managed to escape death in the first weeks following the start of the war would die from starvation and cold.

Computer calculations made by Soviet scientists showed that the "nuclear winter" would not bypass the southern part of the planet either, although would arrive somewhat later compared with the Northern Hemisphere. The heavy atmospheric pollution in the northern zone could bring about changes in the global circulation of air flows, which would lead to the transfer of the black cloud southward. As a result the temperature in the Southern Hemisphere would be almost comparable with that in the North.\*

The consequences of the severe frosts for countries in the Southern Hemisphere would be no less but more dire even. The weakness and vulnerability of the national economic infrastructure, the preponderance of the rural population, the great dependence on food imports, the absence in the tropical zone of developed heating systems and a whole number of other factors would lead to the death of the majority of inhabitants of the southern half of the planet, even if the present forecasts of a drop in temperature prove, as some specialists believe, somewhat overstated.

The majority of scientists agree with the "nuclear winter" theory. However, some Western specialists linked to military-industrial circles are attempting to refute it and persuade public opinion that a thermonuclear conflict would not lead to a global climatic catastrophe. They often refer here to the fact that the superpowerful volcanic eruptions which have occurred in the past accompanied by a discharge into the atmosphere of large amounts of ashes and smoke did not lead to a pronounced drop in temperature, although their power amounted to several thousand megatons.

This formulation of the question is faulty from the very outset. The impact on the climate, including the air temperature near the earth's surface, is determined in such cases not by the power of the explosion as such but the amount of dust, soot and so forth released into the atmosphere, that is, by the impact on the optical density of the air over large distances. As already mentioned, particularly dangerous in this respect are the conflagrations of cities, in which a vast quantity of materials producing "obscure products of combustion" are concentrated.

II

In the past decade even many scientists studying global problems of the present day posed with all seriousness the question of the fact that the impact of increasingly large-scale human activity, military particularly, on the natural

<sup>\*</sup> VESTNIK AN SSSR No 11, 1984, p 710.

environment had approached limits the crossing of which would lead to farreaching negative changes in the complex system of the planet's natural mechanisms and perhaps even bring about ecological catastrophe.

An understanding of the fact that even a relatively insignificant nuclear conflict is fraught with the danger of the death of civilization lends particular importance to the exclusion of wars from the life of mankind and the establishment everywhere in international relations of a new political practice and new political thinking based on the idea of peaceful coexistence and puts the problem of mankind's survival at the center of world politics.

Revelation of the global climatic consequences of a thermonuclear conflict in which only a comparatively negligible part of the nuclear weapons stockpiled today is used poses many questions of paramount importance. Objective scientific research shows, for example, that an attempt to launch a so-called first "disarming and decapitating" strike would be disastrous for the aggressor even if he did not experience the gravity of a retaliatory strike. The severe frosts of the "nuclear winter" paralyzing the economy and destroying harvests would be a kind of boomerang hitting whoever in a fit of militarist madness unleashed a thermonuclear war. "A major first strike," C. Sagan writes, "could be an act of national suicide, even if retribution does not follow."\*

Thus scientists of world renown, American included, have demonstrated convincingly that the "limited" nuclear wars concept, which occupies a large place in the Pentagon's strategic developments, is not only exceptionally dangerous for mankind but loses any military-political meaning altogether. A "limited" nuclear conflict, not to mention a "total" exchange of thermonuclear strikes, simply cannot merely by virtue of its geographical and economic consequences be an instrument for the achievement of political or military goals.

Discovery of the "nuclear winter" phenomenon testifies with all certainty that removal of the military threat and an end to the arms race are the most urgent and truly paramount tasks for all countries and peoples, in whatever corner of the planet they are situated.

An event of truly historic scale was the program for nuclear disarmament by the year 2000 set forth in the statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on 15 January 1986. Never before has mankind been offered such a bold, wide-ranging, detailed and multifaceted set of measures whose realization could remove for all time the threat of nuclear destruction, including the prospect of a climatic cataclysm. The statement not only names the ultimate goals but also determines the temporal stages of their achievement and proposes constructive and realistic solutions of many complex problems of a reduction in military potentials taking into consideration the security interests of both the nuclear and nonnuclear states.

Considering it impossible to overlook even the slightest chance of progressing toward a more stable and stronger peace, the Soviet leadership is endeavoring by force of example and arguments to break with the dangerous course of events and develop political dialogue. Such a policy made possible the Soviet-American top-level meeting in Geneva in November 1985, which was a most important political

<sup>\*</sup> FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Winter 1983/84, p 292.

event of international life. A fundamentally important result of the meeting was the fact that the leaders of the USSR and the United States declared in a joint document that nuclear war must not be unleashed, emphasized the importance of the prevention of any war—nuclear or conventional—between the USSR and the United States and undertook not to aspire to achieve military superiority. The top—level meeting initiated a dialogue for the purpose of achieving changes for the better in Soviet—American relations and in the world at large.

However, the policy of the leadership of the United States and a number of its NATO allies is taking shape largely under the influence of circles who are unwilling to come to terms with objective realities. They are characterized by, in particular, an orientation toward power confrontation as far as nuclear brinkmanship and an endeavor to achieve military superiority.

The security concept which has been adopted today in the United States does not take account of the interests of other states, primarily the USSR. It proceeds from the fact that S&T "breakthroughs" and use of the achievements of the most modern technology for military purposes will sooner or later extricate the United States from the "nuclear deadlock" and secure for it the predominant positions in the system of international relations. Such a policy, which gives rise to the nuclear arms race, is today the main source of the military danger. Serious disquiet is caused by the fact that the reckless military-political goals of militarist circles are being underpinned by the creation of increasingly new arms specially intended for their realization.

The U.S. Administration's endeavor to develop effective ABM systems and create a new class of weapons—strike space—based arms—represents a particular threat. Implementation of these plans will initiate a new round of the arms race and spur it on in all areas. The ABM Treaty and the agreements limiting strategic arms—mechanisms limiting the military confrontation—will be jeopardized. The danger of a war being unleashed and, consequently, the likelihood of climatic catas—trophe is growing.

The strategic thinking predominant currently in U.S. military-political circles largely determined their reaction to the discovery of the "nuclear winter" phenomenon. Statements concerning the need for the development of means of warfare specially intended for operations under low temperature conditions and the heavy dust content of the atmosphere ensued. Thus J. Gertler, an employee of the Rand Corporation, expressed concern that the discharge into the atmosphere of soot, fly ash and dust and also the mass conflagrations might, apart from all else, disable or "blind" reconnaissance satellites, ABM system sensors and so forth. "We will probably have to develop alternative means of gathering intelligence information,"\* he declared.

Some American military theorists are attempting to persuade public opinion and political circles that the discovery of the "nuclear winter" phenomenon dictates the need for the development and urgent adoption of binary chemical ammunition, superpowerful types of conventional arms and a buildup of general forces. The leitmotiv of their arguments is fundamentally primitive: if nuclear war is impossible, we need to prepare urgently for conventional or chemical warfare.

<sup>\*</sup> J.J. Gertler, "Some Policy Implications of Nuclear Winter," January 1985, p 13.

Such recommendations are nothing other than a cynical attempt to adapt to modern conditions military-political concepts which long since came into conflict with the very course of historical development and the trend toward states' interdependence, which is blazing a trail for itself increasingly manifestly.

Responding to the appeal of the American Union of Concerned Scientists, M.S. Gorbachev emphasized: "What is needed now more than ever is a farsighted policy based on an understanding of realities and the dangers which we will inevitably encounter tomorrow if today those who can and must adopt the sole correct decision shirk their responsibility."\*

The "nuclear winter" concept broadens appreciably the scientific understanding of the realities and dangers of the modern world and confirms the urgent need for restraint and responsibility in policy and a renunciation of "power" dogmas and stereotypes. The results of the research of scientists of the most varied disciplines emphasize once again that the national security of any state—from the biggest and most powerful to the smallest—may be ensured only on the paths of a strengthening of security and the general promotion of equal security for all.

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<sup>\*</sup> M.S. Gorbachev, Op.cit., p 187.